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OPEN HOUSING MEETS MY OLD KENTUCKY HOME: A
STUDY OF OPEN HOUSING WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION
TO IMPLICATIONS FOR KENTUCKY
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education' in 1954, the civil rights movement in the United States
has precipitated a growing awareness on the part of the general
public that we live in an era of immediacy. Minority groups,
Negroes in particular,2 have attempted to impress upon the gov-
erning power structures that "second-class citizenship" will no
longer be tolerated. "Freedom now!" is the-demand.
The reactions of various governmental units to this con-
temporary militancy have ranged from total suppression3 to full
cooperation and implementation.4 The latter has taken shape in
both statutory and case law attempting to afford "freedom now"
in such areas as public accommodations,5 employment,6 education,7
and voter participation.8 -
Another area, thought by some to be the most important, has
become the focal point of the new militancy. This is the area of
housing.9 Housing is of crucial concern to modem man:
The planning of human shelter was a relatively simple matter
in the days' of the cave man. Not so today. The complexity of
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Negroes comprise the largest segment of our non-white population, see text
at note 38 infra, and seem to be the most militant minority group.3 An excellent example of this may be found in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958).
4 The examples of this are numerous as the survey of laws in other juris-'
dictions will show. See Appendix I & II infra. The statutes cited in notes 5-8 infra
are also examples of governmental cooperation and implementation. In Kentucky,
see the Civil Rights Act of 1966, Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 344 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as KRS].
542 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).642 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2-2000e-15 (1964).
7 The foremost example of this is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). See also, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000c-9 (1964).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1965).
9 See RAIKrN & GRICSBY, THE DEmAD FOR HousING IN RAcIALLY MXEm
AREAs IX (1960). -
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our society and the tremendous advances in science, not only
permit, but also require, man's shelter to be much more than
protection against the elements. It must satisfy his economic,
social and psychological needs as well."'
Many feel that the housing discrimination which exists frus-
trates the economic, social, and psychological needs of the Ameri-
can Negro. Open housing legislation is viewed as a means of elimi-
nating housing discrimination and its accompanying ills. A dia-
logue concerning open housing laws exists on a nationwide basis,
with one of the primary focal points of this dialogue being the
State of Kentucky in general, and the City of Louisville in parti-
cular. A brief review of developments in Kentucky and Louisville
will help set the stage for a detailed discussion of open housing in
Kentucky.
In 1962, the Louisville Human Relations Commission was
established to promote improvement of inter-racial relations and
the elimination of discriminatory practices; its powers were
limited to investigation, conciliation, and the submission of
recommendations to the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen." In
1963, an ordinance was passed prohibiting racial discrimination
in places of public accommodation and providing for fines of up
to one hundred dollars for each violation. Three or more con-
victions shall, if the Commission so finds, constitute a public
nuisance. Upon such finding, the Commission refers the matter
to the Director of Law who then applies for appropriate in-
junctive relief.'2 In 1965, an equal employment ordinance was
passed, providing fines of up to one hundred dollars for each
violation. 3
Louisville entered the housing field in 1965, when the Board
of Aldermen adopted a "Declaration of Principles of Freedom
of Choice of Residence." It provided a system for hearing com-
plaints of discrimination in violation of principles set by local
professional organizations of builders, real estate dealers, and
financiers. The ordinance states in part: "Every family shall
have full freedom to establish its home in a neighborhood of its
choice, restricted only by a family's financial resources and the
10 BEYER, HousING: A FACTuAL ANALYSIS vii (1958).
11 Ordinance 33, Series 1962, March 28, 1962.
12 Ordinance 66, Series 1963, May 15, 1963.
13 Ordinance 23. Series 1965, February 10, 1965.
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availability of such property by a willing seller."'14 It does not
provide for either subpoena powers or punitive action of any
kind; instead, reliance is placed upon negotiation and persuasion
by a seven-member panel. 15
The Louisville-Jefferson County Human Relations Commis-
sion and various civil rights groups began a campaign for an
ordinance with some "teeth" in 1966. This effort culminated in
a Commission-drawn ordinance being submitted to the Board of
Aldermen in the early part of 1967. The proposed ordinance
prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental of virtually all
housing and contained fines from $100 to $500 and/or up to
thirty days in jail for each violation.'6 Opposition immediately
arose over the penalty provisions, and subsequently a revised
proposal was submitted which exempted the direct sale of a resi-
dence by an individual private owner without the services of a
real estate broker or salesman. In addition, enforcement pro-
ceedings in Jefferson Circuit Court were substituted for the
penalty provisions. 17  After amending the proposal to include
changes offered by Mayor Kenneth Schmied, the aldermen de-
feated the bill by a nine-three vote on April 11. s18 This rebuff
touched off marches and demonstrations by open housing
backers. 9
On April 14, at the City's request, Jefferson Circuit Judge
Marvin J. Sternberg issued a restraining order allowing marches
only during daylight hours, exclusive of the rush hours (7-9 A.M.
and 4-6 P.M.). The order also limited the number of marchers
14 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 13, 1966, § E, at 1, col. 3.
15 Id.
16 Louisville Courier-Journal, February 2, 1967, § A, at 17, col. 1. The pro-
posed ordinance covered the sale, rental, lease or financing of real property. It
exempted the rental of housing accommodations in a two-family dwelling if the
owner or some of his relatives lived in one of the two apartments and the rental
of rooms in one's home. Religious institutions were also exempted from the pro-
hibition against religious discrimination. The Commission could initiate complaints,
issue cease and desist orders, and initiate civil action in the circuit court.
If the property was sold during the Commission's investigation, the Commission
could go to the city or county attorney for initiation of criminal action in police
or Quarterly Court. Fines and imprisonment were also provided.
17 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 2, 1967, § A, at 17, col. 1.
18 Louisville Courier-Journal, April 12, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 5. In a prepared
statement, the majority of the aldermen announced the rejection of the ordinance
because of the demonstrations which they felt were planned by outside agitators
for the purpose of fomenting widespread disorder. They further stipulated that no
further action should be taken "until our community regains its composure and




to no more than one hundred and fifty and prohibited the demon-
strators from interfering with traffic. In addition, the police were
to receive written notice at least twelve hours in advance of the
time and route of any march, the number of participants, and the
names of the organizers. 20  Open defiance of the order resulted
immediately, and several arrests were made.2' Court battles en-
sued,22 and the slogan of many open housing proponents became
2 0 Louisville Courier-Journal, April 15, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 1.
21 At least fifteen arrests were made the same night that the order was made.
Louisville Courier-Journal, April 15, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 1. This was followed by
forty-six arrests the next evening. Louisville Courier-Journal, April 16, 1967, § A,
at 1, col. 1.
22Three important contests developed. The first began with a petition filed
in federal district court seeking removal of the case involving violation of the
order against night marches from Jefferson Circuit Court to the federal district
court. The federal judge ruled in favor of the city and returned the case to the
circuit court on the grounds that the defendants had failed to show that they
were unable to receive fair treatment in the state court. Louisville Courier-Journal,
April 20, 1967, § A, at 1, col: 1.
The seeds of the second court battle were sown while the first contest was in
federal court. During this time, the Rev. A. D. Williams King and six other open
housing leaders were held in contempt of court for violating the order against night
marches and were sentenced to thirty-hour jail terms and thirty dollar fines.
Jailing of the seven was first postponed to permit them to attend a top-level
conference with city officials. They then appealed to the Kentucky Court of
Appeals; in a one-sentence denial which contained no reasoning, this court
refused to overturn the conviction. Finally, United States District Judge James
F. Gordon issued an order restraining Judge Sternberg from carrying out the
sentences pending a hearing. Defendants argued that Steinberg violated due
process by finding them in contempt during a two-day period when motions were
being heard by United States District Judge Henry Brooks. The state court,
they argued, had no authority to rule on the case while it was in federal court.
However, Judge Gordon refused to take jurisdiction in the complaint, pointing out
that the technicality was not of sufflcient seriousness to authorize him to inter-
fere with the state court's judgments. With all their legal remedies exhausted,
the seven paid their fines and served their sentences.
During this same time, the Rev. A. D. Williams King and eleven others
filed suit in federal district court against city and county officials; they alleged
that the laws and ordinances under which more than six hundred demon-
strators had been arrested were unconstitutional in that they violated the
defendants' rights of free speech, assembly, and petition. This complaint also
alleged that the ordinance and statutes fail to establish any ascertainable standard
of guilt and are susceptible of sweeping and improper application. (The laws in-
volved were parading without a permit, disorderly conduct, loitering, causing a
child to become delinquent, conspiracy, and criminal syndicalism.) On May 3,
two United States District Judges and one United States Circuit Judge were
named to hear the case. On May 10, open housing advocates and city and county
officials agreed in court before United States District Judge James F. Gordon to
several stop-gap measures until the three-judge federal panel could rule on the con-
stitutionality of the laws. The agreements were as follows: 1) cases of all demon-
strators scheduled for trial in police court would be continued until the federal
panel made a ruling; 2) the circuit court restraining order was amended to allow
marches until 8:30 P.M.; 3) one person would be designated grand marshal of
demonstrations but need not participate: 4) demonstrators would be entitled to a
parade permit from the city unless a federal court denied a permit; 5) public
officials could issue citations, make arrests, admit to bail an or prosecute all
persons believed by them to be in violation of ordinances and statutes, with final
(Continued on next page)
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"No Open Housing, No Derby." The pre-Kentucky Derby
Pegasus Parade was cancelled because of the potential disruption,23
but the race itself was run without interference, some one hundred
and forty demonstrators choosing instead to march on downtown
Fourth Street for about ninety minutes.24
The pressure by proponents and opponents of open housing
has continued with no foreseeable solution.25 If an ordinance is
finally passed, additional problems will probably arise. William
P. Snyder, President of the Louisville Real Estate Board, has said
that local realtors would seek a referendum on any open housing
law passed in Louisville. 26
The first open housing measure in Kentucky was passed by
Bardstown and Nelson Cointy jointly.27 A strong act, it is sub-
stantially the same as the first proposed Louisville ordinance in
that it covers virtually all housing and contains penalty pro-
visions.28
On June 1, 1967, Covington, the state's third largest city,
passed an open housing ordinance by a 3-2 vote of the city com-
mission.29 Although exempting sales by individual home owners,
(Footnote continued from preceding page) "
disposition of cases involving the ordinances and statutes in question to be
handled in the "normal course of events"; 6) if a dispute arose between the two
sides, it would be submitted informally to Judge Gordon.23 Louisville Courier-Journal, May 2, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 5.24 Louisville Courier-Journal, May 7, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 1. However, 1,156
Army and Air National Guardsmen, three times the usual number, and over
100 Kentucky State Policemen were on duty at the Derby. The rest of the 2,500-
man security force included city and county police and privately-hired watchmen.25 There have already been well over six hundred arrests, and the marches
are continuing. Louisville Courier-Journal, April 25, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 5.
26 Louisville Courier-Journal, ]an. 20, 1967, § A, at 21, col. 1.27 Bardstown, Nelson County, Ky., joint Ordinance and Resolution of the
City of Bardstown and the County of Nelson, Kentucky, for the Prevention of
Discrimination and Creating a Bardstown-Nelson County Commission on Human
Rights and to Prevent Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation, Resort,
or Amusement, Emplo ,ment or Housing, June 14, 1966.
28Mr specificaly, it provides for the coverage of virtually a improved
and unipoed real estate, brokers, and financing, with the following exemptions:
1) th e of housing accommodations in a building which contains housing
accommodations for not more than two families living independently of each
other if the owner or a member of his family resides in one of the housing ac-
commodations; 2) the rental of a portion of a housing accommodation by the
occupant of the housing accommodation or by the owner if he or a member of
his family resides therein; 3) rental by a religious organization or a charitable or
educational institution connected with a religious organization. The Comnssion
can init iate complaints and issue cease and desist orders. If violation continues,
the Commission shall either file a complaint for enforcement in the Nelson Circuit
Court or certify the case and the entire record to the county attorney for prosecu-
tion. The law provides for fines up to $500 and/or up to thirty days in jail.29 Louisville Courier-Journal, June 2, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 3.
the measure covers other housing transactions quite thoroughly
and provides fines and jail sentences for offenders.30 While they
will probably not challenge the legality of the ordinance, local
realtors are attempting to influence September's primary in which
local offices will again be filled.31
In October, 1966, the Lexington Human Rights Commission
recommended, to both the city and county governments, an open
housing ordinance similar to the defeated Louisville ordinance.
In each instance the proposal was killed in committee.32 On
January 31, 1967, the Lexington-Fayette County Human Rights
Commission was formed and is now working on new proposals
for open housing legislation.33
30 Morspecificall, virtually all improved and unimproved real estate,
financing, and broadly-defined "salesmen" are covered, with the following exemp-
tions: 1) rental of a housing accommodation in a building which contains such
accommodations for not more than two families living independently of each
other, if the owner or a member of his family resides in one of the housing ac-
commoddtiors; 2) rental of a portion of a housing accommodation by the occupant
of the housing accommodation, or by the owner if he or a member of his family
resides therein; 3) a religious institution, or a charitable or educational organization
operated by a religious institution, if such discrimination is calculated to promote
the religious principles for which it is established or maintained; 4) the direct
rental or sale of a housing accommodation by the private individual owner himself
without assistance of any kind rendered by a salesman. The Commission can
initiate complaints and issue cease and desist orders. If any order is disobeyed,
the Commission shall either file a complaint for enforcement in the Kenton Circuit
Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 704 of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
or certify the case and the entire record of its proceedings to the City or County
Attorney for prosecution. Fines between $100 and $500 and/or imprisonment for
thirty days are provided. In addition, a broker's city occupational license can be
suspended for a period of not less than thirty days. Ordinance 0-43-67, June 1,
1967.
31 Louisville Courier-Journal, June 21, 1967, § B, at 1, col. 1. Kenton County,
which includes the city of Covington, also enacted an open housing ordinance.
See Appendix II, No. 17 infra.3 2Correspondence with the Lexington-Fayette County Human Rights Com-
mission, May 23, 1967.
33 Two measures have been drafted and are now in the revision process.
One proposal is aimed at the individual property owner in that, although sales by
him without assistance of a broker are exempted from coverage, he as owner is
subject to the enforcement provisions of the ordinance. The other prohibits dis-
crimination in commercial real estate transactions and limits enforcement pro-
ceedings to the broker in such cases.
Both measures exempt rentals on rooms in owner-occupied housing and in a
duplex in which one unit is owner-occupied, and also certain property owned,
leased, or rented by religious, charitable, and educational institutions and or-
ganizations. Likewise, neither provision allows for criminal prosecution; rather,
the Lexington-Fayette County Human Rights Commission, which has enforcement
powers, may go into circuit court and obtain an order of compliance. If this order
is disobeyed, the violator is subject to contempt proceedings. Louisville Courier-
Journal, June 28, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 5.
Other than a few peaceful demonstrations led by the Congress for Racial
Equality, there has been little public reaction to the proposals. After a meeting
(Continued on next page)
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The only other city to take any step in the housing field is
Hopkinsville, where in 1963, a fifteen-member Human Rela-
tions Commission was established "to promote and secure mutual
understanding and respect among all economic, social, religious,
ethnic and racial groups." The Commission is empowered to act
as conciliator in racial disputes, to make investigations of com-
plaints, and to submit recommendations for legislation to the
Mayor and city council. 34
In- April, 1967, Hopkinsville Mayor Alfred Naff, on the
recommendation of a citizen's advisory committee, appointed a
three-member committee to study the need for enactment of an
open housing law. On June 22, the local branch of the NAACP
and the Progressive Citizens Committee asked the Human Rela-
tions Commission to use its influence with real estate dealers,
home builders, landlords, lending institutions, and other groups
to obtain an open housing policy. However, no city legislative
action was requested.35
Thus, Kentucky has witnessed agitation, turmoil, and con-
structive work by responsible citizens, all stemming from the
open housing issue. Obviously, open housing is a crucial issue
on the state and local, as well as the national level. The purpose
of this article is to explore and consider the origins, extent, and
result of discrimination in the sale and rental of housing with
emphasis on the applicability, of the nationwide picture to the
special problems of Kentucky. In conjunction with this, the
article will point out various remedies which other governments
-federal, state, and local-have utilized. The constitutionality of
these remedies in Kentucky will be discussed, and conclusions
will be drawn, suggesting action necessary in the Commonwealth.
II. THE HOUSING PROBLEM
Open Housing legislation, by the plain meaning of the term,
indicates a concern for minority groups. Other government action,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
involving Fayette County judge Joe Johnson, Lexington Mayor Fred Fugazzi,
city commissioners, and representatives of the city-county commission, Judge
Johnson predicted passage of some open housing measure by both the city and
the county. Louisville Courier-Journal, June 80, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 2.
.14 Ordinance 24-68, July 16,-1963.
35 Louisville Courier-Journal, June 23, 1967, § B, at 1, col. 4.
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such as urban renewal or low income housing tends to focus on
the economically deprived, i.e., the purpose of those programs is
primarily to improve the living conditions of the poor, whether
that poor be white or Negro. The concern is with geographical
areas, not ethnic consideration; it is only incidental to these
projects if the group happens to be mostly white or mostly black.
In open housing (fair housing, forced housing, or whatever it
may be called), the primary legislative goal is the elimination of
racial considerations in the housing market. Such legislation com-
mands, in effect, that sellers or renters in the housing market may
not refuse to sell or rent to a willing buyer or renter for the sole
reason that he is of a particular racial or ethnic origin.
Since only thirteen per cent of the population of the United
States is non-white, 38 open housing legislation is designed to pro-
tect a relatively small portion of the total population. There are
housing problems for Puerto Ricans in New York, Nisei in San
Francisco, Chinese in both cities, Mexican-Americans in Houston,
and Indians in the Southwest, the Dakotas, North Carolina, Cali-
fornia, Montana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.37 However, while
thirteen per cent of the country's population in 1960 was non-
white, about ninety-two per cent of this group was Negro.38
Therefore any discussion of minority housing problems will
primarily refer to those problems vis-a-vis the Negro.
But to reflect on the Negro as a group is still to paint with
too broad a brush, because, while open housing concerns Negroes,
it would not affect all Negroes. Racial considerations do not
deprive all Negroes of better housing. Some Negroes, for example,
simply do not favor integration, although it is impossible to say
how many or why. There may be an ethnic desire on the part of
some Negroes to keep the races separate; 39 there may be fear of
the consequences of integration; 40 or there may be a kind of
optimism on the part of certain Negroes that
36 U.S. DEP'T OF CO anaacE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIE UNITED STATES
(1966).3 7 GLAZER & McENTiRE, STmDmS IN HOUSING AND MINORITY GROUPS (1960);
McENTRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE 12, 46-60 (1960).
38 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 36, at 24.
3 0 MEYERSON, TERRrrr, & WHEATON, HOUSING, PEOPLE, AND CITIES 75(1962).40 Lincoln, The Black Muslims, in MINORITY PROBLEMiS 220 (1965); see also
McENTrE, supra note 37, at 75.
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the next generation will be a little better off; and he will think
about making efforts toward that end, but he does not really
believe in his own capacity to live as a free equal, un-
segregated, undiscriminated-against American who can be
proud to be both a Negro and an American. Moreover, al-
though he wishfully believes that the next generation will be
better off, he does not devote his attention to preparing an
economic base and a historical or cultural image which are
the necessary foundations for the freedom of that next gen-
eration.41
This optimistic lassitude also tends to remove these Negroes from
the group which would be directly affected by an open housing
law.
Another, and possibly even more effective removal of Negroes
from the effects of open housing legislation is that caused by
economic deprivation. Many Negroes could not move out of
their resent housing into more costly quarters if they did so
desire. While non-white incomes have increased dramatically
in recent years, there are other factors which must be considered.
For example, the number of non-white families whose income
did not appreciably increase has continued to grow, so that there
are proportionally more poor families each year. This situation
will probably remain true no matter how much larger the Negro
middle class becomes. Moreover, the rapid rise of the Negro
middle class with increased wealth and income potential has been
matched by an even steeper upward trend in non-Negro wealth.42
In addition, the comparatively low income level of minority
groups, together with relatively unstable employment factors tends
to limit their ability to meet the usual credit requirements. In
short, non-whites have not improved their position with respect
to whites during the period from 1950 to the present. The
median earnings of non-white males in 1960 represented only
sixty-two per cent of the median white income, and had, in fact,
decreased one per cent between 1950 and 1960. Median incomes
for Negro females in the same period did increase, but still rep-
41 Butler, The Negro Self-Image, in MiNorry PROBLEMS 354, 357 (1965).
4 2 PETMrGREW, PRoFmE oF THE AMEUCAN NEGRO 188-92 (1964); Moynihan,




resented only seventy-two per cent of the median earnings of all
females.43
Other factors which tend to delimit the group being considered
are the educational and employment levels of Negroes. The 1960
census shows only slightly more than half as many Negroes as
whites with one year of college education; and over fifty per cent
of all urban non-white workers in 1960 were employed as house-
hold or other service employees in low paying jobs.44 Further-
more, in the past thirty-five years the rate of Negro unemployment
has increased to the point that it is now regularly more than twice
as great as the rate among whites. In 1957 the ratio of non-white
to white unemployment was 2.05. By 1964 the ratio had risen to
2.18.45
But who would be affected by open housing legislation? As
discussed, open housing would affect only a narrowly defined
group. The increase in earning power of the Negro population
has created a dramatic increase in the size of the Negro middle
class. It is these Negroes who are affected by open housing legis-
lation. In particular, then, this discussion refers to members of
a minority group, such as Negroes, who have the financial ability
to participate in the housing market, but are precluded from
doing so solely because they are Negro. One example of such a
person is the Negro physician. Any professional man who has
spent years educating himself and becoming a respected member
of his profession will usually have money and some status. If he
wants to build a new home for a growing family, he must have a
site. If he lives in Louisville, Kentucky, or in any number of
cities, the chances are that his choice will be limited. Such a
physician has been reported as having had his choice restricted
to the heavily Negro "West End" of Louisville.4
One reaction to such an example is to treat it as an isolated,
insignificant event. To this there are two responses. The first is
that access to housing now is the key to solving other civil rights
problems. This physician does not represent all discriminatees in
4 3 Housim & HOME FINANCE AGENCY, OUR NoN-WHITE POPUAION AND
ITs HoUsING: THE CHANCES BErw N 1950 AND 1960 (1963).
44 Id.45 Moynihan, supra note 42, at 750.
46 Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 11, 1966, § D, at 1, col. 1.
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the housing market. By far, the preponderance of those affected by
discrimination are those Negroes seeking to rent better housing.47
Moreover, it is within the rental market that the owner-renter or
agent-renter is most concerned about the economic repercussions
of integration. 48 In either event, sale or rental,
Access of the Negro to decent housing is becoming the vortex
around which his other rights revolve. Without housing in
areas of his choice, the right of his child to an unsegregated
school is meaningless; his right to a job will be impaired; his
right to move and to secure shelter in a decent neighborhood
will be an empty shell.49
Significant progress has already been noted in the areas of
public accommodations, employment, education, and voting. But
there has been little in the housing area. 0 In sum, it seems fair
to say
that lack of housing opportunities lies at the heart of the
Negro's other social problems. The discriminatory practices
which confine him to the slums of the central city work at
the same time to bind him to poor schools and to a generally
unhealthy environment.51
Perhaps an absence of discrimination in housing would not
solve all Negro problems and end the need for a civil rights
movement. But more than one researcher in the field has con-
cluded that an attack on discrimination itself is as timely in the
housing context as is the attack made by urban renewal projects
and other housing reform programs. It has been stated that of the
three major limitations on Negro participation in the housing
market (choice, poverty, and discrimination) discrimination is by
far the strongest,52 and that
Even though differences in the economic and social qualities
of groups play a dynamic role in affecting their housing, a re-
duction of prejudice and discrimination will by itself be
sufficient to improve greatly the housing of non-white
groups.53
47 See text at note 65 infra for an indication of the size of this group.48 See, e.g., a striking illustration of the renter-owner problem in 112 CONG.REC. 21693-94 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1986).49 Abrams, The Housing Problem, in DmA.us 64, 72 (Winter 1966).
50 McENIRE, supra note 37, at 347; BAPKiN & GRIGSBY, supra note 9, at 1.
51 LORD EQUAL OPPORTUNIrY IN HOUSING 9 (1966).
52 Taue:er, Residential Segregation, in ScrNirxc AMERICAN, Aug., 1965.
53 GLAZEM & McENI'u, supra note 37, at 9.
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Another researcher put it this way:
Certainly the provision of good housing (by slum clearance,
urban renewal, building of low income housing, etc.) will not
solve all social and personal problems .... but that attack
cannot succeed-indeed it cannot commence-without the
obliteration of the discriminatory obstacles which condemn
the Negro to certain areas, to substandard housing, and to
poverty in general.54
The second response to the argument that the Negro pro-
fessional is an isolated example is a direct refutation: it is not
isolated-in fact, the Negro middle class is burgeoning; Negro
buying power is increasing; the Negro is becoming a stronger
economic force; Negroes could exercise a significant impression
on the demand function of the housing market if discrimination
were eliminated.
Poverty and low income will probably always be a factor in
the Negro housing situation. However, open housing legislation
is concerned with those Negroes who do have the money. For
these people, urban renewal or a mere shifting from an old
ghetto into a nice new one is no answer. For them, slum clear-
ance is meaningless unless they can choose their new housing
freely. If open housing includes the choice of neighborhood, 55
the problem for low income or rising-income Negroes is extreme
since "racial discrimination limits the housing market even for
upper-income families of minority origin." 56 (Emphasis added.)
In addition, the housing market as an economic entity "by and
large . . . tends to reinforce all manner of pressures for the
involuntary segregation of persons with similar characteristics.
These can be lumped under the one word 'discrimination.' 5i
It was stated above that access of the Negro to decent housing
is the "vortex around which his other rights revolve." Implicit
in this is something more than just the right to buy or rent a
dwelling. Implicit is the right to select any environment which
he desires and can afford. As a Negro housewife in Boston said:
I don't think that too many people start out by saying 'I want
to move into a white neighborhood.' They want to move to a
54 LoRD, supra note 51, at 9-10.
55 See text at notes 74-75 infra.56 MEYERSo N, TnaRL-iT, & WHEATON, supra note 39, at 66.
5T Id.
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neighborhood that has modem housing, good schools, that has
close shopping centers, that has a plot of grass around it,
where people don't go through the street and drop paper;
they want something clean.58
So the inquiry must identify these people, indicate how many
there are, and whether their demands can be met. A 1963 study
by the United States Housing and Home Finance Agency59 found
a "spectacular rise" in the incomes of Negroes in urban areas and
an increase in demand for middle-income suburban housing. If
Negroes in this category ($7,000-$10,000) had purchased houses
in the $15,000 bracket in the same ratio as whites did, there
would have been demand potential in the amount of some 45,000
housing units in the seventeen areas studied. Why was there no
such realization to the economy? Because, "while the study cites
a number of related factors inhibiting home ownership among
non-whites, it points particularly to racial restrictions,.as an im-
portant deterrent to the availability of new housing for -this
group." 0°
In the regions nearest Kentucky, including Cincinnati, Atlanta,
Cleveland, Chicago, and St. Louis, the increase in the income
of non-white families is remarkable. In Cincinnati, for example,
the number of non-whites in the $5,000-$9,999 bracket between
1949 and 1959 increased from 115 to 3,849. In the $6,000 plus
bracket, the increase was from 145 to 2,372.1 In the country as
a whole, the percentage of non-white families earning $6,000 in
1961, 20 per cent, was over five times larger than in 1945.62
This growing economic power is reflected in other figures.
The assets of Negro savings and loan associations, for instance,
have multiplied over thirty-two times since 1947, a rate
roughly three times that of all savings and loan associations
combined. Similarly commercial banks owned and operated
by Negroes increased their assets from five million dollars in
1940 to about fifty-three million dollars by 1960, a growth rate
over five times larger than that of all commercial banks. And
8 MASS. DEP'T OF CoimEmcE AND DEVELOPzmNr, THE MIDDvL INcOME
NEGrO FACES UAN lREN -"wAL 98 (1964).
59 HOUSIG AND HoME FINANcE AcENcy, POTENTIAL HOUSING DEMAN oF
NoN-WHITE POPULATION IN SELECTED MZrROPOLrrAN AREAS (1963).
6o Id.61 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION 1950; U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION 1960.
'2 PETTIGREW, supra note 42, at 181-83.
[Vol. 56,
NoTms
the fifty-one Negro controlled life insurance companies have
doubled their assets since 1951 to a present total of at least
320 million dollars.
63
It would seem to follow that more Negro money would be
injected into the housing market, and so it has been. The 1950's
marked a doubling of the percentage of non-whites residing in
census defined "standard housing." And many Negroes became
able to afford their housing without taking in boarders and ex-
tended family members.64 Furthermore, as a result of rising
incomes, home ownership participation has increased rapidly
among non-whites.
But despite this increase in the purchase of homes by non-
white families, only one third of the total number owned their
own homes in 1950, as compared with fifty-seven per cent of white
families; by 1960 these percentages had changed to two-fifths
and two-thirds.6 5 These figures show increased Negro ability to
participate in the housing market, but that their gains do not
match gains by whites either relatively or absolutely. Further-
more the average value of owned homes is much less for non-
whites than for whites 8
By and large then, the available statistics tend to show a grow-
ing number of middle class Negro families. Clearly this category
is still heavily outweighed by low income families (though im-
provement in this ratio is also shown). Not only are more housing
units being demanded by this middle class, but there is also an
increasingly effective demand for mortgage financing from this
group. Many Negroes have demonstrated financial strength ade-
quate to meet the highest mortgage credit standards, and Veteran's
Administration and Federal Housing Administration studies
demonstrate that they are sound risks. For example, an analysis
of mortgage foreclosures in six metropolitan areas indicated that
a lower ratio of foreclosures was necessary with non-white home-
owners in the income bracket above $5,000 than was necessary
with whites in the same bracket.67 The indication seems to be
63Id.
64 Id.
6 5 MYERsoN TtERrr, & WHFAToN, supra note 39, at 75.
66 Id.
67 U.S. HousINc AND HoM FINANCE AGENCy, MORTGAGE FoRECLOSURES IN
Six METROPOLrrAN AurAs 67 (1963).
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that the Negroes in the new rising middle class invest and manage
their money at least as well as whites and in this particular table-
better.
Despite these favorable indications, mortgage bankers in the
past have not been influenced in their lending policies and tend
to treat all Negroes, high and low income, alike. In part this is
because low income Negroes have a worse foreclosure record than
whites in low income brackets. 68 But even though the records
indicate that more individual attention should be given individual
Negro families, the traditional banker's approach remains. The
fact that race in upper income brackets appears to have little or
no bearing on foreclosures or delinquencies seems to have been
ignored. A special report of a committee of the Mortgage Bankers
Association pointed out that these institutions tended to classify
Negroes as a "group risk" rather than as individuals. 60 This
seems to be discrimination based on something other than reality.
It is, in fact, economic discrimination.
This position is more anomalous, even as a realistic business
approach, when juxaposed with the experience of lenders who
do not consider race. The Bowery Savings Bank, one of the
largest mortgage lenders in the country and the largest mutual
savings bank in the world, has
followed successfully the policy of making loans on mortgages
without regard to race, color, creed, or national origin of
either the owners or the tenants of the property. Its ex-
perience with those mortgages has beerl just as good as its
experience with any other type of loan that it has made. It
has millions of dollars of mortgages on properties which are
open to occupancy by any person who is qualified eco-
nomically to pay the rent or pay the price for the housing;
and . . . its experience with respect to those loans has been
just as favorable as its experience with respect to other loans
that it has made.70
Such institutions are, fortunately, not the only effective outlet
for the increased non-white demand for housing mortgages. An-
other is a growing Negro-owned and operated mortgage financing
68 Id.
69 Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of America, Committee on Financing Minority
Housing, Report to the Board of Directors 11 (1955).
70 U.S. Comm'n on Human Rights, New York Hearings, Feb. 2-3, 1959, 31
(1960).
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industry which has recognized the Negro demand for such services.
In 1921, the National Negro Insurance Association was organized
by thirteen companies. In 1962, the Association (now the Na-
tional Insurance Association) reported assets of over $343 million
with mortgage real estate loans of almost $94.5 million. Similarly,
Negro savings and loan associations have captured a share, small
but meaningful, of this strongly competitive industry; from 1940
to 1963, their total assets increased from $5 billion to $108
billion. In almost every case the Negro-owned operation came
into being because existing institutions were not meeting non-
white demand for mortgage funds. By 1963, there were thirty-
three such institutions, six in California.71
The foregoing shows an encouraging picture. However the
total housing picture is rather bleak:
The housing available to Negroes is inferior in quality corn-
pared to the housing of whites; both the housing and neigh-
borhoods in which he lives show signs of greater deteriora-
tion; there are fewer amenites; mortgages are more difficult to
obtain; there is little or no private investment in new buildings
for Negroes; tax arrears are higher in their neighborhoods and
public interest in maintenance is lower; real estate values are
lower in relation to net income; over-crowding is more in-
tense; schools, hospitals, and recreation are inferior; and the
Negro usually gets less housing per dollar he pays.72
A vital valve is not functioning properly in the life of the
modern Negro who is a member of the rising middle class. The
valve is held shut by his lack of access to housing. He is richer
than ever before, participates more in American life, and is able
more fully to realize his capabilities-yet his progress is still years
behind the rate at which whites are progressing and he still lives
in comparative poverty. He is becoming concentrated in urban
ghettoes and slums, and the benefits of his wealth remain nearly
impossible to manifest in the housing market.
In 1960, forty-four per cent of all units occupied by non-whites
were substandard, compared to thirteen per cent for whites.
One hundred and fifty-five thousand non-white families had to
share single dwelling units with other families. This represents
71 Pitts, Mortgage Financing and Race, in RACE & PROPERTY 109 (1964).72 ABRAms, TnE Crry is TH FRONTIER 59 (1965).
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4.8 per cent of all non-white families. Only 2.1 per cent of white
families are forced to live under these conditions.73
Considering the inferior quality of non-white dwellings con-
trasted with those of whites at every income level-an inferiority
not compensated by additional space-it would seem natural that
less would be paid for this space. But statistics compiled by the
Census Bureau show that non-white renters, with few exceptions,
pay nearly as much as whites. These prices are paid for fewer
rooms per person, fewer rooms per unit, and for substandard
units.74 For example, the average non-white renter in St. Louis
pays about eighty-three per cent of what the white pays,75 but the
value of that property, due to its location and relative dilapidation,
is much less.76 Thus, not only are non-white dwellings more
likely to be substandard and overcrowded,7 7 but a higher relative
proportion of income is paid by non-whites for these tenements
since Negroes get so much less for their rent money.
These characteristics of the housing problems of non-whites
are economic effects which are caused, in part at least, by dis-
crimination in jobs, housing, and other areas. But perhaps the
most significant and widespread economic effect of housing dis-
crimination is the phenomenon known as "urban decay." 78
The population of the United States has been classified by the
Bureau of the Budget as either inside or outside what it calls
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA). SMSA refers
to a county or group of contiguous counties with at least one
central city of 50,000 or more. Also, according to the 1960 census
definition, "urban" areas are comprised of incorporated cities
of 2,500 or more inhabitants and the densely populated urban
fringes (suburbs).79 A glance at these statistics helps in the under-
standing of the phenomenon of urban decay. Because our pop-
ulation is so highly mobile it is possible to classify it in terms of
its "mobility status";8 0 it is not necessary to point out that many
Americans take advantage of their freedom of mobility.
73LoRD, supra note 51, at 3.
74 Id. at 142. These conclusions are based on U.S. census statistics.
75 Id.7 6 McENTm, supra note 37, at 135.
77 Id. at 126.78 Abrams, supra note 49, at 65.
79 U.S. DF-T OF CoMMERcE, supra note 86, at 2.
80 Id. at 3.
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In 1900, nine-tenths of all Negroes lived in the South and
more than three-fourths in rural areas. By 1950, Negroes had
become predominately urban dwellers and only two-thirds lived
in the South. Negro migration has been from South to North
as well as from rural to urban; and both trends have recently
accelerated greatly. From 1940 to 1950 more than three million
Negroes moved to cities while rural Negro population declined
by almost a million.61 This migration has been to the central city
areas, not into the suburbs, since the pull of the northern and
western cities has been job opportunities and relative racial
equality.8 2 As the Negroes moved in, the whites moved out into
the more expensive suburbs and offered their homes at bargain
prices.8 3 The trend to suburbia for racial and other reasons has
continued until today the central cities have become areas of
heavy Negro concentration with large, white suburbs surrounding
the cities. There has been a significant trend along these lines
to the present. From 1950 to 1960, the percentage of the white
population which lived in central city areas declined from 31.1 to
30 per cent and increased in urban fringe areas or suburbs from
14.7 to 22.8 per cent. The same figures for Negroes show the
reverse. Negro city population increased from 39.2 per cent of
the total Negro population to 50.5 per cent, and decreased in
the rural areas from 38.3 to 27.6 per cent. Only 6.1 per cent of
Negroes lived in urban fringe areas in 1950 and that figure had
increased negligibly by 1960 to 8.4."
It is not unnatural, of course, for cities to develop outward.
nor is it unusual for minority groups to migrate into the central
city. Early immigrants usually went to the cities in great throngs
and found living space in the older areas abandoned by those
moving to newer districts where the rent was always less. As the
immigrants became assimilated and improved their economic
position they moved away.8 Negroes will undoubtedly, if given
the opportunity, do the same. However there are some extra
phenomena today which did not exist when most immigrants
81 U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950, VOL. I, Characteristics of the Popula-
tion, pt. 1, U.S. Summary, Table 34 (1951).82Grddzins, The New Shame of the Cities, in MINoR= PROBLEMS 158, 160
(1965).
83 See Section III. infra.
84 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 36, at Table 22.85 McEN~rE, supra note 37, at 19.
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were white. The first is that not only house-seekers, but com-
merce and industry are moving to surburban locations.88
Obviously this trend encourages urban decay. The second is that
although an outward growth of cities is natural, the concentricity
of black central areas surrounded by white suburbs is not a
natural phenomenon because discrimination exerts an unnatural
pressure on the natural outward movement of Negroes.87
The consequences are already apparent. Slums spread and
since the surrounding areas have no free market for Negro hous-
ing, overcrowding results. The remaining city dwellers, both
white and non-white, are generally low income groups, among
whom racial pressures seem to be most strongly manifested. 3
Crime rates are higher, and health standards are lower; in short,
the culture of poverty continues to spread. And the cost to the
taxpayers is great.
The city revenues from Harlem (symbol of Negro ghettoes
over the country) from sales, city income, real property, and
commercial occupancy taxes falls far short of paying for the
extra police, fire, health, welfare, and building inspection
costs to the city.89
The federal government seems to be highly concerned with
the urban decay problem. -One study being considered by the
government to rejuvenate the cities would cost fifty billion
dollars.90 Donald Hummel of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development has expressed concern by warning realtors
to "get involved" in revitalizing and governing American cities
"before the federal government is forced to widen its areas of
operation." 91
The urban decay problem is pressing enough to have the at-
tention of Congress. The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Development Act of 196692 offers Congress' findings:
Improving the quality of urban life is the most critical
domestic problem facing the United States. The persistence
88 Folson, Outward Expansion of Industry is Changing the Face of Suburbia,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1957, at 1, Col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, May 21, 1967, at 41,
col. 1.
87 ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 28 (1955).
88 Grodzins, supra note 82, at 163.
89 Lexington (Ky.) Sunday Herald-Leader, Nov. 6, 1966. at 50, col. 1.
90 Louisville Courier-Journal, Nov. 27, 1966, § A, at 1, col. 1.
91 Id.
82 Pub. L. No. 89-754, 80 Stat. 1255 (1966).
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of widespread urban slums and blight, the concentration of
persons of low income in older urban areas, and the unmet
needs for additional housing and community facilities and
services arising from rapid expansion of our urban popula-
tion have resulted in a marked deterioration in the quality
of the environment and the lives of large numbers of our
people while the Nation as a whole prospers.93
The purpose of this Act is to
revitalize large slum and blighted areas; to expand housing,
job, and income opportunities; to reduce dependence on wel-
fare payments, to improve educational facilities and programs;
to combat disease and ill health; to reduce the incidence of
crime and delinquency; to enhance recreational and cultural
opportunities; to establish better access between home and
job; and generally to improve living conditions for the people
who live in such areas .... 94
So it would seem that urban decay is a problem that should con-
cern every city with any problems in the areas-listed above.
The momentum of this pattern now seems to be'self-sustaining
unless the Demonstration Cities program and others like it are
large enough to be successful in reversing the trend. Left to
themselves, these population patterns can have no effect other
than to swell the ghettoes and further exacerbate the color
dichotomy between cities and suburbs. To reverse the trend
completely, at least sixty per cent of the Negro city dwellers
would, in most cities, have to be relocated into presently white
dominated areas.95 Merely to allow the natural migration of
financially able Negro city dwellers would not reverse the trend
but certainly would relieve it. As mentioned above9" Negroes in
one income bracket alone would have demanded 45,000 units of
housing if they could escape the slums, but
while the study indicates a number of related factors inhibit-
ing home ownership among non-whites, it points particularly
to racial restrictions as an important deterrent to the avail-
ability of new housing in this group.97
However, there appears to be no reversal of this trend, and each
93 Id. See 11 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4723 (Nov. 20, 1966).
94 Id.95 Taueber, supra note 52.96 HousING AN Ho. FiNANcE AGENCY, supra note 59.
97 Id.
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year the ghettoes continue to expand.98 There are various rea-
sons for this continued expansion; some Negroes would, in any
event, choose to remain there with people they know and under-
stand; but the line between voluntary and involuntary ghetto-
like concentration is difficult to follow. "By and large, the market
tends to reinforce all manner of pressures for the involuntary
segregation of persons with similar characteristics. These can
be lumped under the one word 'discrimination.' $go
This, then, is where open housing laws enter the picture.
There is great pressure from financially able Negroes to buy or
rent houses outside the ghettoes, in clean areas, near good schools,
where they can enjoy their increased income. But whites, from
their position of numerical and economic superiority, have kept
them in the ghettoes. The main reactionary force is discrimina-
tion.
It is not totally wrong to say that there are as many reasons
for discrimination as there are persons who discriminate. But
there are tw6 main headings under which it is helpful to examine
prejudice. One is psychological: the focus on individual prejudice.
The other is economic, or the overall functions and effects of
the prejudices of one race against another as they affect society.
The core idea here is that if it were more widely known that
prejudice is perhaps as injurious-in terms of dollars and cents-
to discriminators as to discriminatees, 100 and to the entire social
entity, more action would be taken to eliminate it. Economics
has already been mentioned in regard to discrimination as a
deterrent to a more active Negro demand for housing. This
demand is to spend money on housing-not necessarily to inte-
grate for integration's sake. This prospective demand is irrevoc-
ably lost to the economy.
Since World War II, the National Association of Home
Builders has come to recognize that substantial markets for
new homes are being ignored by the industry and that profit-
08 Grier & Grier, Equality & Beyond: Housing Segregation in the Great
Society, in DAEDALus 77, 87 (Winter 1966).
9 9 MEYERSON, TEuRurr, & WHEAToN, HOUSING, PEOPLE, ANm CrrEs 75
(1962).
10OThe terms "discriminator" and "discriminatee" may seem amusingly
'legal," but they are used commonly in the civil rights literature.
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able opportunities for additional business may be lost.
Some of the country's largest mortgage lenders are recogniz-
ing that they are less competitive with other classes of savings
and mortgage-lending institutions solely because of their dis-
criminatory policies. 01
This would appear to be an anomalous situation in a capi-
talistic society, but in the overall view it makes sense. It is rather
universally accepted that there is an inverse relationship between
property values and the presence of Negroes,102 i.e., that Negro
influx into a neighborhood automatically means: 1) values go
down, 2) enough Negroes follow the leaders to turn the entire
neighborhood into a Negro enclave, and 3) contamination,
dilapidation, and filth naturally result. 0 3 A detailed discussion
of these and other beliefs as they relate to discrimination by in-
dividuals follows in section IV; here, the focal point is the
economic-rationale, which quite apart from racial ill-will, tends
to provide a fertile ground in which discrimination can flourish,
with all its coeval inequities. It can flourish because anyone who
accepts these postulates will discriminate against Negroes in
order to protect his economic interests; that is, for economic
reasons, and not because he is racially intolerant.
A detailed scientific study, by Nathan Glazer and Davis
McEntire in conjunction with a widespread study by the Com-
mission on Race and Housing, reached the conclusion that
Prejudice in its pure form-that is to say, as unreasoning and
inflexible antipathy-rarely plays a decisive role in the
determination of the housing of minority groups... [E] very
action of discrimination-and there is discriminatory behavior
by builders, renters, lenders, government, and other groups-
is based on economic factors in the situation somewhat inde-
pendent of prejudice .... 104
Another conclusion made by the same study group is "that a
rise in the economic capacity [of a minority group] is an extremely
I'D' M -Y soN, TE'rr, & WHFAToN, supra note 99, at 77.
10 2 See Section III. infra.
103 Palmore & Howe, Residential Integration and Property Values, in SocIAL
PROBLEMS (Summer 1962); See also, LA RE , PROPERTY VALUEs AND RACE
(1960).
104 GLAZER & McENTIrE, STUDIES IN HousrN AND MINORITY GnouPs 4
(1960).
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powerful force in improving its housing, even though it may
have little effect on the degree of segregation and on prejudice
against it."105
If these two conclusions are considered together, it can be
postulated that economic factors are not only present but are an
important key to problems of discrimination in housing; and
that if anyone does discriminate to protect an investment, a
demonstration that there is no natural relationship between race
and property values may serve to reduce housing discrimina-
tion.106
One area in which economic considerations can cause some
housing discrimination is in the mortgage lending aspect. 10 7 In
addition to property location and other considerations applicable
to all borrowers, there are some additional considerations where
minorities are concerned; the most important of these factors is
whether the property securing a loan to a Negro is within "an
established Negro neighborhood."' 08 The reason given is not
that there is prejudice or discrimination but that good business
(economics) demands it. There are two reasons for lending to
Negroes only for property in good quality Negro neighborhoods.
One is the desire to protect property values [and hence in-
vestments] in white neighborhoods against the believed
destructive effect of non-white entry. The other is to preserve
good relations with the white people of a neighborhood and
avoid being blamed for placing a non-white family in their
midst. Part of the good relations to be preserved is with other
members of the financial and real estate business community
who may be devoted to keeping non-white out of white neigh-
borhoods. 09
Thus, public relations (economics) is also a motivation for lend-
ing policy-which restricts Negro housing freedom.
Similar motivations are presented by some realtors, who claim
they discriminate not for racial but for economic reasons. The
claim has been that realtors are merely agents for a home owner
who has a property right to choose the person to whom he sells." 0
105 Id. at 5.
106 See Section II. infra.107McENrImE, RESIDENCE AND RACE 218-38 (1960).
108 Id. at 224.
109 Id.
.. 0 Whether such a right exists is discussed in Section VI. infra.
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The National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) issued
a policy statement on minority housing. Statement number one
reads:
Being agents, realtors individually and collectively in per-
forming their agency functions, have no right or responsibility
to determine the racial, creedal, or ethnic composition of any
area or neighborhood or any part thereof."'
So despite the fact that NAREB is the most outspoken single
opponent of "forced" housing,"12 this opposition is based on
economics. The reasons revolve around an agency responsibility
to a principal, and the theme that they are powerless; and that
realtors like everyone else have to "make a buck," but if they
sell to Negroes they will be professionally ostracized.
One youthful salesman was courteous and cooperative [when
faced with a Negro home buyer] but said he would have to
check with the reality [sic-an interesting misprint] associa-
tion. He gave the Negro his card and invited him to return.
When the Negro returned, the young salesman evidently had
learned for he said, "I am in sympathy with the colored
people, but selling to a Negro would be tantamount to putting
myself out of business as well as ostracizing me from other
brokers and residents in this area ... I don't have the courage
to sell to a Negro."13
The causes of discrimination are usually based on prejudice
and the kinds of prejudice, as just discussed, may be primarily
economic. Now it is necessary to look at some effects of dis-
crimination. Urban decay, which is probably the most obvious
effect, and the artificial oppression of the Negro housing demand,
have already been discussed. Another inimical effect of housing
discrimination is that it forms the base for other forms of dis-
crimination. This effect is graphically pointed out in a study
by Leo Kuper which compares South African apartheid policy
with housing segregation in the United States." 4 In both places,
M11 Policy statement adopted by the National Association of Real Estate
Boards [hereinafter referred to as NAREB].
112 "Forced Housing" is NAEB's term of art, chosen as a semantic ripostv
to the terms "open7 and "fair' housing. For practical matters the terms are
synonymous.
113 McENtrm, supra note 107, at 239.




Kuper finds, where a minority is physically isolated, isolation in
other areas such as in schools, hospitals, libraries, and other
facilities follows. The net effect is a system of total de facto
segregation with the resultant superior-inferior racial feelings.
Not only does discrimination (prejudice) lead to segregation,
but the equation is reversible, i.e., segregation creates more dis-
crimination (prejudice). Deutsch and Collins pointed out the
latter half of the equation in a study of integrated housing which
showed that contact between the races promoted interracial as-
sociation and mutual respect.115 The inference drawn from this
study, a follow-up project," 6 and other empirical investigations,"--
supports the thesis that proximity of groups which are mutually
antagonistic tends to reduce prejudice and racial discrimination.
Another effect of discrimination is that many of the human re-
sources of minority groups are lost to a segregated society. It can
hardly be gainsaid that the prime waster of such resources is hard
core poverty.
The reasons for poverty are presumably the same for Negroes
as for low income whites-poverty breeds poverty. But for
minorities there are additional factors which tend to make poverty
an even more inexorably oppressive force. For example, popula-
tion growth seems to be concentrated among the poor; and since,
proportionately, there are more poor non-whites than whites,
non-white families size increases while white family size changes
little. Between 1950 and 1960 the non-white population grew at
a rate of 2.4 per cent per year while white population grew at the
rate of 1.7 per cent. The significance of these figures is ac-
centuated by statistics which indicate that, as of 1960, non-white
mothers, aged thirty-five to thirty-nine, with family incomes over
$10,000 had 2.9 children; those with incomes less than $2,000
had 5.3. Even more striking is that Negro families in higher
income brackets have fewer children than their white counter-
parts. 18 Another factor which tends to generate poverty among
non-whites is that a Negro family is more likely to be broken up
115 DEUTSCH & COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HousIN (1951).
116 WuN.Ezn WALELEY, & CooiK, HUMAN RELATIONS IN INTERRAcIAL HOUSING
(1955).
117 See, e.g., Swados, When Black and White Live Together, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 13, 1966, (Magazine), at 47.
118 Id. at 758.
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by the strain of unemployment and marginal income. In 1960,
fully one quarter of the four-child families among non-whites
were headed by women separated from their husbands. As poverty
is the cause, so poverty is the result." 9
Thus, this "culture of poverty"'120 is self-propagating, so that
despite the current civil rights efforts, there are little prospects
that all the differences between whites and Negroes in terms
of their regional and residential patterns, their backgrounds,
and in the way employers, unions, and others in the labor
market treat them will soon be erased. There are, therefore,
little prospects that we will soon see substantial equality in
the education, skills, and opportunities of the new groups of
young people of the two races. 12'
The Negro has a far heavier burden to shoulder in order to
escape the culture of poverty than does the white. The white is
not subject to racial discrimination. This human loss is, of course,
both sociological and economic; but there are economic implica-
tions to the extent that a society-needs the full economic coopera-
tion of all its members to attain optimum economic effectiveness.
If any portion of the economy cannot contribute, the remaining
portions must do the extra work, and pay the extra price.122
The last consequence of segregation and housing discrimina-
tion to be mentioned is wholly economic. The economy suffers
from the loss of non-white participation in the housing market.
This is a price paid by society for its discriminatory practices.
Another such cost is the loss of potential industrial development
to a community without open housing legislation. When a com-
pany is interested in a location, it may be that either certain key
personnel are non-white or that the industry follows non-dis-
criminatory employment policies. 123 In either event, it would
be likely that Negro white collar workers are employed or employ-
able, since this is a growing group.
[W]hite collar work was not an important field for Negro em-
ployment for many decades, but recently this has changed.
119 Id. at 767.12 0 LEvIs, LA VmA: A PUERTO RICAN FAuLy IN TE CULTURE OF POVERTY-
SAN JUAN AND Nmv YORK (1966).
121 HESTAND, ECONOMIC CRoWTr AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR
MINoRmES 57 (1964).
'-
2 See text at note 111 supra.
123 As is required by federal and some state laws. See, e.g., KRS § 344.040
(1966).
KFNTucxy LAW JouNAL. Vl 6
Only 3 per cent of Negro workers were engaged in white
collar occupations in 1910, 6 per cent in 1940 and 15 per cent
in 1960. White collar jobs have been as important as manual
and service work as growing areas of Negro employment.1 24
Furthermore:
The expansion of the Negro middle class has been most
marked by accretion of persons in professional, technical,
clerical and sales occupations. This expansion by approxi-
mately 300,000 persons since 1940 has been influenced in part
by government policy which prohibits those business firms
holding contracts with the federal government from dis-
criminating against workers on the basis of race, religion,
creed, or national origin. In engineering, architecture, and
the natural sciences ... the increases among Negroes, though
small in absolute numbers, have been rather dramatic. Be-
tween 1950 and 1960, there was a three-fold increase in Negro
engineers. The number of Negro architects increased by 72
per cent . . . physicians increased by 14 per cent, dentists
by 31 per cent, and lawyers by 43 per cent . . . [But] it is
not only the increase in number of these professionals which
deserves attention; the improved opportunities for advanced
training and learning experiences are also of importance.125
Since such people will be valuable employees, an industry would
consider not only the normal site requirements but also the
housing situation and the area's attitudes toward segregation.12
Thus it is conceivable that an unfavorable attitude toward equal
housing which would affect employment policies or employees
of an industry might cost a community a plant and a tremendous
increment to the area's economy.127
The same possibility of lost income exists where an installa-
tion is to be located by the Federal Government or where federal
funds are at stake. It is difficult, as in the case of industry, to say
just how much weight is given to housing implications, but that
they are considered seems certain. The recent furor over the
location of the atom smashing plant provides an illustration.
Kentucky was considered for this plant and several proposals
were presented regarding various possible sites. After some delay,
124 HIasrAI-, supra note 121, at 43.
125 Edwards, Community and Class Realities, in DAEDALUS 14 (Winter 1966).
126 A list of usual considerations appear in Stuckeman, A Community-Industry
Marriage. Will It Last?, in AnxA DEvxx-oPmEr 6 (Feb., 1967).
127 Id.
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a small Illinois town was selected. Weston, Illinois, had no open
housing law prior to the selection, but passed one shortly there-
after.128 While the selection of a site is "final," Congress has not
yet appropriated the funds, and may not. Civil rights advocates
are taking advantage of this situation to bring attention to the
lack of open housing laws in the surrounding counties and in
Illinois as a whole. 12 It will be an indication of just how much
consideration is given the racial picture of a prospective facility
location as the denounement progresses in Weston and in Con-
gress. It can be said, though, that the federal government will be
increasingly concerned with the racial balance of a community and
with its attitudes toward civil rights. The Department of Health,
Education and Welfare is now conducting "anti-bias" surveys in
certain areas to determine whether public agencies are admini-
stering federally supported programs with an absence of racial
consideration.130 Furthermore, the Johnson Administration has
stated that discrimination in either employment or housing will
not be tolerated where the Demonstration Cities program is con-
cerned. 31 This policy position apparently has to be considered if
Louisville's Demonstration Cities proposal is to be successful.
III. INDIVIDUAL DISCRIMINATION: MYTHS AND REALITY
Section II discussed the economic causes and effects of housing
discrimination as they relate to society. Here, the inquiry will
focus on those beliefs which underlie housing discrimination
and have been called, after analysis, "myths."
These "myths" are as follows: (1) the belief that the entry
of a Negro into a neighborhood will cause property values to
decline; (2) the belief that social status is damaged by having a
Negro neighbor; (3) the belief that the Negro is inherently
128 N.Y. Times, March 5, 1967, § 1, at 58, col. 1.
129Id. See also 112 CONG. RMc. 21694 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1966). In a letter
to the Illinois Department of Business and Economic Development, Glenn T.
Seaborg indicated clearly that the racial picture in Illinois was being "evaluated."
On April 25, Seaborg was more specific. He is reported as having said that unless
Illinois passes an open housing law, Congress may not even approve initial design*
funds for the smasher. Louisville Courier-Journal, April 28, 1967, § A, at 4, col. 1.130 Louisville Courier-Journal, Jan. 28, 1967, § B, at 1, col. 4.
131 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 19, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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unkempt and will fail to maintain his property; (4) the belief
that one Negro will be followed by a heavy influx of Negroes into
the area; and (5) the belief that one's white neighbors will soon
leave the neighborhood after Negro entry is made.
The American philosopher William James once wrote that
"our judgments . . . change the course of future reality by the
acts to which they lead."'18 2 The statement is appropriate in the
context of the present discussion and is especially meaningful
when the word "myths" is inserted in place of "our judgments."
For example, if one white family in an area where a Negro has
moved feels that all its neighbors will soon move, its decision to
move is made on this assumption. Each family does the same,
until, in fact, the white residents have all moved. The original
belief is made "true" by the action to which it has led; it has
been confirmed by future reality. An opposite attitude, a belief
that one's neighbors will not move with the coming of the Negro,
and a concerted effort on the part of the people of the neighbor-
hood to maintain its present character, can have an opposite re-
sult, and the "truth" of white withdrawal is dispelled.
The declining property value argument is often an excellent
example of the judgment-influences-reality syndrome. If the view
in a neighborhood is that Negro entry will depress property
values, then an area where such entry is made may see the white
homeowners, attempting to avert the mythically inevitable price
depression, put their homes on the market en masse. The result is
a glut of homes on the market, an excess of supply over demand,
and, as was predicted and believed, a decline in the price which
the property will bring. This panic selling has been characterized
elsewhere as "the self-fulfilling prophecy."' 33
The result of this cycle of belief-plus-result-equals-reenforce-
ment-of-original-belief is that attitudes are crystallized in the mind
of the individual, the character and effects of prejudice are in-
durated, and both are much more difficult to eradicate. With this
in mind studies have been made to see if the beliefs did have a
basis in fact or were, as many supposed them to be, "myths."
132 JAN{ES, PRAmATISM AND FOUR ESSAYS FROM THE MEANINcS OF TRUTH
252 (1963).
13.3 See LAURENTI, supra note 103, at 25.
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Should they be in fact exposed as myths, the feeling was that much
of the opposition to open housing, or at least the rationalization
therefore, would vanish.
The analysis of the property value argument is, perhaps, the
most important of these beliefs, because, the belief that property
values do decline influences the other beliefs and reactions to
them. It has been said that:
No other reason .. .is more frequently and strongly urged
in support of racially separate residence patterns than that
non-whites depress property values. This is a widespread be-
lief and one of crucial importance because it governs, or at
least rationalizes many practices of real estate brokers, build-
ers and financial institutions-as well as the actions of home-
owners.134
Perhaps the most extensive and comprehensive of the studies
made of the effect of race on property value was that conducted
by Luigi Laurenti in San Francisco, Oakland, and Philadelphia.
The study was sponsored by the Commission on Race and Hous-
ing, an independent private citizen's group. Laurenti employed
the following methodolgy."35 He selected "test" areas into which
Negroes had moved, and, for comparison, he selected "control"
areas which had remained all-white. The "control" areas resembled
the "test" areas in all significant respects: "age, type, and market
value of houses, topography, location, land use pattern, income
and occupational class of the residents and the character of
neighborhood development."' 136 By doing this, it was possible to
isolate the factor of race and evaluate what effect the entry of
minorities had on the market price in the integrated area as
compared with the similar all-white area. This was done by a
comprehensive analysis of the real estate transactions in both areas
over periods of up to fifteen years. "Approximately ten thousand
sales prices were collected, representing about half of all trans-
actions in the San Francisco-Oakland areas and total sales in the
Philadelphia area."'37
From the results of Laurenti's analysis of thirty-four com-
parisons between "test" and "control" areas, he concluded that "no
'34 Id. at 5.
15 Id. at 28-46.
136 McENTmE, supra note 107, at 161.
137 Id. at 162.
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single or uniform pattern of non-white influence on property
prices could be detected,"' 38 and that "the entry of non-whites into
previously all white neighborhoods was much more often as-
sociated with price improvement or stability than with price
weakening."' 3 9
The following table gives the results of the study.140
Paired Comparisons of Price Movements
Test Areas by No
Per Cent of Popula- Significant Test Area Control
tion Non-White, 1955 Total Differences Higher Area Higher
30-75 Per Cent
8 Areas 16 10 5 1
14-28 Per Cent
6 Areas 9 3 4 2
6- 7 Per Cent
3 Areas 5 - 4 1
3 Per Cent or Less
3 Areas 4 1 2 1
The study recognized ten factors which, after Negro entry,
could affect the market price of homes in the newly integrated
neighborhood. These are:
(1) The strength of whites desire to move out; (2) the
strength of non-whites desire to move in; (3) willingness
of whites to purchase property in racially mixed areas; (4)
housing choices open to non-whites; (5) absolute and re-
lative purchasing power of non-whites; (6) absolute and re-
lative levels of house prices; (7) state of general business
conditions; (8) long run trend of values in areas involved;
(9) time.141
As an example of the interaction of these factors, Laurenti gives
two extremes: the glutted market and the market where houses
are in short supply.142 If there is a plentiful supply of houses to
which whites can move, and they look upon the coming of the
138 LAURENTI, supra note 103, at 47.
139 Id.
140 McENTIRE, supra note 107, at 163.
141 LAURENTI, supra note 103, at 47-8.
142 Id. at 48-9.
[Vol. 56,
Negro as a catastrophe and simultaneously put their homes on the
market, there is a glut of houses for which the Negro demand is
not able to compensate. The price falls. On the other hand, if
there is a short supply of houses available and the white residents
of the area are not intimidated, the great demand of Negroes for
houses, due to the tight market, will force prices upward. The
typical situation suggests a "balance of forces" where Negro de-
mand offsets the white exodus, keeping prices at a relatively
stable level. 43
Laurenti points out that in his study "the sellers were white
and most of the buyers were non-white," and that "the study
findings signify... that in the time period and the areas covered,
non-whites were generally able to enter each local market fast
enough to avoid the creation of a relative price slump."'144 A
similar study in the Chicago area found that "the white market in
such areas diminishes almost to the vanishing point."' 145 The re-
searcher here concluded that "as long as Negro housing demand
continues, property values will not decline because of a Negro in-
flux" but that "should Negro demand abate, the price structure
in such areas might weaken."' 146
The important question in relation to the weakening of Negro
demand, which will inevitably occur as more and more areas be-
come open to Negro occupancy, is whether the virtually non-
existent white demand will exhibit an inverse increment. Studies
have shown that "resistance of white people to buying or renting
in racially mixed neighborhoods is greatly reduced when the non-
white group is not numerous and is not perceived as likely to
become the numerically dominant element. . . .,'47 From a study
on demand in racially mixed areas comes the following comment:
Our data appear to support the view that as the proportion of
Negroes in a mixed area increases, the percentage of white
families who will consider the area as a place of residence
declines. For many white families, doubts and apprehensions
regarding status, quality of schools, property values, personal
143 Id. at 49.
144 Id. at 57-8.
14 5 ANs, OPEN OCCUPANCY VS. FoRcED HousiNG UNDER TiE FounTNTH
A.mENtE'r: S-miPoswm 284 (1963).
146 Id. at 285.
1 4 7LAuRIENTn, supra note 103, at 57.
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safety, and social contact are all tied to the actual or antici-
pated number of Negroes in the neighborhood. 48
It has been suggested that
to the extent that racial exclusion lessens, the number of
neighborhoods containing small numbers of non-whites will
be multiplied. Opportunities to escape living near non-whites
by choosing exclusive neighborhoods will become fewer, and
as the process continues, race should gradually lose its im-
portance as a consideration in the housing market. 49
This latter statement is especially important in a discussion of
open housing laws. If they were in effect, the conditions under
which the Laurenti study was conducted would, theoretically, not
be present. The typical housing situation in the absence of such
laws is one in which the confinement of Negroes to a limited area
causes the pressure of demand to rise until a new neighborhood
is "broken." The pressure is relieved as home hungry Negroes
spill over into the new neighborhood. As the Negroes move in
the whites, fearing the Negroes will soon dominate the area, exit
and the transition of the neighborhood is soon forthcoming. Con-
ceivably under open housing laws this will not occur since the
Negro demand will be satiated throughout all sections of the com-
munity. Moreover, whites will not be so anxious to move with
only a few Negroes in the neighborhood and the exclusive areas
to which they could move would be fewer. Thus, the transition of
neighborhoods should become much more infrequent.
Another prime consideration of the white which underlies his
opposition to Negro entry is status-that intangible yardstick
which measures a person's station in society. The status of an
American, the esteem in which he is held by others and by him-
self, is a composite of a myriad of factors-education, wealth, and
job position, to name a few. The neighborhood in which a person
lives and the quality of his dwelling have much to do with de-
termining his status. Indeed, with the burgeoning of the suburbs
in the postwar period, one's house and neighborhood have taken
on an even greater role in establishing his "place" in the social
spectrum. 50
148 RAPiKN & GRIGSBY, THE DxmArD Frt HousINc IN RACIALLY MIxx ARmAS
55-6 (1960).
149 LAunmncrx, supra note 103, at 57.
1 50 PAcKAmD, Tm STATUS SEEKERs 77-9 (1961).
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Unfortunately, racial considerations often enter into evalua-
tions of status, particularily in the residential field. While an
individual might work side by side with a Negro, the presence of
the same Negro in his neighborhood is often seen as a calamity. 51
In such a situation, the individual feels that he will be regarded
by his friends and associates as having lost ground in the status
race. Indeed, one study on white attitudes toward interracial
housing revealed that status in the eyes of others was a paramount
reason for opposing integrated neighborhoods, even though those
responding did not feel this was justified. 52 It is, then, the fear of
the opinions of others which determines opposition based on
status. It has been said in regard to the problem of housing and
race that "the individual concerned is less free than in many
other areas of life to make decisions according to whatever personal
feelings he may have. His choices are shaped and limited by pres-
sures that converge on him from family and friends and neighbors,
other associates, and the whole community."' 53
The belief in status loss after Negro entry seems to be the
product of a stereotyped view of the Negro. The individual Negro
is judged, not in his capacity as an eminent doctor or professor,
but rather as a member of a traditionally lower class group.
This "association between non-white race or color and low status
is profound and widespread."' 54 Actually, when based on criteria
other than race, the Negro newcomer to white neighborhoods is
frequently higher on the status totem pole than his new neighbors.
An unpublished study, which was cited by Laurenti, took in-
to consideration the "occupations, educational attainment, and
family income of white and Negroes"'15' in the neighborhoods
entered by non-whites. The researcher found "the income Negro
group superior to whites in all these respects indicative of socio-
economic status."'5 6 It has been suggested that whites fear that the
entry of one Negro into an all-white area, even though his social
and economic status is fully commensurate with that of his
151 ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEiGIIORS (1955).
15 2 Rose, Inconsistencies in Attitude Toward Negro Housing, in MINonrrY
11oUSING 387 (1965).
153 McENTmE, supra note 107, at 86.




neighbors, will be a prelude to the eventual entry of lower class
Negroes.
White residents of middle class neighborhoods are paying for
certain values that residents of lower class areas do not
possess.... The values of a middle class include such things
as quiet, protection from violence, cleanliness, and good
schools-none of which exist in the slums .... These values
are generally seen as threatened by the entrance of any lower
class group. 57
This fear of lower class entry, however unfounded it may be,
is present whenever a Negro moves into a previously all white area.
One writer has postulated that the decline of anti-Japanese pre-
judice has resulted from the fact that most Japanese-Americans to-
day are middle class. 158 Because of stringent immigration laws,
there is little likelihood that undesirable Japanese will follow in
the wake of Nisei entry into a white neighborhood. The portrait
of the Japenese has taken on the hue of the acceptable middle
class. Negroes, on the other hand, despite their improving social
posture, retain the lower class stereotype because of the constant
migration to the cities. Therefore, white residents see the pos-
sibility of an imminent deluge of lower class, "undesirable"
Negroes.
Actually this fear on the part of whites is irrational. The laws
of the market would exclude lower class Negroes from more
desirable neighborhoods in the same way they exclude lower class
whites. Only those who are financially able and can meet mortgage
requirements could move into middle class neighborhoods. Thus,
the elimination of the factor of race in the housing market would
stabilize status in the neighborhoods, with middle class whites and
middle class Negroes sharing common areas.
The stereotype view of the Negro has also bred the myth that
the property of Negroes is invariably unkempt. The Negro is
pictured as living in squalor, in rundown and dilapidated housing,
with garbage in the gutter and rats in the halls. Informed sources
speculated that
it is quite probable that much of the white held belief about
substandard maintenance by non whites stems from over-




crowded slum areas, where non whites are predominately
tenants and where most landlords spend little, if anything to
maintain the appearance of property in which their only in-
terest is the derivation of income.159
In fact, studies have shown that Negroes, when given the
chance of home ownership and of living in a decent neighborhood,
maintain their homes as well as whites.
Statistics accumulated by the United States Housing Author-
ity and the Federal Housing Authority show that Negroes and
whites of comparable incomes have practically identical re-
cords of property maintenance and payment, regardless of
whether they live in mixed or segregated neighborhoods. In
- fact, these statistics show that Negroes have a slightly better
record in this respect than vhites.' 60
Laurenti also found that "non-whites were maintaining their
property at least as well as white owners.' u6 Another researcher
found that in his study area "a higher percentage of Negro home-
owners had made and were making repairs than were white
homeowners of comparable properties."' 62
Several reasons have been proffered as to why Negro main-
tenance should equal and in many cases surpass that of whites. Of
course there is the usual pride in ownership and the desire to keep
one's home in good condition. But in addition to this, there is
apparently a feeling of "race pride" on the part of many Negro
homeowners and an attempt to live down the reputation gained
from decades in the slums.' 63 One Negro homeowner interviewed
remarked that "good maintenance helps Negroes in general to find
better housing."' 64 In any event, the evidence would seem to de-
mand the conclusion that the belief of Negro slovenliness as a
racial characteristic is without foundation.
IV. THE HOUSING PROBLEM IN KENTUCKY
As has been delineated earlier, open housing relates peculiarly
to the cities and is meant to affect the relatively small number of
159 LAURENTI, supra note 155, at 236.160 LAURENT, supra note 155, at 233. Laurenti takes the quote from NATIONAL
Coammury RELATIONS ADVISORY CoUNcIL, EQUALrrY OF OPPORTUNITY IN
HOUSING, A HANDIBOO OF FAcrs (1952).
161 LAURENTI, supra note 155, at 56.
162 Id. at 233.
163 Id. at 235.
164 Id.
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minority group members who can afford to buy or rent better
living quarters, but are prevented by discrimination from doing
so. The Kentucky situation, then, must be examined in light of
the character of the state's minority population, their living con-
ditions, and their ability to escape these conditions should
racially restrictive barriers be lowered. From this examination it
should be possible to draw conclusions on the need for, and the
possible effects of, open housing laws.
A. Characteristics of Kentucky's Minority Population
The 1960 Census of Population'65 showed that the Negro
population of Kentucky was 215,949, or 7.1 per cent of the overall
population. 166 Kentucky's Negro to white ratio is lower than that
of most nearby states except Indiana.167 The rate of Negro
population growth within the Commonwealth has also been much
smaller than that of the contiguous states. 68
As would be expected, the largest concentration of Negroes
within the Commonwealth is within the two largest metropolitan
areas, Louisville and Lexington. It is interesting, and perhaps
surprising, that there are large sections of the state in which the
presence of Negroes is negligible. 69 Eastern Kentucky is the best
example. In this forty county area there are fewer than two
Negroes for every one hundred people.170 This relative absence of
165 U.S. BuREAU or TmE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPUILATON, 1960.
166 Other minorities: Indian 391; Japanese 774; Chinese 288; Filipino 236;
other 435.
167 For comparison: Alabama 30%; Indiana 5.8%; Illinois 10.3%; Mississippi
42%; Missouri 9%; Ohio 8.1%; Tennessee 16.5%; Virginia 20.6%.
168 For comparison: Alabama 983,290 to 980,271; Indiana 121,916 to
269,275; Illinois 387,486 to 1,037,470; Mississippi 1,074,578 to 915,743; Missouri
244,386 to 390,853; Ohio 339,461 to 786,097; Tennessee 508,736 to 586,786;
Virginia 661,449 to 816,258.
169 See map, Appendix IV infra.
170 Negro distribution in Kentucky by region:
Negro % of % of
Region Population population state pop. Negro pop.
E. Ky. (40 cos.) 747,187 14,899 24.6 6.9
W. Ky. (32 cos.) 645,981 53,283 21.2 23.9
N. Ky. (7 cos.) 260,745 5,313 8.6 2.5
N. C. Ky. (23 cos.) 499,841 50,239 16.5 23.9
S.C. Ky. (17 cos.) 252,053 11,389 8.3 5.3
Jefferson Co. 610,947 78,350 20.1 36.5
For counties in each region, see map infra.
Negro density by region, i.e., Negroes per 100 population.
(40 cos.) 1.9
(34 cos.) 1.0
E. Ky. ( 6 cos.) 3.9 (Bell, Harlan, Letcher, Mason, Perry, Pike)
(Continued on next page"
[Vol. 56,
Negroes undoubtedly results from the fact that, historically, the
topography of Eastern Kentucky created a situation in which the
use of slaves was unprofitable. Indeed, the major concentration of
Negroes within Eastern Kentucky is in the larger coal counties
and in the river town of Maysville. The settling of Negroes within
the coal counties was instituted when Negro labor was imported
to build the railroads and work the rivers.
Northern Kentucky likewise has relatively few Negroes, per-
haps for the reason that this area is, in essence, but a suburb of
Cincinnati. Negroes settle in the larger urban center of Cin-
cinnati, rather than in Covington and Newport, because their jobs
are in Cincinnati.
There is a heavy concentration of Negroes in western counties
of the state, particularly those along the Tennessee border.171
Christian County, for example, is 22.4 per cent Negro. But in the
state as a whole there does not seem to be a great problem in
terms of a large minority population. Seventy-two of the state's
one hundred and twenty counties have a Negro population of
under five per cent, and thirty-four counties have fewer than one
hundred Negroes. 17 2
The mobility of the population is an important aspect of the
problem for it tends to show which areas are growing and where
the pressure for housing is created. The decade of the fifties show-
ed a great movement in Kentucky's population, with eighty-eight
counties showing losses in overall population and ninety-two
decreasing in Negro inhabitants. The forty Appalachian counties
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
W. Ky. (32 cos.) 8.3(27 cos.) 5.9( 5 cos.) 13.1 (Christian, Henderson, Hopkins, Logan, McCracken)
N. Ky. ( 7 cos.) 2.2( 5cos.) 1.2
(2 cos.) 2.2 (Campbell, Kenton)
N. C. Ky. (22 cos.) 7.8
( 1 cos.) 15.2 (Fayette)
S.C. Ky. (17cos.) 4.3
Jefferson Co. 12.8
171 Western counties, 10% or more Negro: Christian 22.4%; Fulton 17.6%;
Logan 11.1%; McCracken 10.9%; Simpson 13.9%; Todd 16.6%; Trigg 17.0%.
172 Bracken 63; Breathitt 49; Butler 72; Carlisle 84; Carter 11; Casey 45;
Clinton 30; Elliott 0; Estill 41; Gallatin 100; Grant 59; Grayson 80; Jackson 0;
Johnson 1; Lawrence 41; Lee 52; Leslie 0; Lewis 20; Livingston 78; Magoffin 1;
Marshall 10; Martin 2; McCreary 0; McClean 60; Menifee 11; Morgan 7; Owsley




suffered a disproportionate share of the loss because thirty-five
decreased in population. This general movement from Eastern
Kentucky resulting from the automation of the coal industry, was,
in most cases, matched by an even greater exodus of Negroes. Pike
County, for example, lost fifty-two per cent of its Negro popula-
tion, while losing only fourteen per cent of its whites.
The greatest population increases were in those counties which
contain or are near large cities. This reflects the nationwide
population shift from rural and small-town environments to the
urban areas. The Negro population increases, however, did not
keep abreast with the overall population increases. In those
eighteen counties which showed an increase of over ten per cent, 73
Negro population increased in only nine. 7 4 In fact, of the thirty-
six counties in the state which have over one thousand Negroes,
only sixteen showed increases in Negro population, and the in-
crease in most of these was negligible.1'75
The critical areas of the state, those with a relatively great
number of Negroes and a propensity for that number to increase,
would be in the following counties: Jefferson, Fayette, Daviess,
McCracken, Christian, and perhaps Franklin. It is not surprising
that these counties also contain six of the state's ten largest
cities. 176 Of the state's largest cities, Louisville, Lexington, and
Hopkinsville have shown the greatest increase in Negro popula-
tion. 77 Because of this, a closer examination of the particular
'73 Boone 68.6%; Bullitt 38.6%; Campbell 13.9%; Christian 34.3%; Clark
11.5%; Daviess 23.3%; Fayette 30.9%; Franklin 13.5%; Greenup 17.5%; Hardin
34.7%; Jefferson 26.1%; Kenton 15.8%; Marshall 25%; McCracken 16.6%; Meade
10.1%; Nelson 13.6%; Oldham 21.5%; Taylor 13.1%.
'74 Christian, 9,871 to 12,192; Daviess, 2,923 to 3,107; Fayette, 17,394 to
20,037; Hardin, 2,846 to 4,597; Jefferson, 62,620 to 78,350; McCracken, 5,964 to
6,207; Meade, 333 to 842; Nelson, 1,587 to 1,745; Franklin, 1,204 to 1,258.
175 E.g., Barren 391; Clark 111; Montgomery 5; Scott 12; Shelby 155;
Simpson 102; Trigg 61.
176 Christian-Hopkinsville; Daviess-Owensboro; Fayette-Lexington; Frank-
lin-Frankfort; Jefferson-Louisville; McCracken-Paducah.
177 Populations-total and Negro-Cities of over 10,000 people-1950 and 1960.
City 1950 1960 1950 1960
(total) (total) change (Negro) (Negro) change
1. Louisville 369,129 390,639 21,510 57,657 70,075 12,418
2. Lexington 55,534 62,810 7,276 13,655 16,192 2,537
3. Covington 64,452 60,376 -4,076 3,574 3,483 -91
4. Owensboro 33,651 42,471 8,820 2,518 2,813 295
5. Paducah 32,828 34,479 1,651 5,360 5,586 226
6. Ashland 31,131 31,283 152 782 828 46
7. Newport 30,070 31,044 974 977 780 -197
(Continued on next page)
[Vol. 56,
1967] NoTEs 179
population characteristics in these three communities will be
made.17 8 This examination will include not only the Negro and
white population within the city limits, but characteristics in the
area beyond the city as well. This will give an indication of the
phenomenon, "white flight," which was discussed earlier. The
distribution of Negroes within the city and outside will give an
indication of whether that phenomenon which has been called a
"white noose" is developing around predominately Negro central
cities.
The two metropolitan areas of Louisville and Lexington ex-
hibit these characteristics more than the relatively smaller com-
munity of Hopkinsville. The Negro population of Louisville in-
creased by almost twenty-two per cent during the fifties, and a
similar increase seems to be occurring in the present decade. A
special census taken in 1964 revealed that Louisville's Negro
population had increased by almost 8,000 during the first years
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
8. Bowling Green 18,347 28,338 991 2,533 3,256 723
9. Hopkinsville 12,526 19,465 6,939 3,852 5,325 1,437
10. Frankfort 11,916 18,365 6,449 1,488 2,397 909
11. Henderson 16,832 16,892 60 2,499 2,567 118
12. Shively 2,401 15,155 12,754 0 2 2
13. Fort Thomas 10,870 14,896 4,026 17 36 19
14. Madisonville 11,132 13,110 1,978 1,182 1,752 -60
15. Middlesboro 14,482 12,607 -1,875 1,177 990 -187
16. Richmond 10,268 12,168 1,900 1,654 1,806 152
17. Mayfield 8,990 10,762 1,772 1,064 1,185 121
18. Valley Station" 10,553 -1 -
19. Winchester 9,226 10,187 961 1,525 1,786 261
20. Glasgow 7,025 10,069 3,044 768 993 228
0 The population of Valley Station was not available in the 1950 census
figures. Apparently, at that time, it had fewer than one thousand inhabitants.17 8 Fpopulation statistics-Louisville and Jefferson County, Lexington and
Fayette County, and Hopkinsvile and Christian County: col. (1), shows popula-tions of the areas in 1950 and 1960; col. (2), the Negro populations, 1950 and
1960; col. (3), the percentage of the total population which was Negro in 1950
and 1960; col. (4), the p ercentage of the total increase in population which was
white and Negro; col. (5), the percentage by wvhich the white population in-
creased, and by which the Negro population increased. The third area in each
area grouping, i.e., Co. bal., represents that area of the county outside the city
limits.
(4) % o 't.tal
(I) Population (2) Negro pop (3) ' Negro increase (5) % inr.
1950 1960 1950 1960 1950 1960 wite Negro white Negro
Jell. Co. 484,615 810.947 62,610 78,350 18.9 12.9 88.3 13.5 23.9 2.5.1
Louisville 869.129 390.639 57.565 70,075 13.6 17.9 42.3 37.7 2.9 21.5
o. hal. 115,480 220,308 4.963 8.275 4.3 3.8 98.8 3.2 91.8 68.7
Fayette Co. 100,746 131,998 17,954 20.037 17.5 15.3 92.2 7.8 34.1 13.9
Lexington 55,534 82.810 13.655 16.192 24.6 25.8 64.9 35.1 11.2 18.6
Co. hal. 45,214 89.036 3,939 3,845 8.7 3.6 100.4 -0.4 58.1 -2.4
Chriot'n Co. 42.359 56.904 9.871 12,192 23.3 21.4 84.0 6.0 37.6 23.5
lapk'vflle 12,526 19.565 3,852 5,325 30.8 217.4 78.8 21.2 65.3 38.2
Co. bll 29.833 :17,439 6,019 6,867 20.2 18.3 88.9 11.1 28.4 14.1
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of this decade 79 as compared with an increase of only 12,500 from
1950 to 1960. Especially significant was the fact that almost fifty-
eight per cent of Louisville's population increase during the
fifties was in the Negro population. This raised the proportion of
Negroes in Louisville from 15.6 per cent in 1950 to about eighteen
per cent in 1960. This was a gain of almost 2.5 per cent in ten
years. This rate of Negro increase appears to be accelerating at an
even faster pace now since the proportion of Negroes in Louisville
in 1964 was 20.1 per cent.180
Ironically, during the first four years of this decade the overall
population of Louisville declined, while the Negro population in-
creased by about twelve per cent. This increase is probably the
result of the urban renewal program in Louisville. When Negro
neighborhoods were destroyed, the uprooted inhabitants moved
into the West End of the city."" But when white areas are destroy-
ed, the inhabitants either moved to the suburbs themselves or
started a process of replacement which drove other whites into
suburban areas.
This movement of Negroes into the "West End" during the
first four years of the decade is graphically portrayed in the census
tract statistics.
In one census tract... there was a solitary Negro at the time
of the regular 10 year census in 1960. By 1964,... there were
300 Negroes in this tract. At the same time, this tracts over-
all population declined almost 6 per cent, which means whites
left the area .... Another tract increased from 8 Negroes in
1960 to 1,315 four years later.... Other West End areas show-
ed big increases in the number of Negroes: one tract went
from 972 to 2,278, another from 910 to 2,805, another from
2,326 to 4,453182
The amazing rise in the number of Negroes within the city
limits has been more than matched by the increase in white
population in suburban areas. Whites accounted for 96.8 per cent
of the population growth in that area of Jefferson County beyond
Louisville between 1950 and 1960. The suburban communities
surrounding Louisville are notable for their lack of Negro in-
179 Cincinnati Enquirer, April 23, 1967, § E, at 3, col. 3.180 Id.
181 Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 11, 1966, § D, at 1, col. 2.
382 Id. at col. 1 & 2.
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habitants. Shively, for example, is a suburb of Louisville and its
remarkable growth has made it the state's tenth largest city. Its
1960 population of 15,515 included a total of two Negroes. St.
Matthews had thirteen Negroes in a population of 8,783; Valley
Station had one in 10,553.
The census map for Jefferson County portrays this inequitable
distribution.183 It can be seen that most of the Negro population
of the county lies within the central and western portion of
Louisville, while the remaining Negroes are scattered throughout
the outlying regions in the eastern part of the county. The south-
ern areas of the county show a Negro distribution of fewer than
one per cent. *
The census map for Fayette County shows a similar pattern of
distribution.'84 Negroes inhabit the central and northern sections
of Lexington, while the remaining sections of the city and the
suburban developments are almost entirely white. The remaining
Negroes in the county are, again, scattered through the outlying
underdeveloped areas.
Within the decade of the fifties, the Negro population of
Lexington increased 18.6 per cent. s5 In the county beyond the city
limits it declined by 2.4 per cent. The percentage increase in the
number of Negroes within the city limits increased 1.2 per cent
during the decade, so the problem of an influx of Negroes would
not appear to be as great in Lexington as it is in Louisville. How-
ever, as in Louisville, there does appear to be a concentration of
white suburbs surrounding the larger city, as the white popula-
tion of the county outside of Lexington increased by about fifty-
eight per cent during this period, and the percentage of Negroes in
this area decreased from 8.5 to 5.6 per cent.
Hopkinsville is not as large as either Louisville or Lexington
and thus does not have the suburban areas characteristic of those
two cities.18 6 Furthermore, it lies in an area which has traditionally
had a large number of Negroes. As a result, with the great in-
crease in the number of white inhabitants during the decade, per-
haps increased with the expansion of Fort Campbell, the Negro
density actually declined 3.4 per cent within the city even though
183 See map, Appendix V infra.
1s4 See map, Appendix VI infra.




the Negro population increased thirty-eight per cent-an increase
greater than that of either Louisville or Lexington.18 7 Yet, this
increase is important in absolute rather than in relative terms,
because it reflects the greater pressure for housing exerted by
Negroes, especially when they are confined by a limited market.
The population figures for Christian County outside of
Hopkinsville do, to some extent, reflect a tendency of whites to
inhabit exclusive suburban areas.' Whites accounted for ninety
per cent of the population growth in this area while in 1950 they
comprised only eighty per cent of the extra-city population. But
any conclusion of white movement to the suburbs in Hopkinsville
must be tempered by the fact that the population of Hopkinsville
is only thirty-six per cent that of Christian County in its entirety.
B. Negro Housing Conditions
The census maps and, indeed, a casual trip through the Negro
section of Kentucky's cities, reveal that Negroes invariably inhabit
the oldest and poorest housing stock. This is due, in large measure,
to the fact that Negroes have long occupied the lowest levels on
the income scale and have been unable to rent or purchase better
housing. However, factors other than lack of income contribute
to this squalor. In a market which restricts the housing choices
open to a certain group of people, there is a great demand but
little available supply. The landlord who rents to Negroes under
such circumstances is under no economic compulsion to keep the
rented quarters in good repair. With the high demand, the land-
lord will always have a ready tenant and will always get his price.
The comparison of substandard housing occupied by whites
with that occupied by Negroes in the metropolitan areas of Louis-
ville and Lexington show some differences. The Census of
Housing gives three classifications for assessing the quality of
housing: sound, deteriorating, and dilapidated. The latter two
make up what is called "substandard" housing. In 1960, fifty-two
per cent of Lexington's Negro population lived in substandard
housing, compared with only twelve per cent of the whites.8 9 The
187 Id.
188 See note 178 supra.
189 Condition of white and Negro occupied housing in metropolitan Lexington
and Metropolitan Louisville.*
(Continued on next page)
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figures are similar for Louisville, but not quite as severe. There,
about forty per cent of the Negroes live in substandard housing,
compared with about fourteen per cent of the whites.
In rental housing, where the majority of Negroes live, 90 the
problem of substandard housing is much worse. 191 For example, in
Lexington, 54.5 per cent of the dwellings rented by Negroes are
substandard, while only thirty per cent of those rented by
whites are so classified. The discrepancy is much the same in
Louisville, and in both cities, it compares with only twenty-two
per cent substandard white-rented residences. It has been sub-
gested that:
If open housing were put into effect in Louisville, rents in
Negro areas would fall immediately. Why? Because if a Negro
could rent a solid house or apartment for $75 or even $90 in
the South or East end, then landlords in the West end would
have to drop their rents to remain competitive. (Or they
would have to fix up their properties.) 192
It has likewise been suggested that freeing Negroes to purchase
houses in different sections of the cities would lead to a gradual
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Metro. Lexington Metro. Louisville
white Negro white Negro
Sound .................................... 87.7% 47 9% .......................... 86 4% 59.9%
Deteriorating ........................ 9.1% 24.1% .......................... 10 6% 26 6%
Dilapidated .......................... 3 2% 27 9% .......................... 3 0% 13.5%
° The statistics for Louisville are drawn from the census report's classification
of the Louisville Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) and as such, in-
clude the two adjacent Indiana counties, Floyd and Clark.
190 Owner-renter ratios in Lexington and Louisville metropolitan areas.
1950 1960
white Negro white Negro
Lexington
Owner ............................ 51.4% 38.5% ....................... 59.1% 39.5%
Renter ............................ 48 6% 61.5% ....................... 40 5% 60.5%
Louisville
Owner ............................ 55 2% 34.7% .......................... 59 5% 40 5%
Renter ............................ 44 8% 65.3% .......................... 40 5% 59 5%191 Substandard housing in Louisville and Lexington metropolitan areas by
status as owner or renter and race.
Lexington Louisville
WhiteOwner .................................. 4.0%................................. 7.6%
Renter .............................................. 22.3% ....................... 22.4%
Negro
Owner .............................................. 30 3% ....................... 29.5%
Renter .............................................. 54.5% ....................... 47.0%
102 Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 11, 1966, § D, at 1, col. 6.
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retirement of much of this substandard housing since landlords
would not be willing to expend the money necessary to improve
their property. It would be in a sense, a natural urban renewal.
C. Negro Purchasing Power
Of course, one of the primary reasons that Negroes inhabit the
central areas of the cities is that here is found the oldest and
cheapest housing stock. Most Negroes, because of their relatively
lower income, cannot afford the luxury of newer housing. But the
income picture of the Negro is changing in Kentucky. During
the fifties, Negro income showed a remarkable increase. 193 In
1950, forty-seven per cent of the state's Negro families had in-
comes of under one thousand dollars a year; 1960, by comparison,
found only thirty-one per cent in this group. Especially sig-
nificant during that decade is the rise in the number of Negro
families earning over four thousand dollars a year-from three
per cent to 'twenty per cent. This rise is due partly to the fact
that more and more Negroes are becoming urban dwellers rather
than rural. This means, generally, that both their wages and costs
will be higher. Furthermore, the general rise in the cost of liv-
ing would mitigate the effectiveness, in terms of purchasing
power, of much of this gain. Nevertheless, the rise in income can,
in part, be attributed to rising job opportunities and increased
educational attainment among Negroes. With the passage of
the state law prohibiting discrimination in employment, 19 4 the
income level should rise at an even more accelerated pace.
However, even assuming that Negro family income maintains
193 Negro Household Income in Kentucky-1950 and 1960
Annual Income % of Negro Households
1950 1960
Under $1,000 ........................................................................ 46.4 30.7$1,000-1,999 .............................................................................. 28.7 22.1
$2,000-2,999 ......................................................................... 16.6 15.3$3,000-3,999 .............................................................................. 5.2 12.0$4,000-4,999 .............................................................................. 1.7 8.8$5,000-5,999 .............................................................................. .6 4.6
$6,000-6,999 ............................................................................. .8 2.4$7,000-7,999 .............................................................................. .2 1.6$8,000-8,999 .............................................................................. .05 .9$9,000-9,999 .............................................................................. .05 .6
O ver $10,000 ............................................................................ .1 .9
194 KRS § 244.040 (1966).
Nors
the growth rate that it showed in the fifties,195 by 1968, thirty-four
per cent of the state's Negro families will be earning over four
thousand dollars a year, and about ten per cent will be earning
over six thousand dollars a year. But this rate of growth probably
will not remain constant since the continued movement of
Negroes into the cities will, of itself, accelerate the rise.
The fact of higher urban incomes for Negroes is reflected in
the statistics in Louisville, Lexington, and Hopkinsville, which
are all above the state average. 196 Indeed, the income level of
Negroes in the state would be much lower if Louisville was not
included in the statistics. In 1960, over forty per cent of Louis-
ville's Negro families had incomes in excess of four thousand dol-
lars annually, and almost fifteen per cent were over six thousand
dollars. The number in these categories in Lexington and Hop-
kinsville is lower, but shows signs of continued improvement. In
its analysis of the metropolitan housing market, the Lexington
and Fayette County Planning Commission reported:
Although the non-white household income distribution will
remain substantially below that for whites, the gap will
narrow during the forecast period. Although well over half
of all non-white households in 1960 had incomes under
$9,000, only 14 per cent of the net gain (in non-white popula-
tion during the 1964 to 1970 period) will be in this low income
group. The situation will be even more greatly improved
during the decade of the seventies as the number of low in-
come non-white households actually declines and the largest
growth occurs in the over $6,000 group. The result of these
changes will be a significant upgrading of the income avail-
able to non-whites for housing expenditures. 1 97
195 Negro income in Louisville, Lexington, and Hopkinsville.
Louisville Lexington Hopkinsville
Under $4,000 ...................... 59.6% .................... 77.2% .................... 76.2%$4,000-6,000 ........................ 25.9% .................... 17.5% .................... 17.6%
Over $6,000 ........................ 14.5% .................... 5.3% .................... 6.2%196 See note 193 supra.
197 City-County Planning Commission of Lexington and Fayette County, Ky.,
An Analysis of the Housing Market in Lexington and Fayette County, Ky. 27(1965). Forecasts of Household Income by Race, Metropolitan Lex-ngton
Income Group White Households Non-white Households
1964 1980 1964 1980
Under $4,000 10,880 10,550 4,700 4,500
$4,000-6,000 8,850 10,350 1,310 2,820
Over $6,000 17,740 37,000 520 2,200
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This discrepancy between income and the quality of houses
purchased is shown by comparing the value of houses owned by
whites and Negroes with the respective incomes.198 In Lexington,
for example, forty-four per cent of white-owned houses are valued
at over fifteen thousand dollars, compared with only 2.6 per
cent of Negro owned houses. In those valued at under ten
thousand dollars, twenty per cent were white owned homes and
almost seventy-nine per cent Negro owned homes. The figures
can be roughly compared with the various income groupings.
Such a comparison shows that although fifty-nine per cent of
whites had incomes of over one thousand dollars a year, more
than eighty per cent of white-owned houses were valued at over
ten thousand dollars. For Negroes, the ratio was twenty-three
per cent and twenty-one per cent. It seems apparent that, be-
cause of his income, the Negro is not able to purchase better
housing in the same extent as whites.
V. OPEN HOUSING LEGISLATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
It has been shown that there are movements in Kentucky to
combat housing discrimination. This type of discrimination is
not peculiar to Kentucky, and neither is the feeling which many
citizens have that the discrimination must be eliminated. There
has been action to eliminate housing discrimination on virtually
every level of government. A survey of this action may suggest
appropriate measures for the state and local governments in the
Commonwealth.
When the 1966 Civil Rights Bill was first introduced in the
United States House of Representatives, the drafters intended to
outlaw discrimination in all housing. However, by August 9,
when the Bill was finally passed in the House and sent to the
Senate, it specifically exempted about sixty per cent of the nation's
housing, covering only the sale or rental of single-family homes
in new subdivisions and apartment buildings containing more
than four units. In the Senate, the bill was opposed by a coalition
198 Comparison of the value of homes owned by whites and Negroes in
metropolitan Lexington.
Value White owned Negro owned
over $15,000 44.4% 2.6%
$10,000-15,000 35.8% 18.6%
under $10,000 19.8% 78.8%
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of Southern Democrats and Republicans led by Senator Dirksen
of Illinois. The ensuing filibuster could not be broken,199 and
the bill was dropped from consideration on September 19.200
On February 15, 1967, President Johnson sent to Congress
a civil rights package which included the following three-stage
plan for elimination of discrimination in all housing: 1) dis-
crimination would be prohibited immediately in the three or four
per cent of all homes already covered by federal executive orders;
2) on January 1, 1968, the law would be extended to cover the
thirty or forty per cent of all homes in real-estate developments
and large apartment houses; 3) on January 1, 1969, all housing
would come under the Act. Legislation would also make it a
federal offense to interfere with anyone exercising his civil rights
guaranteed by federal law, which rights would include purchasing
a home free of discrimination.2 0 1
However, with a much more conservative Congress this year
than in 1966, there seems to be little possibility that a federal
open housing law will be enacted. Therefore, for an analysis of
existing law and the trends in this field, one must turn to the
states and their local governments.
In 1957, New York City became the first governmental entity
to legislate against racial discrimination in the housing market
generally.20 2 This was followed the next year by a similar ordi-
nance in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.203 No state statute covered
private housing until 1959, when Colorado,204 Connecticut, 20 5
Massachusetts, 206 and Oregon20 7 adopted such laws. As of June,
1967, some nineteen states208 and twenty-eight cities2 9 had adopted
109 Two cloture votes were held. The vote on September 14 was 54 to 42 in
favor of choking off debate, ten short of the needed two-thirds majority. Twelve
moderate Republicans joined with forty-two Democrats voting for cloture, while
twenty-one Democrats, mainly from the South, and twenty-one Republicans voted
against the motion. On September 19, the motion again received a favorable but
less than adequate response, the vote standing 52 to 41 for cloture.
200 Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 20, 1966, § A, at 1, col. 1.
201 Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 16, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 6.
202 New York City Fair Housing Practices Law (N.Y. City, Local Law No.
80), Dec. 30, 1957.
203 Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 523, Dec. 15, 1958.
204 Colo. House Bill 259 (1959) [hereinafter cited as H.B.].205 Conn. Pub. Act 113 (1959).
208 Mass. Act, ch. 239 (1959).
207 ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 659.031, 659.033, 696.800 (1959).
208 Alaska Acts, ch. 49 (1962); Colo. H.B. 259 (1959); Conn. Pub. Act 113
(1959); Ind. Senate Act 115 (1965); Me. Pub. Laws, ch. 344 (1965); Mass.
iFootnote 208 continued on next page and Footnote 209 on next page)
19671 NOTES
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
anti-discrimination laws affecting some part of the private hous-
ing market.
State and local open housing laws vary widely in their cover-
age of the private housing field and in methods of enforcement,
thus defying any type of general classification. A brief look at
various laws and ordinances will illustrate the divergent ap-
proaches to open housing.
Some laws, for example those in Maine210 and New Hamp-
shire,21' extend only to rental housing, while others, such as those
in Oregon,212 Wisconsin,213 and Chicago, Illinois,21 4 cover only
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Acts, ch. 230 (1959); MICH. CONST. art. 5, 329; MIN. STAT. § 363.01-09,363.12-.13 (1962); N.H. Acts, oh. 219 (1961); N.J. Pub. Laws, ch. 106 (1961);
N.Y. Acts, ch. 414 (1961); Ohio Senate Bill 198 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S.B.];ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 659.031, 659.033, 696.300 (1959); Pa. Act No. 19 (1961);
R.I. Acts, ch. 27 (1965); Wis. Acts, ch. 439 (1965). California's present open
housing provision is made up of four laws: 1) CAL. Civ. CODE § 51-52; 2) CAL.
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-41 (Supp. 1965); 3) CAL. CIV. CODE § 53;4) 1963 Rumford Fair Housing Act The major provisions of these statutes are set
out in Appendix I.209 Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinance 2358, June 18, 1963; Ann Arbor, Mich.,Ordinance 60-65 Dee. 20, 1965; Bardstown, Ky., Ordinance, June 14, 1966;
Chicago, Ill., Ordinance, oh. 198.7-B, Sept. 11, 1963; Covington, Ky., Ordinance0-43-67, June 1, 1967; Des Moines, Iowa, Ordinance 7079, June 4, 1964; East
St. Louis, Ill., Ordinance 3913, Jan. 29, 1964; Erie, Pa., Ordinance 19, Sept. 1,
1963; Gary, Ind., Ordinance 4050, May 24, 1965; Grand Rapids, Mich., Ordinance
1628, Dec. 23, 1963; Iowa City, Iowa, Ordinance, August 18, 1964; Kalamazoo,
Mich., Ordinance 750, June 6, 1966; Madison, Wis., Ordinance 1568, Dec. 13,
1963; New Haven, Conn., Ordinance, May 14, 1964; New York, N. Y., Local Law
No. 80, April 1, 1958; Oberlin, Ohio, Ordinance 235, Nov. 20, 1961; Peoria, Ill.,Ordinance, Dec. 30, 1963; Philadelphia, Pa., Code, ch. 9-1100, (1963); Pittsburgh,
Pa., Ordinance 523, June 1, 1959; Schenectady, N.Y., Ordinance 14, 353, April 1,
1963; St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 52, 328, Feb. 6, 1964; St. Paul. Minn, Legislative
Code, ch. 74, Sept. 13, 1964; Wichita, Kan., Ordinance 27-903, Oct. 6, 1964.
The major provisions of these ordinance are set out in Appendix II. Although
research fails to disclose an ordinance, the National Committee Against Discrimina-
tion in Housing in its publication, The Fair Housing Statutes and Ordinances As
of June 1. 1965. also lists the following cities as having open housing ordinances:
Beloit, Wisconsin, effective April 1. 1964; Duluth, Minnesota, effective Oct. 19,
1963; Indianapolis. Indiana, enacted July, 1964; New London, Conn., effective
August 1, 1963; Yellow Springs, Ohio, adopted August 19, 1963.
Laws prohibiting housing discrimination also exist in the District of Columbia,
Kenton County. Ky., King County, Wash., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
In nddition, other cities, such as Cincinnati, Ohio (Ordinance 112-1965, March 17,
1965); Los Angeles. Cal. (Ordinance 131,700. Jan. 25, 1966); Minneapolis,
Minn. (Ordinance 89-33, Oct. 15, 1963); Providence, R.I. (Ordinance, ch. 1570,
Sept. 24, 1963); Seattle, Wash. (Ordinance 92 191, July 15. 1963); and the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn. (Ordinance
approved Dec. 28, 1965), have adopted policy statements against all kinds of dis-
crimination and in many instances have set un a commission to study the existing
situation and to seek conciliation of racial differences.210 Me. Pub. Laws, ch. 344 (1965).
211 N.H. Acts, ch. 219 (1961).
212 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 659.031, 659.033, 696.300 (1959).213 Wis. Act, cli. 439 (1965).
214 Ordinances oh. 198.7-B, Sept. 11, 1963.
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persons engaged in the business of selling or renting real property.
The Erie215 and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,2 16 ordinances spe-
cifically exempt personal residences offered for sale, while New
York City217 and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 218 exempt religious
and denominational organizations or charitable and educational
institutions connected with a religious organization. Still others,
for example, Indiana,21 9 Massachusetts, 2 0 and Minnesota, 21 in-
clude any advertising of covered real estate, while states and
cities such as New Jersey, 22 New York State,2 3 Ohio,224 Gary,
Indiana,2 25 Albuquerque, New Mexico,2 2 8 and Madison, Wiscon-
sin,227 include financing institutions within the coverage of their
statutes and ordinances.
When New York in 1945 enacted the first state statute pro-
hibiting discrimination in employment,228 it followed federal
precedent-29 in creating a State Commission Against Discrimina-
tion to enforce the new law. Other states copied the commission
approach, and now the enforcement of most civil rights legisla-
tion, including housing laws, is handled in this way.3 0
Although the scope, power, or resources may vary, the methods
of operation under most laws and ordinances are substantially
similar. There are basically four procedural stages for handling
a complaint:
1) an investigation to determine the facts;
215 Ordinance 19, Sept. 1, 1968.
216 Philadelphia, Pa. Code, ch. 9-1100 (1963).
217 New York City Fair Housing Practices Law (N.Y. City, Local Law No.
80), Dec. 30, 1957.
218 Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 523, Dec. 15, 1958.
219 Ind. Senate Act 115 (1965).
220 Mass. Acts, ch. 239 (1959).
221 Minn. Stat. §§ 363.01-.09, 363.12-.13 (1962).
-22 N.J. Pub. Laws, ch. 106 (1961).2 2 N.Y. Acts, Ch. 414 (1961).
224 Ohio S.B. 198 (1965).
225 Ordinance 4050, May 24, 1965.
226 Ordinance 2358, June 18, 1963.
227 Ordinance 1568, Dec. 13, 1963.
228 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 118, §§ 1-3, (frequently referred to as the
Ives-Quinn Bill).
229 In 1941, after much agitation from organized labor, President Roosevelt,
by executive order, established the Fair Employment Practices Commission, which
was to enforce another order requiring all defense contracts to include a provision
obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race,
creed, color, or national origin. The Commission was killed after five years by
Congressional refusal to renew its appropriation.
230 Maine is the only state having no official enforcement agency.
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2) an attempt to eliminate the discrimination by conference,
conciliation, and persuasion;
3) if step (2) fails, formal procedures begin, usually in the
form of a public hearing, ultimately culminating in the
issuance of an order to cease the discriminatory practice;
4) if the order is not obeyed, enforcement is sought through
the courts.
The deliberate enforcement of a law through persuasion is a
new approach to law enforcement. Generally, the commissions
operate with great circumspection, making minimal use of formal
legal procedures, and relying chiefly on conference and concilia-
tion to secure voluntary compliance with the laws. For example,
a telephone interview with the Director of the Indiana Civil
Rights Commission revealed that, of the forty-one complaints
they received in 1966, only two reached the public hearing
stage. 23'
Few states with open housing laws provide assurance that the
property in dispute will remain available to the purchaser until
final disposition of the complaint. Unless the agency has this
power in the form of a temporary restraining order prior to its
final order, the property may be sold. Therefore, several states,
led by Massachusetts, have attempted to provide adequate relief
by empowering courts to act at an earlier state of the proceed-
ings.232 A survey of commission procedures conducted in
231 Telephone interview with Mr. Harold Hatcher, Director, Indiana Civil
Rights Commission, March, 1967.
232 a) Massachusetts-After a complaint is filed and probable cause is found
to exist, the Superior Court, on application of a commissioner of the Commission,
may grant injunctive relief preventing the sale or other disposition of the property
in question until final determination by the Commission. MASS. ANN. LA'Ws, ch.
151B, § 5 (Supp. 1963).
b) California-Under the Rumford Act, after a complaint is filed with the Com-
mission and probable cause is found for its allegations, the Commission may bring
an action to enjoin the owner from selling or otherwise disposing of property until
it has ruled on the complaint. This temporary restraining order is limited to
twenty days. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35734. Though the Unruh Civil
Rights Act provides only for damages, it has been interpreted to allow injunctive
relief. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 470, 20 Cal. Rep. 609, 613,
370 P.2d 313, 317 (1962).
c) Connecticut-After a complaint is filed and probable cause is found, any three
commissioners may file a petition in equity in the circuit court seeking to restrain
and enjoin the defendant from selling or renting to anyone other than the com-
plainant or otherwise making unavailable to the complainant any housing ac-
commodation with respect to which the complaint is made, pending final determin-
ation of proceedings on the case. No temporary relief will issue until the com-
(Continued on next page)
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Massachusetts revealed, "The Massachusetts Commission is find-
ing the injunctive relief process a 'valuable and necessary tool.'
There are indications that this provision has encouraged some
landlords-both large and small-to be more co-operative in
conciliation efforts." 233
A far-reaching appraisal of the effectiveness of open housing
laws may not be available for many years since the oldest act on
the books dates back only to 1957.234 However, a look at the
activity of a few commissions may serve as a progress report on
the elimination of discrimination in the housing field to date.
The Rumford Act was passed in September, 1963, and the
California Fair Employment Practice Commission had received
440 complaints as of November 30, 1966. Of these, 101 were
closed for insufficient evidence of discrimination, another 27 were
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and in 59 the complaint was
withdrawn. All but two of the cases where discrimination was
found to exist were settled by conciliation. The Commission
also reports that more than 75% of all complaints concerned
apartment rentals, while homeowners were involved in a negligi-
ble 2% of the cases. 235
The Chicago Commission on Human Relations reports a
total of 323 complaints received since the passage of the Chicago
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
mission gives bond in an amount to be determined by the court. The respondent
shall be entitled to all damages suffered by him in case the commission fails to
rosecute to effect the action in which the relief was granted. CoNN. REv. STAT.
53-36a (Supp. 1965).
d) New York-Although the laws contain no provision for injunctive relief, the
Attorney-General can request a temporary restraining order under N.Y. Executive
Law § 63(9) pending disposition of complaints of housing discrimination.
e) Oregon-After a complaint is filed with the Commission of Labor, the alleged
violator is immediately notified of its filing and is forbidden for ninety days after
receipt of the notice from taking action which would make the property un-
available to the complainant. ORE. REv. STAT. § 659.010-.115 (Supp. 1963).
Violation of this provision gives rise to a private cause of action by the com-
plainant, in which actual and reasonable exemplary damages may be recovered.
Since there is no requirement for a showing of probable cause before the tem-
porary restraining order issues, an undue hardship is perhaps imposed upon
innocent owners.
f) Pennsylvania-After a complaint is flied, the court, upon application of the
Commission, may grant injunctive relief to restrain the sale, rental, or other dis-
position of the property until the case is settled. The injunction can be granted
for a maximum of thirty days, with extension at the discretion of the court.
Pa. Act 533, fan. 24, 25, 1966.233 TnENrs iN HoUSING, Sept. - Oct. 1963, at 5.
234 New York City Fair Housing Practice Law (N.Y. City Local Law No. 80),
Dec. 30, 1957.
235 Correspondence from the California Fair Employment Practice Commis-
sion, April 12, 1967.
KENTucXY LAw JouNAL
Fair Housing Ordinance in September, 1963. Of these, 79 were
adjusted during investigation and 70 were conciliated. Of the
remaining 174 cases, 154 were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
or no probable cause, 5 were closed after a public hearing, and
15 are pending. Of these 323 complaints, 206 alleged a refusal
to rent, while only 38 concerned a refusal to sell.236
Forty-one complaints were received by the Indiana Civil
Rights Commission in 1966. Of these, eighteen were adjusted
by conciliation, fifteen were dismissed for insufficient evidence,
and five were withdrawn by the complainant. Two hearings
were held, and two complaints are still pending.2 7
The St. Louis Council on Human Relations reports that,
during the three years in which their open housing ordinance has
been in effect, approximately seventy-five complaints have been
filed, of which fifty were conciliated on the staff level, seven were
dismissed for insufficient evidence, and six were withdrawn at
the request of the complainant. Hearings were held on twelve
complaints unresolved at the staff level; of these six were re-
solved satisfactorily for the complainant by the Council and six
were referred to the City Counselor's office for court prosecu-
tion.ms
The Ann Arbor, Michigan, Commission receives approxi-
mately twenty-five complaints a year,m 9 and the commissions of
Erie, Pennsylvania, 240 Gary, Indiana, 2 1 and the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts 242 report that their provisions had been effective
in reducing overt discrimination in housing. At the other ex-
treme, the King County, Washington, Sheriff's Department re-
ports the filing of only one complaint in three years, and it was
subsequently dismissed for insufficient evidence of any discrimin-
atory practice. The reason put forth by the Sheriff's Office for
236 Correspondence from Mrs. Naomi B. Brodikey, Chicago Commission on
Human Relations, April 18, 1967.
237 See note 231 supra.
238 Correspondence from Mr. W. J. Duford, Commissioner, St. Louis Council
on Human Relations, March 16, 1967.
239 Correspondence from Mr. D. Cowley, Ann Arbor Human Relations Com-
mission, March, 1967.
240 Correspondence from Mr. Leonard L. Karter, Executive Director, Erie
Human Relations Commission, March 16, 1967.
241 Correspondence from Mr. Charles H. King, Jr., Executive Director, Gary
Human Relations Commission, March 15, 1967.
242 Correspondence from Mr. Malcolm C. Webber, Chairman, Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, March 21, 1967.
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NOTES
the lack of activity is that there is no evidence of any discrimina-
tion in the county.243 With the exception of King County, the
above-mentioned commissions have reported that the present
laws were both necessary and in need of fortification by the
elimination of exemption clauses. At the same time, all believe
that, while the laws have improved the situation greatly, no
statute will eliminate the problem entirely.24
Although the early laws in this field were rather limited in
scope,2 45 the trend of the acts is toward more comprehensive
coverage of the housing field, applying alike to owners, builders
brokers, and mortgage lenders. 246  There is also a movement
toward more effective administration and enforcement of the
statutes. Eight of the nineteen states now permit the commis-
sion to initiate proceedings on its own motion without waiting
for a complaint,2 47 while such cities as Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,248
New York City,2 49 Albuquerque, New Mexico,2 50 and Gary,
Indiana,25 1 also allow such procedure. Two states authorize an-
other authority, such as the attorney general, to file complaints
with the commissions.252
Activity on the part of civil rights groups for action in this
field has also increased. In comparison with 1963, when cam-
paigns were waged in only twelve states,253 1965 saw various
groups in twenty-one states lobbying for initiation of laws to
apply to the general housing market or for measures to strengthen
existing statutes. Success of some degree was attained in ten of
the twenty-one states.2  .
2 43 Correspondence from Mr. Jack D. Porter, Sheriff, King County, Washing-
ton, March 17, 1967. This law does not cover the city of Seattle.
244 See notes 231, 235-42 supra.245 The early laws applied only to publicly subsidized housing.246 See Appendixes I, II infra.247 Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.2 48 Ordinance 523, June 1, 1959.
'249 Local Law No. 80, April 1, 1958.
250 Ordinance 2358, June 18, 1963.
251 Ordinance 4050, May 24, 1965.
252 New Jersey and Oregon.
253 Nat'l Comm. Against Discrimination in Housing, The Fair Housing
Statutes and Ordinances as of June 1, 1965, p. 1.254 The ten states which passed such a law are Colorado, Connecticut,
Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin. The other eleven were Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
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Several states255 and cities25 6 have also adopted what is com-
monly known as "blockbusting" or "panic peddling" laws, which
prohibit real estate brokers from soliciting the sale of real prop-
erty on the basis that impending change in the racial composition
of the neighborhood will soon adversely affect property values.
The usual punishment for such activity is either revocation or
suspension of a broker's license. In addition, open housing laws
have stimulated the formation of more than 250 local open hous-
ing groups throughout the nation, including "Welcome Neigh-
bor" pledge-signing campaigns to assure acceptance, neighborhood
stabilization efforts to maintain existing integrated patterns, and
the operation of listing services for open housing.257
However, somewhat of a countertrend may be developing in
different sections of the country, since open housing laws have re-
cently been rejected through popular referenda in-such diverse
places as Detroit, Michigan, Tacoma and SeAttle, Washington,
Akron and Toledo, Ohio, and Berkeley, California.25s
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN OPEN HOUSING LAW IN KENTucKY
A. Introduction
It should be clear that the fundamental purpose of an open
housing law259 is to prohibit vendors and lessors of housing
facilities and their agents from discriminating against prospective
buyers or tenants because of race, color, or creed.260 This pro-
hibition evolves from a policy decision that such discrimination
is inimical to national ideals embodied in the Bill of Rights, the
thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth amendments, and similar pro-
visions in state constitutions, and that such discrimination bears
255 These states include California, Connecticut, Maryland, New York, Ohio
and Pennsylvania.
256 The cities adopting such ordinances are Baltimore, Md.; Buffalo, N.Y.;
Chicago, Ill.; Detroit, Mich.; East St. Louis, Ill.; Kansas City, Mo.; Park Forest,
Ill.; Peoria, Ill.; San Francisco, Cal.; Shaker Heights, Ohio; South Euclid, Ohio;
Toledo, Ohio; Warrensville Heights, Ohio; Washington, D. C.; and Wichita,
Kansas.
257 Sloane, Housing Discrimination-The Response of Law, 42 N.C.L. REV.
106, 127 (1963).2 5 8 See Appendix III. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1965, § 8 (Review),
at 1, col. 1.259 This term is used because of the three alternatives ("fair," "forced," and
"open") it seems to be the most neutral term.
260 For an analysis of various laws on the subject already enacted, see text
at notes 199-258 supra.
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no rational relation to any reasonable interest of the property
owner. Thus, it establishes that the color of a man's skin is ir-
relevant to a sale or rental of real estate. However, since an open
housing law inhibits the hitherto free choice of sellers and land-
lords, many feel that it is inconsistent with the "basic economic
norms embodied in our due process clauses, state and federal." 261
In addition it is contended that such a law creates "forced hous-
ing,"26 2 thus depriving homeowners of a fundamental right-the
"freedom of choice." 263 The contentions of those opposing "open"
or "forced" housing might be better understood if set out at
some length.
The fourteenth amendment requires that a man's property
shall not be taken from him without due process of law; is the
effect only to protect physical property? Few would suggest that
"property" is so limited. The National Association of Real
Estate Boards in a statement of policy has asserted:
We hold steadfastly to the principle that the right to own,
rent and dispose of real property, and the right to use it
freely within the limits of necessary measures to protect the
public health and safety, are traditional, constitutionally
guaranteed to each citizen, and indispensable to the mainte-
nance of a free society of free men.264
The Supreme Court has echoed similar sentiments in saying that:
"property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It
is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dis-
pose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of
property." 26 5 This constitutional right to dispose of property
gives rise to the right to dispose of that property to whomever
one wishes. It is contended that this right is such that "however
arbitrary or capricious a private property owner's refusal to deal
with a prospective tenant or purchaser may be, the state may not
2 6 1 AVINS, OPEN OCCUPANCY VS. FoRcED HousING UNDER= E FoUnTEmNm
AwamNrrT: Symposrwr! 8 (1963).262 This term is commonly used by those who oppose open housing legisla-
tion. It carries the connotation that open housing involves the forced sale or rental
of property. A good example of this is an advertisement used by the Louisville
Board of Realtors. Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 2, 1967, § A, at 9, col. 1-3.
263 This is a term realtors and other opponents of open housing legislation use
quite frequently. See Avins, Anti-Discrimination Legislation as an Infringement
on Freedom of Choice, 6 N.Y.L.F. 13 (1960). See also text at notes 270-79 infra.2 64 Statement of Policy, Adopted by NAREB, Nov. 14, 1963.
2 65 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
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interfere, for this is the very essence of private property."2 6 In
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat,267 a case
often cited as support for this proposition, the court "supposed
that it was elementary law that a trader could buy from whom he
pleased and sell to whom he pleased, and that his selection of
seller and buyer was wholly his own concern." 2 8 The Cream of
Wheat court also quoted with approval the following from Cooley
on Torts: "It is part of every man's civil rights that he be at
liberty to refuse business relations with any person whomever,
whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the result of whim,
caprice, prejudice, or malice." 269 Some opponents contend that
an open housing law, by depriving property owners of the right
to freely choose prospective buyers, amounts to an invalid at-
tempt to transform a private enterprise into a public utility.
A public utility "must serve all . .. without discrimination,"
and these "onerous duties" may not be imposed on private
businesses by "legislative fiat," for "that would be taking
private property for public use without just compensation."
Since anti-discrimination legislation in housing attempts to
impose the obligation of public utilities on private businesses,
it is unconstitutional.27 0
In addition to the fourteenth amendment property rights
argument, opponents of "forced" housing base their resistance
on "freedom of choice." The following line of argument is
rather typical: "The right to individual and uncoerced freedom
of choice and association, including the right of the individual
to decline to associate with another, is an individual right, a
human right, and a civil right, and such right to choose to as-
sociate or decline to associate extends to ethnic grounds. '27 1
Viewed in this light, "freedom of choice" could be no less than
basic to a democratic society. But in a democratic society whose
framework is a constitution and laws, if such a freedom exists, it
must have its basis in some provision of the constitution. The
United States Constitution has never been interpreted as provid-
268 AvrNs, supra note 261, at 11.
267 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
268 Id. at 48.
289 CooLEY, TORTS 587 (3d ed. 1906).27o AvINs, supra note 261, at 10. The author is quoting Michigan Pub. Util.
Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1925).
271 Avins, supra note 268, at 25.
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ing for an independent, unequivocal right called "freedom of
choice."
In surveying literature circulated by proponents of this argu-
ment,272 it becomes apparent that "freedom of choice" includes
many different creatures. On one hand, it may be a freedom to
choose prospective buyers or renters, and on the other it may be
a sort of freedom of association.273 It becomes clear that where
"freedom of choice" exists, it springs from a fundamental right.
There is a right to vote,274 to attend church,275 to voice an
opinion,276 or to sell property.277 All of these involve the so-called
"freedom of choice," because all of these acts may be done or not
at the individual's pleasure. However, all find their origin in an
independent fundamental right. Is there also a freedom to choose
the type of neighborhood one wishes to live in? Does any gov-
ernmentally induced (or forced) change in the character of that
neighborhood violate that freedom to choose? If such a freedom
exists, it would seem to be a type of first amendment, "freedom
of association" right. It would be enforced against state govern-
ment by the guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, that no one
shall be "deprived of ... liberty . without due process of
law."278
Kentuckians are also protected against similar incursions of
their "freedom of choice" by Section Two of the Kentucky Con-
stitution which provides: "Absolute and arbitrary power over the
lives, liberty and property of free-men exists nowhere in a re-
public, not even in the largest majority." 27  So, in the final
analysis, opponents of "forced housing" are contending that a
272 In truth, few proponents of this argument are actually putting their views
into print. The Realtors' Commissions and Professor Avins furnish virtually the
entire published opposition to open housing legislation. Avins work cited supra
sufficiently defines his position. For further examples of the realtors' views, see
CoNsEn, HumAN Ri-IHTS AND THE REALTOR (a phamphlet reproducing editorials
from REALTOR'S HEADLNEs, Sept., Oct. & Nov. 19683).
273 This freedom is well-defined in Douglas, The Rights of Association, 63
COLUm. L. REv. 1361 (1963); Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of
Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Feilman, Constitutional Rights of Association.
1961 Sup. CT. REv. 74.
274 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1.
275 U.S. CoNsr. amend. 1.
278 Id.
277 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
278 Id.
279 Ky. CONSr. § 2. This section has been interpreted as being roughly
identical to the fourteenth amendment. Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky.
1964).
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state's prohibition of discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing is unconstitutional because it deprives individuals of
liberty and property without due process of law.
B. General Constitutionality of an Open Housing Law
1. The Nature of Due Process.-As already established, prop-
erty rights and "freedom of choice" are not absolutely guaranteed
against state incursions. The guarantee goes only to deprivations
without due process of law. Thus the first question for con-
sideration is: What is due process of law?
In a classic case on substantive due process, Palko v. Connecti-
cut,2 0 Mr. Justice Cardozo asserted that due process is composed
of those things which are "of the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty." 281 It involves "principle[s] of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental." 2 2 On another occasion the Court pronounced
that "in each case 'due process of law' requires an evaluation
based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science,
on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the de-
tached consideration of conflicting claims . . . on a judgment
not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the
needs both of continuity and of change in progressive society." 28
In spite of the force of the Court's rhetoric, one is left with
gnawing doubts about the real character of due process. It does
not become clear from the foregoing what actions a state can take
without violating due process of law. However, the Court has
not always been so inscrutable. In Nebbia v. New York, 28 4 due
process was held to demand "only that the law shall not be un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to
be attained. ' 2 5 It must logically follow from this principle that
280 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
281 Id. at 325.
282 Id.
283 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1950). Although both this case
and Palko involved criminal prosecutions, it would seem that the general definition
of due process would remain unchanged regardless of the type of case involved;
the only difference should lie in application.
284 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
285 Id. at 525.
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the object sought to be obtained cannot be something outside
the state's authority.2 8
For a Kentucky law or ordinance, legitimacy under the fed-
eral constitution would be only half the battle. However, the
Court of Appeals has asserted that Kentucky's constitutional
prohibition of "arbitrary power"287 embodies the same basic
guarantees as the fourteenth amendment. 28 8 Thus, Kentucky's
protection against "arbitrary power" and the federal requirement
of due process are virtually synonymous in meaning. The Ken-
tucky Court has chosen to allow legislators the same leeway which
the Supreme Court would grant, determining only whether the
"law is reasonably within the scope of a legitimate public pur-
pose."28 9
2. The Police Power.-The test for due process indicates
that for each law two questions must be answered. 1) Is the legis-
lature pursuing a "legitimate public purpose"? 2) If so, is the
law reasonably within the scope of that purpose?
A prerequisite to answering either question is an exploration
of the public purpose involved in an open housing law. The
Court of Appeals has stated:
To a degree and in a sense, practically every law enacted by
the legislative departments in our form of government
emanates from authority conferred by and springing from
the exercise of the Police Power. Its fundamental purpose is
the bettering of the conditions of living, and involves a
multiplicity of objects looking to that end-chiefly the im-
provement of morals, health, education, co-operation, and
all things else tending to make government ball bearing and
smooth running.290
Thus, the police power must be the basis for sustaining an
open housing law. This concept, like due process, has always
286 In spite of the way the test is set forth in one sentence, reason tells us it
must be a two-part test. If the "object sought to be obtained" was something
utterly outside the state's power, the law would be voided regardless of its re-
lation to the "object." Thus we look not only to the validity of the legislature's
means, but to its end as well.
287 KY. CoNsT. § 2.
288 Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964).
29 Id. at 883.
290 City of Louisville v. Kuhn, 284 Ky. 684, 686-87, 145 S.W.2d 851, 853
(1940).
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proved difficult to define. Kentucky's Court has made such at-
tempts as: police power "is the right on the part of the Legis-
lature ... to regulate, deal with, curtail, or even prohibit certain
engagements, conduct, or acts tending to suppress or injuriously
affect movements, measures or schemes in furtherance of a
permissible and authorized public policy." 291 Some doubt re-
mains in spite of this effort. Perhaps it is best to say merely that
"everything contrary to public policy or inimical to the public
interest is the subject of the exercise of the public power." 292
The traditional bases of the police power are the areas of public
safety, health, morals, and general welfare.293
Obviously the police power is a broad, comprehensive con-
cept, but does its scope encompass an open housing law? The
public interest involved in an open housing law is very broad,
perhaps to the extent of encompassing all of the four traditional
bases of the police power. A recent New Jersey case which
enumerates the evils of housing discrimination supports this
theory.
Discrimination against Negroes in the sale and rental of
housing accommodations results in inadequate housing for
them and in segregation in housing. They are thus compelled
in large numbers to live in circumscribed areas under sub-
standard, unhealthy, unsanitary, and crowded living con-
ditions. These conditions in turn produce disease, increased
mortality, unstable family life, moral laxity, crime, delin-
quency, risk of fire, loss of tax revenue and intergroup ten-
sions.... Standards of sanitation have to be sacrificed because
strict enforcement of building and health codes will simply
make a great many people homeless .... All of these things
imperil the tranquility of a community. In addition, sub-
standard and segregated housing seriously complicates the
problem of public school integration.29 4
Perhaps it would be simplest to support an open housing
law on the basis of the "general or public welfare." 2 5 The Court
291 Workman's Comp. Bd. of Ky. v. Abbot, 212 Ky. 123, 129, 278 S.W. 533,
536 (1925).
292 Gross v. Commonwealth, 256 Ky. 19, 23, 75 S.W.2d 558, 560 (1984).
293 These four areas are usually spoken of as the subjects of the police power.
See, e.g., Goodpaster v. Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Ass'n, 279 Ky. 92,
129 S.W.2d 1033 (1939); Ware v. Ammon, 212 Ky. 152, 278 S.W. 593 (1925).
294 Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481, 485 (1962).
295 This is a very broad area. It involves no stretching of "public welfare" to
include within its bounds a prohibition of racial discrimination in housing.
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of Appeals has given Kentucky lawmakers wide latitude in en-
acting laws for the "public welfare." Its position in this regard
has been made quite clear by cases such as Moore v. Ward,9 6
where the Court asserted that:
It is peculiarly within the province of the legislature to
assimilate, consider, and weigh all the factors which inhere
in the concept of public welfare. When the courts repeatedly
assert that they have no authority to challenge the wisdom of
a statute, it is a recognition that the legislature may within
extremely broad limits determine "its own standard of public
welfare."297
The Court of Appeals, like the United States Supreme Court,
has gotten out of the "super legislature"298 business. Both Courts
went through an era in which they invalidated economic regula-
tion quite readily.29 9 But as the laissez-faire economics which
motivated the earlier decisions became somewhat passe, both
Courts discovered that "the fourteenth amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."300
Even though the statement that the Court of Appeals would
view an open housing law as bearing a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose is speculative, a contrary decision
would be rather difficult to square with cases like Jasper v. Com-
monwealth,301 wherein the Court held that the police power is
as "broad and comprehensive as the demands of society make
necessary . . . . It must keep pace with changing concepts of
public welfare."302 Likewise federal constitutionality should be
assured by cases such as Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri,303 and
Railway Express Agency v. New York "04 wherein the Supreme
2968377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964).
297 Id. at 884. The Court of Appeals was quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952.2 98 The term "super-legislature" was used by Mr. Justice Douglas in the
Day-Brite case, id., when he said: "Our recent decisions make plain that we do
not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide
whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare."
299 For an account of this period in the Supreme Court's history, see Wucrr,
TnE CRowvH oF AImucAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1942). For Kentucky
examples, see Black v. O'Hara, 175 Ky. 623, 194 S.W. 811 (1917); Tilford v.
Belknap, 126 Ky. 244, 103 S.W. 289 (1907).
30u Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
301 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964).
302 Id. at 711.
303 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
204 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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Court constantly reiterates that it does "not sit to weigh evidence
on the due process issue in order to determine whether the regu-
lation is sound or appropriate." 30 5 The conclusion must be that
the federal due process standards are virtually identical with
Kentucky's in the area of economic regulations, and an open
housing law does no violence to either.306
3. Due Process Constitutionality in Other Jurisdictions.-
Perhaps to further bolster the proposition that open housing laws
could meet constitutional challenge in Kentucky, it would be
helpful to survey the constitutional status of open housing laws
in other states. As pointed out in the survey contained in this
article,307 seventeen states and twenty-five municipalities have
already passed laws regulating some aspect of the problem. A
brief look at some of the state court decisions passing on the
constitutionality of these statutes would seem helpful to the
present discussion.
A leading case is Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v.
Case.308 Sustaining the general validity of an open housing statute,
the Colorado court said:
We hold that as an unenumerated inalienable right a man has
the right to acquire one of the necessities of life, a home for
himself and those dependent upon him, unfettered by dis-
crimination against him on account of his race, creed or color.
The act of the legislature here in question is fully justified
by... the Ninth Amendment of the United States.30 9
305 Id. at 109. For additional support on the proposition that an open housing
law could withstand constitutional challenge in the nation's highest Court, see
The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination
Legislation, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526, 588 (1960).
306 Most of the constitutional arguments used by opponents of open housing
legislation are made with the private homeowner in mind. This is as it should be
because, when an open housing law is applied to a private homeowner selling his
own home, the greatest constitutional difficulties are raised. However all open
housing laws cover a greater range of transactions than the sale between two private
individuals. Most of the laws presently in operation cover real estate brokers,
landlords, and lending institutions as well (if indeed they even cover the private
sale). See Appendix I & II infra. Thus far the constitutional issues have been
discussed with the private homeowner in mind on the theory that if open housing
could survive constitutional challenge as regards that private sale, no difficulties
would arise in application to realtors, banks, or landlords. For some cases up-
holding antidiscrimination legislation as applied to businesses, see Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 224 N.E.2d
793 (Ill. 1967); Commonwealth v. Beasy, 386 S.W.2d 444 (Ky. 1965).
307 See Appendix I & II infra.
308 380 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1962).
309 Id. at 41.
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New Jersey also sustained its open housing law against due
process attack in Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp.310 The court
upheld the law by using a test identical with that employed by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals: exercise of the state's police
power "is valid so long as the regulation or limitation on the use
of property bears a reasonable relation to public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare." 311 This view was again upheld in
a 1965 case.312
The most recent case of this series involves the Chicago open
housing ordinance. 313 The Chicago Real Estate Board sought a
declaratory judgment on the validity of Chicago's ordinance
and an injunction to enjoin its enforcement. The Illinois
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the ordinance in an ex-
tremely thorough opinion which covered every constitutional
aspect of open housing legislation, and discussed at some length
the other state court decisions in this area.314 It concluded that
"th concept of due process of law has never insulated a business
from regulations deemed essential under the police power. 315
Although New York,316 Massachusetts, 317 Ohio,318s Califor-
nia,319 and Washington 320 have also had occasion to pass on the
constitutionality of open housing laws, none of these statutes were
invalidated on due process grounds.
4. Property Rights.-In spite of voluminous authority to
the contrary, opponents of open housing press their property
31037 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481 (1962).
311 Id., 181 A.2d at 484-85.
312 David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965).
313 See Appendix II, No. 5 infra.
314 Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 224 N.E.2d 793 (IIL. 1967).
315 Id. at 801.
316 New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pellham Hall Apart-
ments, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1958).
317 Massachusetts Comm n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 182 N.E.2d
595 (Mass. 1962).
318 Porter v. City of Oberlin, 30 Ohio App. 2d 158, 209 N.E.2d 629 (1964).
An earlier case, Porter v. City of Oberlin, 1 Ohio St. 2d 143, 205 N.E.2d 363
(1963), generally upheld the ordinance, but voided the enforcement pro-
cedure. The reason was that a dismissal by the enforcing commission did not
prevent later judicial action. For a criticism of these somewhat dubious grounds,
see Pearl & Terner, Fair Housing Laws: Halfway Mark, 54 GEo. L.J. 156
(1965-66).
•319 Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. Rep. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313 (1962).
320 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 365 P.2d 1,
(Wash. 1961). This case also voided the statute on grounds other than due process.
For a discussion of this case, see text at notes 340-59 infra.
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rights argument.321 The basic fallacy in this argument is the
contention that an open housing law amounts to a taking and
thus must be compensated for due process to be satisfied.322 An
open housing law, limiting the grounds for choosing buyers or
renters, only regulates one's use of his property.3 23 Obviously this
type of antidiscrimination law does not completely deprive a
seller of all "freedom of choice." It prohibits only what the law
considers unreasonable grounds for choosing-race, color, or
creed. No law requires sale or rental to a person not likely to
pay or keep the premises in good repair. Certainly even the
most ardent opponent of open housing can distinguish between
this type of regulation and a law which eliminated all "freedom
of choice" in selling property or perhaps even eliminated the
right to sell. The latter actions might well involve the taking
of a property right, but no one could seriously contend that
every restriction placed on property constitutes a taking. Of
course, federal and state requirements of due process prevent
"the legislative power of this state from arbitrarily passing a law
taking property away from one person and giving it to another
person without value received or without any contractual basis. '3 24
But it is clear that a law or ordinance could "require that
property rights be subordinated even though they are otherwise
within the protection of the Constitution."325 This entire line of
321 AvDs, OPEN OCCUPANCY VS. FoRcED HOUSING UNDER THm FoUETEmun
AMENDmENT: SYmpOSIUm 8 (1963); AvyNs, Anti-Discrimination Legislation as an
Infringement on Freedom of Choice, 6 N.Y.L.F. 13 (1960); Avins, Trade Regula-
tions, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 149 (1957).
322 They are partially correct. If property is in fact taken, due process re-
quires that compensation be paid. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897).
323 Tedifference between a taking and a regulation is often a very fine line.
In cases where it is difficult to determine which is involved, a balancing test is
employed. The public benefit gained by the regulation is balanced against the
private loss. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272 (1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
If the balancing test is applied to an open housing law, it should become
apparent that no compensation is required. Consider the evils enumerated by the
court in Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481. 485 (1962)(see text at note 294 supra). If some of these evils were eliminated by an open
housing law, the public benefit would be immeasureable. On the other side of the
scales, the private loss must be weighed. This loss can be described variously as
""freedom of choice" or a basic property right, but it seems ultimately to boil
down to little more than the opportunity to practice racial prejudice. Such a loss
carries very little weight.
324 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 632, 635, 204 S.W.2d 973,
975 (1947).
325 Bond Bros. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist.,
307 Ky. 689, 696, 211 S.W.2d 867, 871 (1948).
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argument was well summarized by the Kentucky Court of Appeals:
Almost inevitably the exercise of police power involves the
destruction or limitation of property rights without a hearing.
It is not a violation of that constitutional mandate if the
police power is properly exercised.... To say that property
is taken without due process, or without compensation, or in
abridgement of the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution, is simply another way of presenting the argu-
ment that the Act is arbitrary under section 2 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution.3 26
The strongest due process argument against an open housing
law may be the one found in a Supreme Court case327 which
originated in Kentucky. It began when Louisville passed an
ordinance to:
[P]revent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and
colored races in the city of Louisville, and to preserve the
public peace and promote the general welfare, by making
reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the
use of separate blocks for residences, places of abode and
places of assembly by white and colored people respec-
tively. -32 8
The effect of these "reasonable provisions" was to require colored
persons living on blocks where the majority of homes were oc-
cupied by colored people to sell their homes only to colored
people; white people in blocks where the majority was white
were likewise restricted.329 The Court of Appeals had no problem
sustaining the statute against due process and equal protection
attacks. 3 0 In the course of its opinion the Court made the fol-
lowing observation (which incidentally furnishes the strongest
language in favor of the constitutionality of an open housing
law which research of Kentucky cases has produced):
The advance of civilization and the consequent extension of
governmental activities along lines having their objective in
better living conditions, saner social conditions, and a higher
126 Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Ky. 1964).127 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
328 This ordinance may be found in Harris v. City of Louisville, Buchanan v.
Warley, 165 Ky. 559, 560, 177 S.W. 472, 473 (1915).
.329 Id.




standard of human character has resulted in a gradual lessen-
ing of the dominion of the individual over private property
and a corresponding strengthening of the regulative power of
the state in respect thereof, so that today all private property
is held subject to the unchallenged right and power of the
state to impose upon the use and enjoyment thereof such
reasonable regulations as are deemed expedient for the public
welfare.331
Buchanan v. Warley332 was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, and the Kentucky decision was reversed. The Court
granted that the state's power to pass laws under the police
power was extremely broad and that this power may be used
to control property. However, it felt Louisville went too far
in this case and held that the ordinance violated the fourteenth
amendment.333
At first blush this case would seem to be anything but a
hindrance to open housing. However, the Supreme Court's state-
ment of the case's issue, if read with an eye toward the basic effect
of an open housing law, could create some difficulty. The Court
said the issue was: "May the occupancy, and, necessarily the
purchase and sale of property of which occupancy is an incident,
be inhibited by the states, or by one of its municipalities, solely
because of the color of the proposed occupant of the premises?" 334
What does open housing legislation do except inhibit the sale
of property "because of the color of the proposed occupant of
the premises." 335 It is unfortunate that the case was decided on
due process when equal protection so strongly recommends itself.
However, when Buchanan was decided, the Plessy v. Ferguson336
doctrine of "separate but equal" was holding sway and prevented
a contrary result. Nevertheless, the Buchanan Court pointed out
that the Civil Rights Acts of 1866337 and 1870338 passed pursuant
to the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, "expressly pro-
vided that all citizens of the United States in any State shall have
the same right to purchase property as is enjoyed by white
331 Id. at 569, 177 S.W. at 476.
332 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
333 Id.
334 Id. at 75.
335 Id.
336163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33742 U.S.C. § 1982 (1866).
.342 U.S.C. § 1981 (1870).
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citizens."339 This statement would indicate that the Court had
equal protection in mind even though it spoke of due process.
Regardless of the factors which might have motivated the Court,
it is in truth a rather extravagant claim that language in Buchanan
invalidating a segregation ordinance could ever be used to in-
validate a law having for its purpose the outlawing of a type of
discrimination.
B. Other Constitutional Problems
At this point the conclusion is that an open housing law
violates neither the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment nor Section Two of Kentucky's Constitution. When speak-
ing of open housing legislation in general terms, the only con-
stitutional problem presented is due process; however, variations
in application of the law or the identity of the governmental
entity passing the law can raise various other difficulties. The
remainder of this section will be devoted to a discussion of con-
stitutional problems, in Kentucky, of variations on the general
open housing theme.
1. Equal Protection.-In 1957 the state of Washington passed
an anti-discrimination statute,340 part of which provided that
publicly-assisted housing could be obtained without discrimina-
tion.341 Publicly-assisted housing was defined as that purchased,
repaired, or maintained by a loan whose repayment was insured
by the federal or state government. 342 The Supreme Court of
Washington 343 held that this statute violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and Article I, Section 12,
of the Washington Constitution which provides: "No law shall
be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation
other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corpora-
tions." In so deciding, the court did not feel there was any
"reason to suppose that persons with FHA mortgages on their
homes are more likely to discriminate against minority groups
than those who have conventional mortgages or no mortgages,
339 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78 (1917).
3140 49 WAsHi. REv. CODE § 60.030 (1957).
341 Id.
342 Id. at § 60.040.
343 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 365 P.2d 1(Wvash. 1961).
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or those who are purchasing upon contract."3 44 The court felt that
the law had the effect of giving those with conventional mort-
gages "special privileges and immunities,"3 45 that the classification
was "arbitrary and capricious," 346 and that it bore "no reasonable
relation to the evil ... sought to be eliminated.1347 The opinion
of the court had the support of only three judges, with two others
concurring in the outcome, but urging that the decision should
turn on what amounted to due process grounds.3 48
This case has received something less than universal acclaim.349
It is a weak precedent, not necessarily because of the split court,
but because of its generally discredited view of equal protection.
Since 1940 the United States Supreme Court has voided only
one economic regulation on equal protection grounds.3 50 The
Court has often reiterated the doctrine that, like due process,
equal protection allows a great deal of discretion to rest with the
legislature.3 51 Basically, only "invidious discrimination"'35 2 is
proscribed. Statutory discrimination will be upheld "if any state
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.''31a
The identical question also confronted the New Jersey,35
California,855 and New York courts,.58 but none followed the
Washington decision.3 57 New Jersey did not find the limitation




34sId.349 See Van Alstyne, The O'Meara Case and Constitutional Requirements of
State Anti-Discrimination Laws, 8 How. L.J. 158 (1962); 75 HAhv. L. REV.
1647 (1962).
35o LocKmauT, KAnasAR, & CHoPES, CASES ON CoNsaToNxAL LAvw 611
(1964). The case spoken of in the text was Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
35' See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).352 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463 (1957).
353 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
s54 Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481 (1962).3
55 Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. Rep. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313 (1962).
356 New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination V. Pellharn Hall Apart-
- ments, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1958).
357The Chicago Real Estate Bd. case, 224 N.E.2d 793 (I1. 1967), involved
an equal protection issue. The realtors argued that home owners and brokers are
both in a position to practice housing discrimination, but only brokers are re-
stricted. The Illinois court discusses a wide range of cases on this issue, id. at
802-07, and concludes that equal protection is not violated. The court (at 805)
felt it
evident that the city council was not obliged to deal with the evil of
housing discrimination in its entirety by prohibiting such conduct by all
persons alike. Quite the contrary. Pursuant to a realistic appraisal that
(Continued on next page)
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to publicly assisted housing to be an unreasonable differentiation.
"Absence of mathematical nicety or exact equality does not offend
where there is some reasonable ground for the separate treat-
ment. The wide scope of state police power will support such
treatment so long as it cannot be said to be arbitrary."358 A New
York court, faced with a similar classification, echoed these senti-
ments and emphasized the established principle that a legislature.
is not required to eradicate an evil in one broad sweep, but
rather may make it a "step by step proposition." 359
In addition to the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution, Kentuckians can also claim equal protection under
Section Fifty-nine of their state constitution. This section gen-
erally prohibits special laws "where a general law can be made
applicable."3 60 The Court of Appeals has held that "in order
for a law to be general in its constitutional sense it must meet
the following requirements: (1) It must apply equally to all in
a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons
for supporting the classification."36' These requirements prohibit
the Legislature from taking what the Court calls a "natural class
of persons" 362 and dividing it, arbitrarily trying to call each new
section a class susceptible to different treatment. The rule is
"well established that the classification must be based upon some
reasonable substantial difference in kind, situation or circum-
stance which bears a proper relation to the purpose of the
statute."36 This would seem to dictate a result different than that
reached by the Washington court. Separation of publicly assisted
housing from privately assisted housing is in no sense arbitrary.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
in this emotionally charged area of housing and race relations progress
can be made by cautious advance, the city should direct its attention to
the aspect of the problem deemed most acute. This step, moreover, will
not be deemed arbitrary merely because others, also guilty of the evil
of housing discrimination, were not included within the classification
selected. The sine qua non, however, is that under the steps taken, the
differences between those included and those excluded from the law are
reasonably related to its purpose. (Citations omitted.)3 5s Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481, 484 (1962).
359 New York State Comin'n Against Discrimination v. Pellham Hall Apart-
ments, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750, 759 (1958). The Supreme Court supported this line of
argument in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
360 Ky. CONST. § 59(29). This section also contains twenty-eight specific
prohibitions of "special laws," but none of these are applicable here.





Surely the state, while hopefully dedicated to eliminating all
discrimination, has an even greater interest in making sure that
those who purchase housing with government money do not
discriminate in the sale or rental of that housing. When viewed
in this light, an open housing law applying only to publicly as-
sisted housing should withstand constitutional challenge in Ken-
tucky.
2. The Authority of Local Government.-The state's police
power is thought to be a power which is inherent in a sover-
eignty. 364 The states, as sovereign entities, thus retain whatever
police power is not expressly denied them by the federal con-
stitution.365 Political entities within a state, the cities and coun-
ties, are not sovereign and possess no such reserved power. 366
Cities and counties are mere "creatures of the legislature."36 7
The people of every state have the inherent right to pass
laws for the public safety, health, morals, and general wel-
fare. The police power rests in the legislature of the state,
and no subdivision of the state may exercise that power except
through a grant made by the people of the state through its
legislative branch.368
Therefore, a city or county in Kentucky could not enact an
ordinance prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing without some delegation of authority from the Legis-
lature or state constitution.
Kentucky's cities are divided into classes by Section 156 of the
state constitution.
The cities and towns of this Commonwealth, for the purposes
of their organization and government, shall be divided into
six classes. The organization and powers of each class shall
be defined and provided for by general laws, so that all
municipal corporations of the same class shall possess the
same powers and be subject to the same restrictions. To the
first class shall belong cities with a population of one hundred
thousand or more; to the second class, cities with a popula-
tion of twenty thousand or more, and less than one hundred
364 For a general discussion of this, see 16 Am. Jun. 2d Constitutional Law
§ 260 (1964).
365 Id. at § 259.
3 66 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.35 (3d ed. 1949); 39 Ky.
L.J. 447 (1950-51).367 Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140, 143 (1879).368 Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 751-52, 7 S.W.2d 219, 223 (1928).
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thousand; to the third class, cities with a population of eight
thousand or more, and less than twenty thousand; to the
fourth class, cities and towns with a population of three
thousand or more, and less than eight thousand; to the fifth
class, cities and towns with a population of one thousand or
more, and less than three thousand; to the sixth class, towns
with a population of less than one thousand 6 9
The only city in the state qualifying as a first class city is Lou-
isville. The general powers possessed by the residents of a first
class city enable them to "govern themselves by any ordinances
and resolutions for municipal purposes not in conflict with the
Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States. ' 70
(Emphasis added.) The general powers of Louisville are also
granted in KRS 83.011:
The legislative body of any city of the first class is hereby
authorized and empowered to exercise all the rights, powers,
franchises, and privileges not in conflict with any statute now
or hereafter enacted which such legislative body shall deem
requisite for the welfare of the inhabitants of such city ...
to the same extent and with the same force and effect as if
the General Assembly bad ... granted and delegated to the
legislative body of such city all the authority that it is within
the power of the General Assembly to grant.371
The effect of these statutes has been to grant to first class
cities a police power "as broad as the police power of the state.' -372
However, the question is which of these two statutes grants this
broad power. The Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v.
Beasy,373 held that "Louisville had adequate police power under
the general charter for cities of the first class, particularly KRS
83.010, to enact a penal anti-discrimination ordinance. '374 This
is a rather surprising result in view of the sweeping delegation
contained in KRS 83.011. Apparently the Court of Appeals feels
that the delegation of power to enact ordinances for "municipal
purposes" is sufficient to delegate the entire police power of the
state. It is difficult to understand the Court's reasoning in by-
360 Ky. CONST. § 156.
370 KRS § 83.010 (1942).
3
7' KRS § 83.011 (1954).
372 Commonwealth v. Beasy, 386 SA..2d 444, 447 (Ky. 1965).
373 386 S.W.2d 444 (Ky. 1965). For a detailed analysis of this case, see 53
Ky. L.J. 812 (1965).
374 386 S.W.2d at 447.
KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL
passing KRS 83.011, which granted to first class cities "all the
authority that it is within the power of the General Assembly
to grant, 3 75 and emphasizing the relatively limited delegation in
KRS 83.010.
Kentucky cities of the second class 376 are granted "power to
govern themselves in all fiscal, prudential and municipal concerns
by ordinances and resolutions not in conflict with the Constitution
or statutes of this state or of the United States."377 (Emphasis
added.) The question which immediately arises is whether
"municipal concerns" are the same. as "municipal purposes."
There is no discernible reason for saying "concerns" are sub-
stantially different from "purposes" in the context of municipal
regulations. Thus, if Beasy is to be accepted at face value, it
would seem that second class cities also possess police power as
broad as that of the state.
Three other classes of Kentucky cities, third, fifth, and sixth,--
are given general delegations which, at face value, seem broad
enough to encompass open housing legislation. Third class
cities are empowered "by ordinance, [to] make police regulations
to secure and protect the general health, convenience, morals and
safety of the public." 378 Fifth and sixth class cities are empowered
to "pass ordinances not in conflict with the Constitution or laws
of this state or of the United States."3 79 They are also empowered
to "enact and enforce within the city limits all local, police, sani-
tary and other regulations not in conflict with general laws." 3s°
This group of statutes, taken in conjunction with the Beasy
case, would allow a strong argument to be made in support of
municipal open housing ordinances in second, third, fifth, and
sixth class cities. There seems to be nothing particularly un-
desirable about the Commonwealth delegating its police power
to municipalities. However, outside of the Beasy case, there is
little authority for giving such a broad interpretation to the gen-
37nKRS § 83.011 (1954).
376 The second class cities in Kentucky are: Ashland, Bowling Green, Cov-
ington, Frankfort, Lexington, Newport, Owensboro, Paducah. KRS § 81.010
(1966).
377 KRS § 84.010 (1942).




eral delegations.3 81 In his treatise on municipal corporations, 8 2
McQuillin made the following comment:
While a municipality must observe and itself not violate
constitutional or statutory guarantees of equality of civil
rights irrespective of race or social condition, insofar as these
guarantees bind municipal governments, a municipal corpora-
tion ordinarily is without power to legislate upon, or extend,
equality of civil rights.38
Thus, while it is certain that first class cities' would be empowered
to prohibit discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, the
general delegations of power to other classes of cities afford no
such certainty. Even though Beasy emphasized the general dele-
gation of KRS 83.010, the broad delegation of KRS 83.011 was
ever present, and though seemingly ignored, its effect on the
Court is uncertain. If "municipal purposes" justified such a
broad delegation, why did the Legislature bother to enact KRS
83.011? Under the Beasy case the latter section appears to be
merely redundant. Thus the powers of other classes of cities
under their general delegations are at best uncertain.
The general delegations of power previously discussed do
not furnish the only bases for open housing ordinances in the
municipalities of Kentucky. There are numerous delegations of
power contained in the statutes which deal with specific topics.
These specific delegations may also be quite important in de-
termining whether Kentucky cities below the first class are em-
381 See Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1964). A good example of a city ordinance
which was sustained in a state court is found in Porter v. City of Oberlin, 3 Ohio
App. 2d 158, 209 N.E.2d 629 (1964), and Porter v. City of Oberlin, 1 Ohio St.
2d 143, 205 N.E.2d 363 (1963). The Ohio court indicated that under Omo
CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 3, Oberlin has police power as broad as that of the state. The
Constitutional provision gave Ohio cities home rule. It provides: "Municipalities
shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt
and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary, and other similar regu-
lations, as are not in conflict with general laws." This is recognized by the Ohio
Supreme Court as delegating an extremely broad police power to Ohio's cities.
See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943).
It would seem that first class cities in Kentucky possess a similar police power
to that of Ohio's cities. However, there is actually no home rule in Kentucky.
See, Note, Municipal Home Rule for Kentucky?, 54 Ky. L. J. 757 (1966).
The Illinois court in the Chicago Real Estate Bd. case, 224 N.E.2d 793(Ill. 1967), raised the inference that a delegation to "pass and enforce all neces-
sary police ordinances," would be broad enough to support an open housing
ordinance. Id. at 800.38 2 MCQULLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPOAMONS (3d ed. 1949).
.383 Id. at § 24.430.
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powered to prohibit discrimination in the sale or rental of hous-
ing.
KRS 84.190 empowers the general council of a second class
city to "license, tax and regulate all trades, occupations and pro-
fessions.11384 Under this delegation it seems possible for a city of
this class to prohibit discrimination by real estate brokers. Indeed
the General Assembly has expressly recognized the power of sec-
ond class cities to regulate brokers under the above statute, for
in Chapter 324 of KRS,38 5 which deals exclusively with real
estate brokers and salesmen, the following provision is made:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall affect the power of
municipalities to tax, license, and regulate real estate brokers.
The requirements hereof shall be in addition to the require-
ments of any existing or future ordinances of any municipality
so taxing, licensing, or regulating real estate brokers.
386
In the Chicago Real Estate Board case, 38 7 a situation was
presented wherein an open housing ordinance was passed on the
basis of a statutory delegation to regulate brokers almost identical
to that in Kentucky.388 In sustaining the ordinance against a
claim that when the delegation was made "regulation" did not
include civil rights legislation, the Illinois court said:
It would be unusual to construe the power to 'regulate' to
mean only the kind of regulation contemplated by the legis-
lature in 1871, as plaintiffs suggest. That exercise in con-
jecture would be contrary not only to the policy of this court
to maintain the resiliency of the law, . . . but to the plain
terms of the statute preserving witdout qualifications, future
regulations of brokers by municipalities. 3 9
The reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court seems sound, and
38 4 KRS § 84.190(1) (1942).
385 KRS ch. 324 (1952).
386 KRS § 324.340 (1942).
387 224 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1967).
388 The Illinois statutory scheme is virtually identical to Kentucky's with re-
gard to regulation of realtors by second class cities. The only difference is that the
Illinois statute specifically names realtors. Cities and Villages Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
oh. 24 § 11-42-1 (1965). This difference should not be of enough significance to
merit a different interpretation.
389 Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 224 N.E.2d 793, 799-800
(Ill. 1967).
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no reason recommends itself why the Kentucky Court of Appeals
should reach a contrary result.
Second class cities also have authority to regulate "tenement
houses."390 This term has never been interpreted by the Ken-
tucky Court, but an early Ohio case391 approved the following
definition:
A building, the different rooms or parts of which are let for
residence purposes by the possessor to others, as distinct
tenements, so that each tenant, as to the room or rooms oc-
cupied by him, would sustain to the common landlord the
same relation that the tenant occupying a whole house would
to his landlord. 92
In other words, "tenement house" meant "apartment house."
Although there is some contrary authority in the meaning of
the term,393 a strong argument could be made that the second
class cities are empowered to apply an open housing ordinance
to apartment rentals.
For some unknown reason fourth class cities receive no gen-
eral delegation of power comparable to the other classes of
cities.394 However, they are specifically delegated the power to
"regulate, within the city, . . . any business licensed or taxed by
the state, and any trade, -occupation or profession."3 95 The Court
of Appeals has already held that this section does not delegate
the power to regulate or tax apartment houses.396 However, there
seems to be no good reason why real estate brokers could not
be brought under its purview. This should be particularly true
in view of the fact that real estate brokers and salesmen are
licensed by the state.3 97
In Kentucky's county governments the fiscal court is the
legislative body. The fiscal court is granted certain powers,398
3 9 0 KRS § 84.190(3) (1942).
391 Rose v. King, 49 Ohio St. 213, 30 N.E. 267 (1892).
392 Id., 30 N.E. at 270.
393 See, e.g., Kitching v. Brown, 92 App. Div. 160, 87 N.Y. Supp. 75 (1904).
394 KRS § 86.010 (1942) specifically empowers a fourth class city to do
certain acts such as sue and be sued, enter contracts, and hold and acquire land.
There is no broad general delegation.395 KRS § 86.120(1) (1942).
396 Martin v. City of Greenville, 312 Ky. 292, 227 S.W.2d 435 (1950).
397KRS § 324.020 (1956).398KRS § 67.080 (1942).
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none of which seem broad enough to permit the court to enact
open housing legislation. However, there is a possible source
for county action in the area of open housing. The Kentucky
Interlocal Cooperation Acts 9" provides:
Any power or powers, privileges or authority exercised or
capable of exercise by a public agency of this state may be
exercised and enjoyed jointly with any other public agency
of this state, or of the United States to the extent that the
laws of the United States permit such joint exercise or en-
joyment.400
"Public agency" within the Act means political subdivisions of
the state.40'
The question raised is whether the Act permits two govern-
mental agencies to exercise a power jointly although only one
of these agencies actually possesses the power. The Act has never
been interpreted by the Court of Appeals, and a -writer discussing
this point was unable to reach a conclusion.402 If the Act is
interpreted to permit interlocal cooperation in an area even
though only one of the governmental agencies was actually em-
powered to act in the area, it might be possible for a county,
acting jointly with a city within that county, to pass an open
housing ordinance. At this time the theory remains untested and
therefore speculative, but the vague wording of the Act would
clearly seem to permit such an interpretation.
The situation at this point is such that the only unequivocal
answer which could be given on local authority in the area of
open housing is that first class cities are empowered to act. In
spite of this uncertainty, the city of Bardstown, together with
Nelson County, has passed a comprehensive open housing
ordinance covering private homeowners and providing for penal
sanctions. 403 This ordinance was passed pursuant to a purported
delegation of authority in the Kentucky Civil Rights Act of
399 Ky. Acts, ch. 216 (1962).4 0 0KRS § 65.240(1) (1962).
401 KRS § 65.280 (1962).
4 0 2 Owsley, The Kentucky Interlocal Cooperation Act, 51 Ky. L. J. 22, 31-32
(1962).403 Bardstown, Nelson County, Ky., Joint Ordinance and Resolution of the
City of Bardstown and the County of Nelson, Kentucky, for the Prevention of
Discrimination and Creating a Bardstown-Nelson County Commission on Human
Rights and to Prevent Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation, Resort or
Amusement. Employment or Housing, June 14, 1966.
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1966.404 Covington, Ky., and Kenton County, Ky., have also
enacted laws, although their laws are much narrower in coverage
than Bardstown's. 405
In discussing specific delegations of power which might per-
mit open housing legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1966 is
highly significant. The Act's title would seem to disavow any
connection with open housing by calling it "an Act to prevent
discrimination in employment and public accommodations within
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. ' 40 6 Consistently with this title,
the various provisions in the Act speak of discrimination in em-
ployment and public accommodations.407 However, the clause of
the Act delegating authority to local governments is as follows:
"cities and counties are authorized to adopt and enforce ordi-
nances, orders, and resolutions prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, and to prescribe
penalties for violations thereof. .. "40s This delegation, standing
alone, is clearly broad enough to allow cities and counties to pro-
hibit discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. But an
interpretation problem is presented when the clause is read along
with the rest of the Act, particularly the title.
It could be contended that the Act does delegate such
authority in view of the fact that all other sections of the Act,
when speaking of discrimination, carefully limit it to discrimina-
tion in public accommodations or employment while the delega-
tion section contains no such limitation. However, a strong
argument can be made that, in view of the Act's title, the Legis-
lature obviously intended the whole Act to refer only to public
accommodations and employment. The Court of Appeals has
indicated the importance of the Legislature's intent in inter-
preting legislation. "The intent of the lawmakers is the soul of
the statute and the search for this intent we have held to be the
guiding star of the court. It must prevail over the literal sense
and the precise letter of the language of the statute." 409
404 KRS ch. 344 (1966).
405 See Appendix II infra.
406 Ky. Acts, ch. 2 (1966).
407 E.g., KRS § 344.100 (1966); KRS § 344.120 (1966).
408 KRS § 344.300 (1966).
409 Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 294 Ky. 122, 171 S.W.2d 41
(1943). The Court was quoting Bridgeman v. City of Derby, 104 Conn. 1, 132
Ad. 25, 27 (1926).
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If the delegation be interpreted to be as broad as a literal
reading would seem to make it, constitutional difficulties must be
faced. Section Fifty-one of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
"No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more
than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title .... 410
One's first impression upon reading this section is that the entire
Act is unconstitutional because the prohibition of discrimination
in public accommodations and employment are two separate sub-
jects. However, the Court of Appeals has not interpreted Section
Fifty-one so strictly,411 having viewed it merely as a requirement
that titles give "fair and reasonable notice of the nature and
purpose of the Act."412 This is "so that a member of the legislature
or any other interested person reading the title may obtain a
general notice or knowledge of the contents of the Act or what
it proposes to do."413
Section Fifty-one does not completely foreclose the possibility
of giving the delegation a broad interpretation. It is at least an
arguable point that the subject expressed in the Act's title was
the prohibition of discrimination in general, thus encompassing
discrimination in housing. There is some authority to the effect
that the constitution requires only that the Act contain nothing
incongruous or irrelevant to the general subject in the title.414
However, if one considers the basic purposes of Section Fifty-one,
it is difficult to accept this argument.
The 1966 Act offers a sounder way to empower local govern-
ments to prohibit housing discrimination. If it is conceded that
local governments are delegated only the authority to prohibit
discrimination in public accommodations and employment, there
may be sufficient delegation to allow a limited open housing
ordinance. The Act defines a place of public accommodation,
resort, or amusement as including
410 Ky. CONST. § 51.
411 The Court has often upheld laws which, like the 1966 Civil Rights Act,
seem to express two subjects in the title. See, e.g., Doller v. Reid, 808 Ky. 348,
214 S.W.2d 584 (1948); Carman v. HiEckman County, 185 Ky. 630, 215 S.V.
408 (1919).412 Board of Educ. of Kenton County v. Mescher, 810 Ky. 458, 459, 220
S.W.2d 1016, 1019 (1949).413 Engle v. Bonnie, 305 Ky. 850, 852, 204 S.W.2d 963, 964 (1947).
414 See Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 294 Ky. 122, 171 S.W.2d 41
(1948).
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any place, store or other establishment, either licensed or un-
licensed, which supplies goods or services to the general
public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of
the general public or which is supported directly or indirectly
by government funds .... 415
It should be possible to fit realtors, subdividers, and perhaps
owners of large apartment complexes into this definition. After
all, their function is nothing more than supplying "goods or
services to the general public." They are no less of a "public
accommodation" than are restaurants and retail stores. Large
subdividers who build and sell hundreds of homes, none of which
they have ever lived in, bear little resemblance to the private
homeowner who puts his house on the market. One who sells or
rents housing for a living, be it as an agent for another or as
the owner, would seem susceptible of being termed a "public
accommodation," as that phrase is defined in the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act.416
VII. CONCLUSION
A. The Need for an Open Housing Law
A solution to the problem of discrimination in housing rental
and sale is a modern imperative. The groundwork laid for this
conclusion has been statistically and economically oriented, but
it shows that discrimination in the sale and rental of housing is
a prime contributing factor to many problems of nationwide
concern. Research indicates that the costs of housing discrimina-
tion to the state, in terms of industrial expansion, federal grants,
urban decay, and a repressed Negro demand for housing, are
more than an informed and progressive society should be willing
to pay.
The human factors, however, are those which commend them-
selves to most proponents of open housing more readily than
415 KRS § 344.130 (1966).
416 There are very few cases which have interpreted the phrase. Rice v.
Rinaldo, 95 N.E.2d 30 (Ohio Ct. of C.P. 1950), held that a dentist was not a
public accommodation. However that case is not irreconcilable with the present
contentions. There are few parallels between realtors and dentists. But see Burks v.
Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. Rep. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313 (1962), where the California
court held that a statute prohibiting discrimination "in all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever,' CAL. Crvn. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1966), applied to
a land developer who built and sold homes.
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statistical and economic factors. In the final analysis, it is people
we are talking about, and the effects on them are the most press-
ing reason to come to grips with housing discrimination and
eliminate its more harmful results. The Supreme Court, in
Brown v. Board of Education,417 alluded to one basic effect of
discrimination against Negro children: "To separate them from
others solely because of their race generates a feeling of in-
feriority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 418
As this is true for children in the schools, so is it true for all
non-whites in forced segregation and in housing markets where
discrimination creates segregation. The feelings of inferiority
coupled with the abject frustration that faces the Negro may do
as much to break his spirit as did the open slavery under which
he formerly lived. A passage discussing the Negro housewife-
mother seems applicable to all ghetto Negroes:
In large measures [the] conditions which existed under
slavery still exist today . . . . [L]iving in restricted slums,
under oppressive conditions, forced to menial work away
from her home and her children, the Negro housewife must
have striking ingenuity and fortitude to be able to keep a
clean, well-kept home and to prevent her children from falling
into evil ways. 419
Sometimes they succeed and sometimes not; but the best we can
hope for is that only the frustration is passed on to the children
and not the resulting propensity for evil. And so it is. The
Negro American today is a smoldering person, highly aware of
his oppression and angry about it, but at the same time fearful
of the white power structure.420 His life is a study in anomoly
and humiliation, replete with superstition on the part of both
whites and blacks, degradation, and little or no opportunity to
escape the discrimination which faces him every way he turns.
It seems, then, little enough to ask that those Negroes who do
overcome these handicaps be allowed to rent homes or apart-
ments or to buy and build homes commensurate with their
417 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
418 Id. at 494.
419 DEUTSCH & COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HoUsIN 139 (1951).4 20 Cayton, The Psychology of the Negro under Discrimination, in MiNoary
PROBLEMS 210 (1965).
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financial ability in neighborhoods of their choosing. The white
community would have something to gain from the assimilation
which would result, and it should help and encourage these
people to escape the slums, the ghetto way of life, and discrimin-
ation in general.
Not only should this be desirable from the standpoint of
optimizing human resources and restoring basic dignity to valued
individuals, but it should be even more desirable from the stand-
point of encouraging contact between the races, reducing tension,
and getting on with the work of securing "the blessings of liberty
to ourselves and our posterity." 421
Finally, it would appear to be time for those who in fact
believe in the precepts on which the federal and state constitu-
tions are based to stand and be counted. Perhaps the undying
opposition to civil rights, of which housing is a part, is the opposi-
tion of a minority. For example, how many whites would be wil-
ling to bomb a church, dynamite a truck, or shoot a man in the
back from ambush to preserve all-white schools or all-white neigh-
borhoods? Only a very few would be willing to go to such extremes,
and the great majority is revolted by such heinous crimes,
cowardice, and mob rule.42 2 Yet there are those who are willing
to go to this extreme, and they may very well be the single most
important factor in relegating the Negro to his present position.
There are many instances where a white has attempted to speak
for the Negro. But then the castigation from the white bigot
is directed to the spokesman with characteristic vituperation and
name-calling. So loud is the philippic that all is silenced-even
the protection that might have been forthcoming from other
whites who might have spoken, but do not for fear that their
deviation from a norm set up by the bigot will bring the obloquy
down on their own heads. One writer has stated that:
Deviation from these norms [of discrimination] ... is difficult
[for many whites] because deviation may incur group sanc-
tions. Since deviation in overt behavior is most likely to
incur group sanctions, it is possible for an individual to have
a "prejudiced" action orientation without having sentiments
... appropriate to this orientation. Thus, under certain con-
421 U.S. CONST. preamble.
422 See ABRAMS, FoEMWDEN N=GHBORS cbs. X, XI (1955).
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ditions, it is possible for a group to be considerably more
prejudiced in action than in sentiment.423
Thus, realtors who broadcast myths about Negroes and de-
clining property values, blockbusters with their misrepresenta-
tions and opportunistic acquisitiveness, and midnight dynamiters
all serve to keep white property owners "in line," whether
designedly or not; the result being that the pressure propagates
the myths of the segregated society. These pressures on whites,
coupled with the other economic and racial myths with which
we are all bombarded, seem to lead to a situation where "a
militant prejudiced minority [is able to determine] ... the social
practices of an unprejudiced majority." 424
An open housing law would relieve this pressure on some
white homeowners when the realtor is the discriminator; it would
also take the pressure off the realtor when the homeowner is the
discriminator.425 In effect, a law would remove the advantage
the vociferous minority now has by removing the group pressure
it can bring to bear. Since the law would cover everyone, realtors
and homeowners could not exercise their discriminatory practices
by citing fear qf:economic or social ostracism. 426 The realtor who
sells to a qualified Negro buyer may still encounter some ostracism,
for "violating his agency status," but other realtors who attempted
to apply the pressure would soon begin to wonder whether the
first agent was not perhaps right after all when he makes a number
of successful sales to financially able Negroes who, in all probabil-
ity, will be accepted by their new neighbors.
These effects of an open housing law would tend, then, to
restore a semblance of equality and dignity to some Negroes.
The tendency would be to give them, their children, and all
Negroes the basic realization that they can escape the ghetto if
and when they are financially able. They do not presently
have reason for such hopes. The resulting motivation for self-
improvement could significantly ease the grinding frustration
of ghetto life and all its attendant social ills, not the least of
which is rioting.
423 DEUTSCH & COLLINS, supra note 418, at 418.
424 Id.
425 Louisville Courier-Journal, Oct. 80, 1966, § E, at 1, col. 4.
426 See text at note 118 supra.
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Admittedly, these reasons why an open housing law is de-
sirable are not so practical as the economic reasons. But they
are the ones which commend themselves to those who find it
anomalous that, in a country based on equality, there is none for
a significant portion of the population. And while the number
of people affected in Kentucky may not be large, a carefully
drawn statute which allows even one deserving person to be
treated equally in the housing market while alleviating some of
the frustration of others, not yet able to take advantage of the
law, should and would be well considered. Also, such legislation
is as much for the future as the present. Kentucky is a growing
state and will continue to grow with the nation. Civil rights
for all Americans is clearly a part of that growth, and there is no
satisfactory reason why such a stumbling block to modernity as
housing discrimination should be allowed to hinder its progress
in any way.
In any event, some arguments against open housing laws are
more in the nature of arguments that such laws are not protective
enough of homeowners and realtors who are not discriminators;
these arguments do not seem to be arguments why no such
legislation should ever be passed. There seems to be no insuper-
able reason why the legitimate objections to open housing cannot
be fairly met and a statute designed which would safeguard the
rights of sellers and renters as well as minority buyers. Senator
Dirksen was the prime opponent of the open housing section of
the 1966 Federal Civil Rights Act. Some of his remarks and
those of other opponents occupy seventeen pages of the Con-
gressional Record.427 This should be required reading for all
those interested in the open housing colloquy; it is the most re-
sponsible argument against open housing which the writers have
seen, and any legislation should take account of the points raised
there.
That discussion, of course, regarded a federal bill, but some
of the basic contentions apply equally to similar legislation on
the local level. Its main thrust is not that no such legislation
should be passed, but that the bill which is finally voted upon
should be thoroughly debated. Its basic proposition is that one
427 112 CoNG. REC. 21690-708 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1968).
1967] NomE
KENTUcKY LAw JouNAL[
citizen's rights cannot be guaranteed by denying another citizen
his rights. But this argument does not mean that no rights can
be guaranteed; it only requires that the measure be carefully
drawn.
The purposes of the 1966 Kentucky Civil Rights Act are:
To safeguard all individuals within the state from discrimina-
tion because of race, color, religion and national origin ....
thereby to protect their interest in personal dignity and free-
dom from humiliation . . ., to make available to the state
their full productive capacities ... to secure the state against
domestic strife and unrest which would menace its democratic
institutions, to preserve the public safety, health, and general
welfare, and to further the interests, rights and privileges of
individuals within the state.428
As these high motives are properly applicable to employment and
public accommodations in Kentucky, so are they applicable to
housing.
B. The Need for a Statewide Law
For much of Kentucky, the question of the need for open
housing laws is largely academic. Negro demand for housing
is based on income increment and growth in population, and
whether such demand is present depends on the quality and
number of jobs available to Negroes. Aside from the larger urban
communities, this complex of factors is not present in Kentucky.
The static or declining population of most of Kentucky's counties
testifies to this fact. Substantial population. growth, with its
attendant homebuilding, has occurred in comparatively few
cities, and the number of these communities which have shown
appreciable advances in Negro population is even smaller.
Moreover, the amazing rise in the income level of Negro house-
holds statewide has been primarily the result of increasing income
among Negro households in these large urban centers. Illustrative
of this fact is that, while twenty per cent of the state's Negro
families in 1960 had annual incomes of above four thousand
dollars, fully forty per cent of the Negro families in Jefferson
County were above the four thousand dollar level. Excluding
4 28KRS § 344.020(1) (b) (1966).
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Jefferson County, only about thirteen per cent of the state's
Negro households had incomes of over four thousand a year, and
the statewide level is even lower if Fayette County is eliminated
from consideration.
Thus, the most critical areas of the state are the two metropoli-
tan areas of Louisville and Lexington. The rapid growth in both
Negro population and Negro income and the potential for such
growth in the future, as Negroes are attracted by the better
employment such areas offer, suggest that in these two areas open
housing laws are imperative.
This is not to say, however, that there is no need for a state-
wide law. It does suggest that the demand on a statewide basis
for the passage of such legislation will be much less vocal than
it would be in the metropolitan areas. Unlike such areas of civil
rights as access to public accommodations and opportunity for
equal employment, only a relatively few Negroes, outside Louis-
ville and Lexington, stand to. gain much practical benefit from
such a law. The principal effect of a state law would be in its
relationship to the metropolitan areas. Even if Louisville and
Lexington were to pass effective open housing ordinances, their
applicability would not extend beyond the city limits. Other
cities that have passed open housing ordinances have found that
the effect of the law is to drive whites into the suburban areas,
while the city itself continues to increase in its proportion of
minority inhabitants. St. Louis, a city with an open housing
ordinance, is a good example. It has been said, in a discussion of
the St. Louis situation, that,
in the county, with no fair housing law, Negroes have had
some success in getting housing . . . but most of them are
being turned away. Rental housing in the county for Negroes
is "virtually unattainable." "Unless we get a metropolitan
law, preferably a state law, . . . we will be driving people
out of the city and into the county."4209
Louisville and Lexington probably will experience the same type
of situation as St. Louis should city ordinances be passed. If a
law applied to entire metropolitan areas, the effect of Negro
entry on any one area would be less severe in terms of the at-
420 Louisville Courier-Journal, February 29, 1967, § C, at 1, col. 1.
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titudes of the white residents and their desire to move. Those
Negroes who chose to move out of all-Negro areas would pre-
sumably be dispersed throughout the entire area. Instead of
neighborhoods being inundated by "home-hungry" Negroes and
the concomitant rapid withdrawal of whites, each neighborhood
would conceivably, and perhaps ideally, have a small proportion
of Negro families.
A statewide law would, then, have its main effect in extending
the protection of the law in those areas where open housing
laws are most needed-the areas surrounding the state's larger
cities. Of course, there will be some effect in any areas in which
Negroes reside.
It could be contended that the problems which militate
against relying on city laws would be solved by enacting a county
ordinance. To a certain extent this is true. However, even in
this eventuality, the whites who move in order to avoid Negro
neighbors need only move across the county line. Thus, the
oft-repeated fear that neighborhoods will be inundated by Negroes
becomes a real possibility. But under a statewide law, there
would be no premium in moving out when the first Negro moves
in. Few neighborhoods in the state would retain their all-white
character, but there should be no panic selling. Without the
panic, there would be no Negro inundation or possible property
value fluctuation.
An additional reason to enact a state wide law should be ap-
parent to all who desire action in this area. The laws are necessary,
but if it is left solely to the cities and counties, some of the state's
Negroes might never have their right to purchase housing in a
free market ensured. The situation in Louisville has shown that
increased pressure for a law often leads to increased controversy
and opposition.
Be that as it may, the suggestion is not that local laws are un-
necessary or futile. It has always been a characteristic of American
political philosophy that fear and distrust of government bears a
direct relationship to the distance that government is removed
from the individual. This seems to be a healthy philosophy and
not at all unwarranted. The individual is much more likely to
have his views aired in city hall than in the halls of Congress. In
recommending an open housing law, this philosophy must be
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considered, and if we are to take cognizance of political realities,
the philosophy must also be reflected in our recommendations.
Before proceeding further, let it be acknowledged that
eventually the federal courts or Congress will act in this field.
Few would deny that the best way to handle discrimination in
housing would be through comprehensive and well-enforced state
or local laws, whose combined jurisdictions cover the entire
country. However, this appears unlikely since open housing has
mustered little support in many states. Though great strides
have been made toward first class citizenship for all Americans,
there remains a great deal of discrimination yet to be overcome.
In any event, whether federal intervention occurs now or later,
action on a state and local level is not to be deemed unnecessary.
In the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964,430 the following provision
is made:
In the case of an alleged act or practice prohibited by this
subchapter which occurs in a State, or political subdivision
of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting such
act or practice and establishing or authorizing a state or local
authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to
institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon re-
ceiving notice thereof, no civil action may be brought under
subsection (a) of this section before the expiration of thirty
days after written notice of such alleged act or practice has
been given to the appropriate State or local authority ...,
provided that the court may stay proceedings in such civil
action pending the termination of State or local enforcement
proceedings.4
31
The Kentucky Civil Rights Act of 1966 provided that one
of its purposes was "to provide for execution within the State
of the policies embodied in the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1964 .... ,,1432 Thus we have a situation where discrimination in
public accommodations and employment is prohibited by both
state and federal governments, but through the above-quoted
section, the federal government is willing to allow the state to
handle the problem. Only on default of this responsibility does
the Federal Civil Rights Act operate.
430 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1964).
43142 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c) (1964).
432 KRS § 344.020(1) (a) (1966).
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The Kentucky Act carries this "local action" philosophy one
step further. It provides that cities and counties are empowered
to "adopt and enforce ordinances, orders and resolutions pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or
national origin, and to prescribe penalties for violations there-
of ... .,143 The Kentucky Act contains no provision to require
a stay in state proceedings if the local government passes an
ordinance, but it would seem that in most cases where the right
was enforceable on a local level, action would be brought on that
level.
In this series of laws, we are able "to have our cake and eat
it too" with regard to the political philosophy mentioned earlier.
That is, the most local law can be invoked first, and the con-
troversy can be settled by local officials. The basic rights of all
Americans to fair opportunity in employment and service in
public accommodations are established. However, those who fear
federal intervention and wish to keep governmental power on a
state or local level can rest assured. If state or local government
does not abdicate its responsibilities to safeguard the rights of
all citizens, it will be able to take care of these problems for
itself.
This is a good method of solving the problem. It is strongly
recommended that Kentucky, in enacting a statewide open hous-
ing law, follow essentially the same procedure used in the 1966
Civil Rights Act, with one exception. Along with the delegation
empowering city and county governments to prohibit housing
discrimination, the law should also contain a provision similar
to the federal provision quoted above, requiring suspension of
state proceedings where alleged discrimination occured within the
jurisdiction of a local open housing ordinance. This suspension
should be maintained until the local authorities have had an
opportunity to eliminate the discrimination. 34
C. Suggested Provisions for the Law
In determining the best type of open housing law for Ken-
tucky, one may consider either political feasibility, the ideal
solution, or a compromise between the two. Perhaps drawing a
433KRS § 344.300 (1966).
434 See, e.g., MODEL ANTi-DisaMINAMON AcT § 905 (1966).
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statute which is politically feasible would be impossible judging
from the pronouncements of the two 1967 gubernatorial candi-
dates435 and the reaction in Louisville to various open housing
proposals. 436 It is not, however, the purpose of this article to
play politics or to advocate a temporary or second-rate solution.
Rather, as a need for such legislation exists, only a law which will
satisfy this need should be acceptable.
Therefore, a comprehensive statute should be enacted, per-
haps along the lines of the Bardstown-Nelson County ordinance,437
which would cover all real estate except an apartment in an
owner-occupied, two-family house or rooms in a single-family
dwelling. By making such exemptions, recognition is made of
the sanctity of an individual's home while he is living therein,
yet an adequate solution for the non-white's problem of housing
discrimination is still provided. By including the rental or sale
of single family dwellings, the statute would recognize that these
are not, or soon will no longer be, the owner's home. Religious
organizations or charitable and educational institutions connected
with religious organization should be allowed to discriminate
along religious, but no other, lines.438 Therefore, such property
as private residences, vacant lots, apartment buildings, and com-
mercial space should be covered by the statute. The act should
extend to owners, real estate brokers, builders, lessors, financing
institutions, and any advertising connected therewith. 39 It should
also contain a blockbusting provision that provides for the
suspension or revocation of broker's licenses as a deterrent to this
practice. 40
435 Republican candidate, Louie Nunn, said he "is 'unalterably' opposed to
open housing forced by ordinance statute, judicial decree, executive order, 'or
by any means whatever."' Louisviile Courier-Journal, Mar. 25, 1967, § A, at 1,
col. 6. Democratic candidate, Henry Ward, does not believe "open housing
legislation is a 'proper subject' for local legislation." He would advocate that the
General Assembly pass a law prohibiting localities from passing laws which would
"make a man sell his home against his will." Louisville Courier-Journal, April 20,
1967, § A, at 6, col. 5.
436 See Section I supra.
437 See Appendix II infra.
438 This is a rather common exemption. See MoDmr. Ai'T-DiscamfINATION AcT
§ 607 (1966). See also Appendixes I & II.43 9 See MODEL ANTI-DISCBMIATION AcT § 602 (1966).440 See Id. at § 606. The Comment to this section says that "'blockbusting'
is carried on by operators who induce whites to sell their property to them at low
prices by playing on the fear that the neighborhood is about to be opened to non-
whites. The property is then resold at high profit to nonwhites who are prepared
to pay exhorbitant prices for decent housing." See also Appendixes I & II supra
for states and localities with this type of law.
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There are three possible methods by which the statute could
operate: (1) through an administrative agency, (2) by means of
a criminal statute which would be enforced through the courts,
and (3) by the creation of a civil action which would be brought
by the individual against whom the discrimination was made.
The use of administrative agencies to enforce civil rights is ap-
parently widespread and well-received. The use of the latter
two means of operation as an exclusive remedy has been largely
abandoned, for
experience has demonstrated . . . that neither of these forms
is successful in appreciably decreasing the incidence of dis-
crimination or in giving its victims an adequate legal remedy.
Prosecuting attorneys are reluctant to bring actions under the
criminal statutes, and, even when actions are brought, juries
are often unwilling to indict or convict. Individuals are often
hesitant to make use of civil action statutes because of the
expense, effect, and threat of community opprobium their use
may entail; the difficulty of calculating damages and their
inadequacy as a remedy for one whose primary interest is
finding a better home or job indicate that broad reliance upon
civil remedies would be misplaced.441
Thus the administrative agency is the only reasonable alternative.
It is logical that the already existing Kentucky Human Rights
Commission should be this agency.442 The administration of the
law could take place within the framework of procedure estab-
lished by the Civil Rights Act of 1966. 443 Whether the size of
the Commission or its staff should be increased would ultimately
depend on the number of complaints received by the Commis-
sion. As under the 1966 Act, individuals, the Attorney General,
or a member of the Commission would have the right to file com-
plaints.4 44 Also, the primary means of enforcing the statute, once
the Commission finds that discrimination has been committed,
would be by "conference, conciliation and persuasion" with the
party committing the unlawful acts. 445 The result of these efforts,
441 The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Anti-
discrimination Legislation, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526 (1961).
442 KRS §§ 344.150,-.190 (1966).
44. KRS ch. 344 (1966).
444 KRS § 344.200(1) (1966).
445 KRS § 344.200(4) (1966).
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if successful, would be a conciliation agreement 446 in which the
discriminating party would agree to rectify his unlawful conduct.
Should conciliation efforts fail, a hearing before the Commis-
sion would be held.447 If the hearing resulted in a decision that
there had been discrimination, the Commission would issue an
order stating that the property owner should "cease and desist"
from his unlawful discriminatory practice. It might also "require
him to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of the Com-
mission will carry out the purposes of [the Act] .... ,44s Such a
requirement would take the form of different actions, according
to the property owner in the individual case. For example, if
the discriminator was a homeowner, the Commission might
order him to sell the property to the aggrieved party if the seller
chooses to leave it on the market.449 Should he no longer have
the home on the market, the Commission should not be able to
force him to sell to the claimant. Such an order would be beyond
the scope of the statute and would be manifestly unfair to the
homeowner, who may have legitimate reasons for his change of
mind. Likewise, forcing him to sell the property when he is not
willing to do so would raise serious constitutional questions. The
order should be limited to requiring him to sell to the party
against whom he has unlawfully discriminated if he is going to
sell it at all.450
On the other hand, the withdrawal of the home from the
market may be a mere subterfuge by a confirmed discriminator
to avoid sale to the particular complainant. After the complain-
ant goes elsewhere to buy, the owner might again enter the
market and sell the property to a white. It would be wise to
incorporate appropriate measures into the law to prevent this
type of evasion scheme. For example, if the Commission, after
such a withdrawal and subsequent sale, felt that the party acted
in this manner to avoid compliance, it could itself initiate hear-
ings to determine if this was, in effect, a discriminatory practice.
If it did so find, then appropriate sanctions, to be discussed later,
446 Md.
447 KRS § 344.210 (1966).
448KRS § 344.230(2) (1966).
449 See MODEL ANTi-DIscRIMNATION AcT § 706 -(1966).
450 112 CoNG. REC. 21696-99 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1966).
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could be applied. In the case of lessors, realtors, and financing
institutions, an order of affirmative action commensurate with
their respective functions could be made by the Commission on
the finding that they were engaged in an unlawful discriminatory
practice.
The enforcement provisions of legislation such as open hous-
ing, which, to a degree, attempts to legislate morals, are ordinarily
the most controversial part. Such a law is considered by many to
be an infringement on the traditional rights inherent in the
ownership of property. Many who would agree with the under-
lying spirit of the law would balk at its attempted enforcement
by the use of penal sanctions. It is widely felt that such sanctions
should be quite limited. On the other hand, if the law provides
no remedy after negotiation with the discriminator has failed,
then it is for many a mere facade without vitality or substance.
A law without enforcement provisions can affect the attitudes of
both the would-be claimant and the would-be discriminator.
The former could feel that any action that he would initiate
under the law would be fruitless, and the latter, that he can act
with impunity.
Such being the case, some form of sanction should be in-
corporated into the act and in a form which will give the act
"teeth.145' There are basically two methods used to provide
"teeth" in open housing statutes. One is to provide for outright
penalties in the event that the Commission finds the law has been
violated. A discriminator, under this method, would be subject
to a fine, a jail sentence, or both. A second method is that of
having no fine or imprisonment for the discrimination itself,
but to permit the Commission to obtain a court order for the
enforcement of its decree in the particular case.452 Should the
discriminator violate this order and persist in his unlawful con-
duct, he would be subject to the sanctions of the court in con-
tempt proceedings.
The latter method of enforcement would be sufficient to
carry out the purposes of the act and to satisfy both the pro-
ponents and opponents of enforcement provisions. The property
*owner is not punished for the initial act of discrimination, but
451 See the discussion of events in Louisville. Section I supra.
452 See text at note 17 supra.
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only in the event that he fails to cease such action. This pro-
cedure provides the element of forceful persuasion which en-
courages compliance and yet gives the discriminator a chance to
cease his discrimination before any sanctions would be applied.
This procedure, while being more equitable for the property
owner, would not diminish the claimant's remedy in any way
nor discourage him from initiating the action. It is also more
politically expedient than the system of outright fines and im-
prisonment which could arouse public opposition to the passage
of an open housing law.
The only conceivable instance in which fines need be imposed
would be in the above described situation where the discriminat-
ing homeowner withdraws the property from the market and,
after the claimant goes elsewhere, re-enters the market and sells
the home to a non-minority group individual. Such a subsequent
sale might not involve discrimination if there was no member of
a minority group bidding for the purchase of the property at
that later date, but the established procedures of ordering the
party to cease and desist and to take affirmative action to remedy
the situation could not come into play. A court order for en-
forcement could not be procured. The only remedy for this
practice would be to permit the Commission, if it found that the
action was an intentional evasion of compliance, to have the party
fined for this evasion.
The rules promulgated by the Commission for the hearing of
complaints should be equitable and ensure the rights of all parties
to any action. They should make it clear that the burden of
proof for establishing discrimination is on the party initiating or
furthering the complaint.4 53 There should never be a presumption
of discrimination against the party who is charged with the un-
lawful conduct. The equitable nature of the rules so promulgated
should be subject, on appeal by either party, to review in the
courts.
However, the law as suggested could, if the basic machinery
for administration of the Civil Rights Act of 1966 is adopted for
use, be attacked as being unfair to the party charged with dis-
crimination. Under that Act, once a complaint has been re-
ceived, the Commission itself bears the responsibility and expense
43 112 CONG. REc., supra note 449, at 21698.
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of investigation and enforcement. The complainant merely sits
back and awaits the outcome of the proceedings. The person
who is charged must, on the other hand, expend both his own
time and resources to defend himself against the allegations. The
person so charged is paying not only for his own defense, but also,
in his role as a taxpayer, for the furtherance of the charges against
him. Such procedure is fine so long as the complaints have merit
since it encourages both complaints and compliance, But in the
case of an unmeritorious claim, it could be argued that the per-
son bringing the complaint goes away after calling into ques-
tion the reputation of the respondent.454 However, the statute,
if it is"modeled on the 1966 Civil Rights Act, would have ad-
equate safeguards to prevent this type of abuse. Under the pro-
visions of the 1966 Act, the Commission or a member thereof,
on the receipt of a complaint, makes a preliminary investigation
to determine if there is probable cause to believe that a violation
exists. Only if the answer is in ihe affirmative do the further pro-
cedures of conference and hearing come into force. If the com-
plaint is found to be without merit, it is dismissed at this stage,
and no further action is taken. The claimant, of course, if he
desires to pursue his action, may take an appeal to a circuit
court.455 Thus, the arguments that the statute is unfair to the
alleged discriminator are overcome by the provisions of the
statute which ensure that probable cause is present before any
affirmative °action is taken.
Another prerogative of the Commission must be mentioned
here. In order to ensure that the subject of the controversy, the
property in question, is not disposed of pending the outcome of
the Commission's hearings on the complaint, it should have the
right to obtain a temporary restraining order from a circuit court
prohibiting the respondent "from doing or procuring any act
tending to render ineffectual any order the Commission may
enter with respect to the complaint. 456 Should the property be
disposed of during the time in which the decree of the court is
in effect, the owner would be subject to the contempt sanctions
of the court.
454 1d.
455 KRS § 344.240(1) (1966).45 1; KRS § .344.200(6) (1966).
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In conclusion, it is to be stressed again that the main method
of enforcement under the statute would be by persuasion and
not by penalty. Experience under the public accommodations
and equal employment statutes as well as with open housing laws
in other states shows that the great majority of the complaints
which are filed are resolved during the early conciliation stage.457
The subsequent stages, including the possibility of court-ordered
compliance, exist primarily as "last resorts" to be used only if
conciliation and negotiation fail; so that they are primarily their
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457 See text at notes 230-81 supra.
45s Sections I & V; Appendices I, II, & IHI.
45 Section VI.
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1. ALASKA-Covers sale or rental of all housing, forbids discrimi-
nation in financing of housing and sale of lease of unimproved real
estate; also covers real estate brokers and builders. Provides for is-
suance of cease and desist orders, judicial review, and punishment of
violations as misdemeanors (fines up to $500, 30 days imprisonment).
Enforced by the Alaska Commission for Human Rights. Effective April
4, 1962, amended 1963, 1965.
2. CALIFORNIA-Covers sales and rentals involving buildings with
four or more units, and all existing publicly-aided housing; also covers
all transactions of brokers, builders and mortgage lenders. Provision
for injunctive relief, or damages up to $500. Enforced by California
Fair Employment Practice Commission. Effective Sept. 20, 1963.
3. COLORADO-Covers all publicly-offered sales or rentals (in-
cluding vacant lots), exempting rental of rooms in single-family
dwellings. Commercial space, brokers, builders and mortgage lenders
are also covered. Makes refusal to show housing a violation. Under
civil remedy clause, complainants may be entitled to damages. Com-
mission empowered to initiate and to seek injunctive relief. Enforced
by Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Effective May 1, 1959, amended
1965.
4. CONNECTICUT-Covers all sales and rentals (including va-
cant lots) except rental of an apartment in an owner-occupied two-
family house and rental of rooms in private residences, brokers, build-
ers and mortgage lenders are covered. Commission empowered to
initiate and to seek injunctive relief. Fines up to $100, 30 days im-
prisonment. Enforced by Connecticut Commission on Civil Rights.
Effective Oct. 1, 1959, amended 1961, 1963, 1965.
5. INDIANA-Covers all sales or rentals (including vacant lots),
commercial space, brokers, builders, mortgage lenders and advertising.
However, no cease and desist orders may be issued against owner-
occupants of buildings with three or less units. Enforced by Indiana
Civil Rights Commission. Effective July, 1965.
6. MAINE-Covers all rental housing. No enforcement agency.
Effective Sept., 1965.
7. MARYLAND-Applies to housing completed after June 1. Con-
tents not available. Passed March, 1967.
8. MASSACHUSETTS-Covers all publicly-offered sales or rentals
(including vacant lots), except rental of an apartment in an owner
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occupied two-family house (rentals of rooms in private residences are
covered by the state's public accommodations statutes by administra-
tive ruling). Brokers, builders, mortgage lenders, advertising, and com-
mercial space are also covered. Provides for revocation of license of
brokers who refuse to obey an enforcement order. Commission em-
powered to initiate and to seek injunctive relief. Enforced by Mas-
sachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Effective July 21, 1959,
amended 1960, 1961, 1963.
9. MICHIGAN-Michigan's new State Constitution has been in-
terpreted by the Attorney General to prohibit discrimination in all
housing and in all mortgage lending transactions. Enforced by the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission. Effective Jan. 1, 1964.
10. MINNESOTA-Covers sales or rentals (including vacant lots),
with the following exceptions: 1) owner-occupied privately-financed,
one-family houses (home with outstanding FHA or VA mortgages are
covered); 2) rental of an apartment in an owner-occupied, two-family
house; and 3) rental of rooms in private homes. Also covers brokers,
builders, and mortgage lenders with respect to housing covered by the
law, and all real estate advertising. Commission empowered to initiate
complaints. Enforced by Minnesota Commission Against Discrimina-
tion. Effective Dec. 31, 1962.
11. NEW HAMPSHIRE-Covers rental, lease, or occupancy of a
dwelling in a building containing more than three accommodations.
Provides for issuance of cease and desist orders, and judicial review.
Violation of order is misdemeanor with fines up to $500 and/or six
months imprisonment. Enforced by the State Commission on Human
Rights. Effective August 29, 1961, amended July 7, 1965.
12. NEW JERSEY-Covers all housing and financing. Exemptions:
Rental 1) of a single apartment or flat in a two-family dwelling, the
other unit of which is occupied by owner as his residence or is the
household of his family at the time of such rental; 2) of a room or
rooms by owner or occupant of a one-family dwelling which is
occupied by him as his residence or is the household of his family at
the time of such rental; 3) a religious organization or a charitable or
educational institution connected with a religious organization. Also
covers all brokers and mortgage lenders with respect to housing
covered by law, and all real estate advertising. State Attorney General
can initiate complaints. Enforced by New Jersey Division on Civil
Rights. Effective Sept. 13, 1961, amended April 7, 1966.
13. NEW YORK-Covers all sales and rentals except rental of an
apartment in an owner-occupied two-family house and rental of rooms
in private residences, commercial space, brokers, builders, mortgage
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lenders, and advertising are covered. Attorney General may seek in-
junctive relief; Commission may initiate complaints. Enforced by New
York State Commission for Human Rights. Effective Sept. 1, 1961,
amended 1963, 1965.
14. OHIO-Prohibits discrimination in sale, transfer, assignment,
rental, leasing or financing of commercial housing; (commercial
housing defined as any housing held or offered for sale or rent, except
the personal residence of the owner). The ban on discrimination in
financing extends also to personal residences. Provision for issuance of
cease and desist orders and judicial review. Effective July 30, 1965.
Enforced by Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
15. OREGON-Covers persons engaged in the business of selling
or renting real property, including vacant lots and commercial space.
Advertising also covered. Attorney General can initiate complaints.
Persons charged with discriminatory acts are notified upon filing of
complaints, are forbidden to sell or rent the property at issue until
disposition of the case has been made, and are liable to damages if
they do so. Separate statute provides for revocation of license of
brokers who violate the open housing law. Enforced by Civil Rights
Division, Oregon State Bureau of Labor. Effective August 5, 1959.
16. PENNSYLVANIA-Covers all sales and rentals (including
vacant lots) except owner-occupied one and two-family houses. Brok-
ers, builders and mortgage lenders with respect to housing covered by
the law and advertising are also covered. Commission empowered to
initiate complaints. Allows injunctive relief to restrain the sale, rental, or
other disposition of the property until case is settled. Enforced by
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Effective Sept. 1, 1961,
amended Jan. 24, 25, 1966.
17. RHODE ISLAND-Covers all sales and rentals (including vacant
lots) except rental of apartments in owvner-occupied, two and three-
family houses and rental of rooms in private residences. Brokers,
builders, mortgage lenders, and advertising are also covered. Com-
mission empowered to initiate complaints. Enforced by Rhode Island
Commission Against Discrimination. Effective April 12, 1965.
18. WASHINGTON-Contents not available. Passed Spring, 1967.
19. WISCONSIN-Forbids discrimination in sale, lease, and financ-
ing of housing where the sale, rental, or lease of the housing constitutes
a business. Exceptions are made for sale of owner-occupied housing,
small rooming house operations, and certain small-lot units. Admini-
stered by the Industrial Commission through its Equal Opportunities




Crry AND LOCAL LAws
Locality Major Provisions
1. ALBUQUERQUE, N. M.-Covers sale and rental of real prop-
erty and lending practices. Exceptions: sub-renting or sub-leasing of
any portion of an apartment or a house occupied by a single family;
also religious organizations or charitable and educational institutions
operated by religious organization. Fair Housing Advisory Board can
initiate complaints, investigate, and recommend prosecution to City
Attorney. Penalty of not more than $300. Enacted June 18, 1963. -
2. ANN ARBOR, MICH.-Covers sale, rental, or other transactions
in real estate. Exceptions are made in regard to rental of rooms in a
single dwelling unit. Violations punished as misdemeanors. Enforced
by Ann Arbor Human Relations Commission. Effective Dec. 20, 1965.
3. BARDSTOWN, KY.-Covers both improved and unimproved
real estate, brokers, and financing. Exemptions: rental of owner-
occupied duplex, of a portion of a housing accommodation by the
occupant of the accommodation or by the owner if he or a member of
his family resides therein, or by a religious organization or a chari-
table or educational institution connected with a religous organiza-
tion. Commission can initiate complaints and issue cease and desist
orders. If violation continues, Commission shall either file a complaint
for enforcement in Circuit Court or certify the case and the entire
record to the county attorney for prosecution. Fines up to $500 and/or
up to thirty days in jail are provided. Enforced by Bardstown-Nelson
County Commission on Human Rights. Effective June 14, 1966.
4. BELOIT, WIS.-Contents not available. Enforced by Beloit
Human Relations Commission. Effective April 1, 1964.
5. CHICAGO, ILL.-Declares that discrimination in housing is
against city policy. Forbids real estate brokers to discriminate. Com-
mission may recommend to Mayor the suspension or revocation of
broker's license if discrimination proved at a hearing. Also covers
blockbusting. Enforced by Chicago Commission on Human Relations.
Effective Sept. 24, 1963.
6. COVINGTON, KY.-All improved and unimproved real estate,
financing, and broadly-defined "salesmen" are covered. Exemptions:
rental of owner-occupied duplex, of a portion of a housing accom-
modation by the occupant of the accommodation, or by the owner if
he or a member of his family resides therein, or by a religious insti-
tution, or a charitable or educational organization operated by a
KENTucKy LAW JouNAL[
religious institution, if such discrimination is calculated to promote the
religious principles for which it is established or maintained. Also the
direct rental or sale of housing accommodation by the private indi-
vidual owner himself without assistance of any kind rendered by a
salesman. Commission can initiate complaints and issue cease and
desist orders. If any order is disobeyed, the Commission shall either
file a complaint for enforcement in the Circuit Court or certify the
case and the entire record of its proceedings to the city or county at-
torney for prosecution. Fines between $100 and $500 and/or imprison-
ment for thirty days are provided. Also, a broker's city occupational
license can be suspended for a period of not less than thirty days.
Enforced by Covington-Kenton Human Rights Commission. Effective
June 1, 1967.
7. DES MOINES, IOWA-Covers the showing, sale, or rental of
all housing and financing. Exceptions: Rental of two-family dwelling or
of fewer than four rooms in a one-family dwelling occupied by owner,
or of any apartment in a multiple dwelling containing six or fewer
apartments. Also exempts religious organizations. No punishment
except making all previous files regarding the violator open for public
inspection. Enforced by Des Moines Commission on Human Rights and
Job Discrimination. Effective June 4, 1964.
8. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-Covers transfer, lease, operation
or financing of most types of housing units and vacant lots. Real estate
brokers must post notice of anti-discrimination regulations in places
where rentals are made. Exceptions: rental or lease of unit by church,
or national fraternal organization, or a dwelling which owner is not re-
quired to be licensed to rent or lease provided that the owner resides
there during the term of requested rental or lease. All persons for-
bidden to engage in blockbusting. Commissioners' Council on Human
Relations investigates and attempts conciliation, but actual enforce-
ment is the responsibility of the Corporation Counsel. Fine of not more
than $300 and/or up to ten days in jail. Effective Jan. 20, 1964.
9. DULUTH, MINN.-Contents not available. Enforced by the
Duluth Fair Employment and Housing Practices Commission. Effective
Oct. 19, 1963.
10. EAST ST. LOUIS, ILL.-Forbids discrimination in the sale of
any residential housing by real estate brokers. Also covers block-
busting. Penalty of not over $200 for each offense. Enforced by the
East St. Louis Commission on Human Relations. Effective Jan. 29,
1964.
11. ERIE, PA.-Covers sale or rental and financing of all com-
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mercial housing. Exceptions: personal residence offered for sale which
contains no more than two families and is used by owner as residence.
Also religious, fraternal and private organizations. Fine of not over
$100 and not over thirty days in jail if fine not paid within ten days.
Enforced by Erie Human Relations Commission. Effective Sept. 1,
1963.
12. GARY, INDIANA-All lots, housing, and financing covered.
Exceptions: multiple family dwelling, or portion thereof, designed to
accommodate not more than three families, with separate units for each
family, where owner occupies one or more of such units. Also any
room or rooms in single apartment, any room or rooms within a single
family private dwelling. Commissions can initiate and issue cease and
desist order. If not obeyed, can seek a decree of court for enforcement
of order. No penalty provided. Enforced by the Gary Fair Employment
Practices Commission. Effective June 4, 1965.
13. GRAND RAPIDS, MICH.-Applies to units in housing ac-
commodations of more than three units, and to lending institutions.
Prosecution is on certification of the record to the city attorney by the
Commission. Fine of not more than $100 and/or up to ninety days in
jail. Enforced by Grand Rapids Human Relations Commission. Ef-
fective Dec. 23, 1963.
14. INDIANAPOLIS, IND.-Contents not available. Enforced by
the Indianapolis Human Rights Commission. Enacted July, 1964.
15. IOWA CITY, IOWA-Applies to financing, and all housing.
Exceptions: rental or lease of accommodation in a building containing
accommodations for not more than two families living independently
of each other if owner or members of his family reside in one of such
units, and rental or lease to less than seven persons within a single
housing accommodation by occupant or owner of such accommodation
if he or his family reside therein. Iowa City Human Relations Com-
mission investigates and seeks conciliation. Enforcement by the City
Council in District Court. Approved August 18, 1964.
16. KALAMAZOO, MICH.-Prohibits discrimination in sales, rent-
als, and other transactions involving real estate. Applies to owners,
lessees, brokers, salesmen, lenders, financial institutions, advertisers,
and their agents. Exceptions: rental of rooms to three or fewer persons
in a single dwelling unit where the remainder of the house is occupied
by the owner or lessee and members of his family. Kalamazoo Com-
munity Relations Board has no enforcement authority. Approved June
6, 1966.
17. KENTON COUNTY, KY.-This county includes within its bor-
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ders the City of Covington. The law applies to all parts of the county
outside the Covington City limits. It is identical to the Covington
ordinance except in two respects. It provides a penalty of only a fifty
dollar fine or thirty days imprisonment, and contains no provision for
the suspension of a realtor's license. Approved July 7, 1967.
18. KING COUNTY, WASH.-Covers all lots, housing, and financ-
ing. Exceptions: renting, sub-renting, leasing or sub-leasing of single
family or duplex units wherein owners or persons entitled to possession
normally maintain or intend to maintain their residence, home, or
abode. Also the renting or leasing either on a temporary or casual
basis and not the principle reason for acquisition of rental unit. Viola-
tion is misdemeanor. Enforced by the King County Sheriffs Office.
(covers the county's unincorporated areas-excluding Seattle.) Ef-
fective March 3, 1964.
19. MADISON, WIS.-Covers all housing, including mobile homes
and trailers, also financing. Exceptions: rent or lease to roomer of any
housing by landlord wha occupies such housing as the household of
his family and who-rents a portion of such housing to not more than
four roomers. Also the sale, rental, or lease of any housing consisting
of one, two, three, or four dwelling units, all in one structure, where
one of such units is occupied by the owner of such housing as house-
hold of his family. Fine of $25 to $500 for each offense. The Madison
Equal Opportunities Commission investigates and seeks conciliation,
but the City enforces. Enacted Dec. 12, 1963.
20. NEWHAVEN, CONN.-Coverage is co-extensive -with Con-
necticut state law. Commission can initiate complaints, seek temporary
injunctive relief while a case is pending, and issue orders. Enforced by
New Haven Commissions on Equal Opportunities. Enacted May 14,
1964.
21. NEW LONDON, CONN.-Contents not available. Enforced by
the New London Fair Housing Practices Board. Effective August 1,
1963.
22. NEW YORK CITY, N. Y.-Covers sale, rental or leasing of all
property and financing. Exceptions: the rental of an apartment in an
owner-occupied two-family house, the rental of a room or rooms with
owner-occupied one-family house, and the rental of a room or rooms
by a tenant occupying an apartment. Also excepted are religious
institutions, or charitable or educational institutions connected with a
religious organization. Commission can initiate complaints and can
direct Corporation Counsel to bring equitable proceedings in the
Superior Court, in the name of the City, for enforcement of the law.
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Enforced by New York Commission on Human Rights. Effective April
1, 1958.
23. OBERLIN, OHIO-Covers structures containing five or more
dwelling units owned or otherwise subject to control of one owner and
any parcel or parcels or lots available for such buildings. Also covers
lending institutions. Commission refers a case to the City Council,
which in turn refers it to the City Solicitor for action. Fine of not over
$100. Enforced by the Housing Renewal Commission. Enacted Nov.
20, 1961.
24. PEORIA, ILL.-Prohibits blockbusting. Also prohibits brokers
from representing in ads or listings a limitation on the sale or rental of
real property because of race, etc., of the buyer or renter. Also covers
financing and pricing. Permits owner of property to sell "to whom-
soever he pleases," and to list property with any restrictions he chooses
to make. Fair Housing Board receives complaints, holds hearings, and
makes recommendations to the City Manager concerning suspension or
revocation of broker's license. Enacted Dec. 30, 1963.
25. PHILADELPHIA, PA.-Covers all vacant land and com-
mercial housing and its financing. Exceptions: personal residence of-
fered for sale, which includes no more than two families and is used by
owner as residence. Also religious organizations and charitable and
educational institutions connected with a religious organization. Fine
of not more than $300 and/or up to ninety days in jail.
26. PITTSBURGH, PA.-Covers brokers and salesmen. Also covers
owner lessee, sub-lessee in a building comprising or containing five
or more housing units (either a single room or rooms) or an apartment
or dwelling owned or otherwise subject to control of one owner or
any parcel or parcels of real property or lots available for the building
of five or more housing units. Lending institutions covered. Religious
organizations or charitable or educational institutions connected with
religious organizations are exempt. The Commission can initiate, as can
the person aggrieved or an organization which combats discrimination.
Fine not over $100 or in default of payment, nor over thirty days in
jail. If non-compliance, Commission can go to court. Enforced by
Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission. Effective June 1, 1959.
27. SCHENECTADY, N. Y.-Covers all real property used as home,
residence, or sleeping place of one or more persons. Affects agents,
brokers, and owners. Exception: owvner-occupied housing for three
families or less. Commission can issue cease and desist order, then can
obtain court order to enforce rulings. Enforced by the Schenectady
Human Relations Commission. Enacted April 1, 1963.
1967] NomE
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28. ST. LOUIS, MO.-Covers all land and housing, also financing
and blockbusting. Exception: Rooms in single family residences. Com-
mission certifies case to the City Counselor who may prosecute to en-
force Commission's findings. Fine up to $500 and/or up to one year
in jail. Enforced by the St. Louis Council on Human Relations.
Effective Feb. 6, 1964.
29. ST. PAUL, MINN.-Applies to improved or unimproved real
property and financing. Exceptions: rental or lease of an owner-oc-
cupied duplex or rental of a room or rooms in an owner-occupied single
family dwelling. Also excluded are religious organizations, or charitable
and educational institutions connected with a religious organization.
Enforced by the St. Paul Human and Civil Rights Commission, which
receives and hears complaints, investigates, seeks conciliation, makes
recommendations for remedial actions, and seeks enforcement by ap-
plication to the City Counsel. Enacted August 13, 1964.
30. WICHITA, KANSAS-Covers any improved or unimproved real
property, financing, and blockbusting. Applies to ownes. and brokers.
Exception: rental of two-family dwelling or of fewer than four rooms
in a one-family dwelling occupied by owner, or of any apartment in a
multiple dwelling containing six or fewer apartments. Wichita Com-
mission on Human Relations submits findings to City Commission for
public recordation. No punishment provided. Enacted Oct. 6, 1964.
31. YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO-Contents not available. Enforced





THE FOLLOWING STATUTES AND ORDNANcEs HAVE BEEN REPEALED
OR ARE UNCERTAIN IN STATUS.
1. AKRON, OHIO-Enacted July, 1964. Struck down by referen-
dum on November 3, 1964.
2. BERKELEY, CALIF.-Enacted Jan. 15, 1963. Struck down by
referendum on April 2, 1963.
3. CALIFORNIA-Proposition 14, which became Article I, Section
26 of the California Constitution, was passed in a popular referendum
in November, 1964, by a 2-1 majority. It provides that neither the
state nor any subdivision thereof shall deny a person the right to
decline to sell or lease his property to such persons as he chooses. The
California Supreme Court, in Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (1966),
found the enactment unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection
of the laws under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. The State was found to be "at least a partner in the
instant act of discrimination," in that by sanctioning the popular pas-
sage of proposition 14, the state encouraged discrimination rather than
merely maintaining a status of neutrality. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the California Supreme Court, holding
by a 5-4 vote that proposition 14 violated the federal Constitution by
involving the state in racial discrimination. However, on April 13,
1967, following the desires of Governor Ronald Reagan, the California
Senate voted 23-15 to repeal the Rumford Open Housing Act. The
measure is now before the Assembly.
4. JACKSON, MICHIGAN-Enacted in 1966. Voided on April 11,
1967, by a vote of 5,826 - 2,886.
5. TACOMA, WASH.-Enacted Sept. 24, 1963. Struck down by
referendum on Feb. 11, 1964.
6. TOLEDO, OHIO-Effective June 9, 1961. Ruled invalid by the
Ohio Supreme Court on March 10, 1965, on the ground that the
ordinance was so indefinite that enforcement of its provisions would
be impossible. On the same date, the same court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Oberlin fair housing ordinance.
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